Putin's unsuccessful rate: As the Russian Federation lost marine confrontation with NATO
NATO expansion over the three years that have passed since Russia has started a full -scale invasion of Ukraine, has transformed the Baltic Sea - once controversial between the Transatlantic Alliance and Russia - to the NATO Lake. And now Russia seems to lose its naval presence in the Mediterranean.
The Baltic, on the one hand of which the Baltic States are, and on the other, new NATO members Sweden and Finland, each of which has powerful anti -ship means, becomes extremely dangerous for the Russian Navy, if it has to act there during a collision with NATO. Meanwhile, the Russian fleet is displaced from the Mediterranean.
Almost two months after the fall of Bashar Assad regime in Syria, Russian ships began to arrive in the Syrian port of Tartus - the main base of the Navy of Russia in the Mediterranean - within a clear evacuation. It seems that thousands of Russians and warships on which they serve are going to leave Syria . . . and the whole region. At best, the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean "faces uncertainty", says the new report of the Royal Institute of Joint Services in London.
In the worst - the Russians will forever leave the Mediterranean. The consequences for European security are huge. There are alternative bases for Russian troops in the South European and Middle Eastern waters, but there are not many. And they are far from becoming a true replacement of Tartus. In November, when, as a result of the sudden offensive of the Assad rebel coalition, Syria was rejected, Russian troops that supported the regime retreated to two of their main bases: Tartus and Khmeimim.
They concealed there for a few weeks, while Moscow negotiated with the new rebel government for further access. Negotiations, in view of everything, failed. By the end of January, the Russian garrison in Syria placed its heavy equipment in Tartus, apparently planning to send it to Russia's full departure with the country's destroyed war. The Soviet Union, and then Russia, maintained a symbolic presence in Tartus from the 1970s before the beginning of the Civil War in Syria in 2011.
The civil war changed everything. Feeling a favorable opportunity, the Kremlin increased the support of the weakened Assad regime. In 2015, Russian troops and heavy aircraft arrived there - and helped the old Army Assad to reflect. Hezbolla's troops supported by Iran also came to the rescue of the regime. The front line stabilized. Having received its reward, in 2017, Russia signed a 49-year-old contract that guaranteed it wider access to Tartus.
When the Russian Federation strengthened its Black Sea Fleet on the eve of a large -scale invasion in February 2022, ships left Tartus. Then, when Turkey closed the Bosphorus Strait for foreign warships in the same year, Tartus became the only Russian naval base for operations in the Mediterranean. For many years, this base was crucial for the projection of Russian force to Southern Europe and the Middle East.
The Russian Fleet's warships could be refueling and re -equipped in the tartus, depriving themselves of the need to carry out long and burdensome swimming in Russian waters. While in Tartus, the Russians had a serious impact on the safety of Southern Europe and the surrounding regions. Obtaining access to Tartus gave Russia the opportunity to gain a foothold in the south. At the same time, the loss of the tartus can deprive her of this position.
Especially considering that the Russian fleet is increasingly being built around small ships, such as missile corvettes with limited range and endurance. There are three obvious Tartus alternatives for Russia. None of them is good. There is Algeria, but "it is not obvious that the strategic calculation will be in favor of the placement of a permanent Russian presence," - said in Rusi.
Syria exchanged access to Tartus for military assistance, which delayed the final victory of the rebels for decades. But what will the Algerians get in exchange for large -scale and long -term Russian presence in the country? According to Rusi, "there is no explicit imperative in favor of Algeria. " The impoverished Port Sudan on the Red Sea in Sudan may be more hospitable for the large contingent of the Russians.
"However, negotiations on the creation of the naval bridgehead, despite the fact that they have been going on for several years, are still towed," Rusi explained. "It is probably a bad option as a direct alternative to Tartus. " Mediterranean surgery from the Port Sudan will also require transit through the Suez Canal, which can be an undesirable restriction. Libya may come. "Russia is already operating the al-quadim air base in the region," Rusi said.
"Tobruck in the East of Libya and perhaps bengas can be a shelter for the homeless Russian Mediterranean Fleet. " But Tobruck, in particular, may not be ready. "With limited repair facilities and the absence of dry dock, a small number of doors of sufficient size and disabilities for expansion, long -term investments in constant presence will probably be associated with technical problems," - said in Rusi.
Moreover, "any Russian presence in Libya will at least depend on the goodwill of Turkey," the analytical center said in London. And Turkish goodwill - in the shortage since the aggressive war of Russia in Ukraine. And this marine weakening will take place at the same time when the Russian fleet loses access to the Baltic in wartime. In the event of a contact with NATO, it will be difficult to create a serious threat to the Southern Flank of the Alliance.
Her ships will only be able to move from the Arctic bases, which are free from ice all year long (unlike St. Petersburg in the Baltic), but a journey through the Greenland-Icelandic-British gap and eventually through the Gibraltar Strait will be long and dangerous in wartime. Starting on the side of a cruel dictator in Syria, and then deciding to invade Ukraine, after which the Bosphorus closed, Russia has relied on its southern strategic presence on the maritime borders of Europe.