Opinions

A new stage of the war began. What changed on the front and what to expect on August 24?

Oleksiy Melnyk Center for Foreign Policy and International Security Center Razumkov Analyze the situation as of the last decade of August it is difficult to say for sure whether Russia will try to send us "gifts" on August 24 - on Independence Day. But given the experience not only of the last six months - Ukraine's Independence Day, as well as Ukraine's independence - for Russia - is like a red rag for a bull.

Despite the fact that there will be no mass celebrations, in any case the Russians will somehow try to demonstrate their attitude to this holiday. Perhaps once again try to show that Ukraine cannot protect itself from the "analog" of Russian weapons.

I would not say that one hundred percent should be what we have not seen (knocking on wood), but we still need to be vigilant and preventive measures of this day at the level of the country's leadership and every individual citizen will not be superfluous. Video of the day What changed on the front as of the last decade of August? You can talk about the positive trends that still have to be fixed. I would not hurry to conclude that Ukraine has already taken the initiative.

Because Russia, albeit inconspicuous, continues attacks in different areas. Therefore, it is no longer a complete possession of the Russian side initiative, but it is premature to say that Ukraine has taken the initiative in operational or strategic terms. At the same time you can really talk about a qualitatively new stage of war.

These blows, which caused the purposes on the Crimean Peninsula, had, in addition to purely military importance, an extraordinary symbolic effect and had a very strong influence on the Russian authorities not only in the Crimea. That is, we can say that a qualitatively new stage of the war has begun.

Well, in my opinion, one of the versions, which is now intensively discussed in relation to the attempt on Alexander Dugin and the murder of his daughter - I do not exclude that this is a non -Calus attempt at the FSB, oriented on Russian public - divert attention from explosions, that took place in the Crimea. That is, to break this information wave.

As for the real threats in certain areas of the front, I will rather agree with the position of our General Staff or political leadership, which is the entire front line, 2. 5 thousand km long. Any of these areas is threatening. Why experienced experience on February 24 is that it is almost impossible to predict the actions of the Russian military-political leadership on the basis of common sense.

This topic is now being discussed after the article at The Washington Post about whether signals from our Western partners were properly perceived, whether well intelligence has been working. So then there is also evidence that all these, figuratively speaking, classic approaches for military textbooks, Russia was not ready for offensive.

And it was a miscalculation, because they did not take into account that there were not so much the military at the head of planning, but the policy or their FSB-shrubs. Why I now say that provocation can occur on any area throughout the front line-from north to south, even in the absence of visible signs of preparation (in the classic approach). Well, and if you start from the available information, from the analysis based on military indicators, it is usually the greatest threat in the East.

Because there, the Kremlin's political goals outweigh the military goals or opportunities of Russia. For Putin, it is important to declare one victory - the so -called dismissal of Donbass. This is, of course, the southern direction where Russian troops are in a difficult position and Russia will try to strengthen defensive positions and counter -attack. Well, the threat from Belarus also did not go anywhere.