Putin will be fighting Ukrainians - as Russia replenishes the army by residents of occupied territories
Let me remind you what happened in 2022, when the number of military personnel was increased by 137 thousand (brought to 1 150 thousand), in 2023 again + 170 thousand (brought to 1 320 thousand). And, finally, the early decree adds 180,000 people in shape. In this case, the number of civilians remains unchanged. This fact is not about the "development of the Armed Forces" and their transformation, but about the banal increase of human resource for use at the front.
In the Ukrainian media, some of the observers have already stated that the process is almost evidence of our victory. Like, Putin needs people and he can't find them. Unfortunately, but such a logic, to put it mildly, limbs. After all, the previous stages of increasing the number of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation ended with staffing - people gained and, unfortunately, gaining.
Despite the great losses that sociology under the Russian Federation demonstrates the coming to the population understanding the true scale of the loss of their army. As an illustration of ladies, the data of the polling on the estimation of the number of Russian losses. But Putin needs people. More precisely, the human resource in order to continue attempts to achieve a "large -scale victory" and entry into negotiations on termination of war from the standpoint of the strong.
In addition, a demonstration of the reaction to the occupation of Ukraine by part of the Kursk region is required. The first days of the operation of the Putin environment were confused. Now, having tightened reserves and trying to counter, it is also impossible to declare a fracture - attacks are ongoing, but successes are very limited. Accordingly, the topic of increasing the number of the army is more than relevant to the Kremlin.
But the word "mobilization" is extremely frightened by "ordinary Russian". And it will be frightened, especially against the backdrop of captives from Kursk region. The situation (with the exception of the ages) is not new. And I have already written about how Putin "closes" the needs for human resources. There are several resources here-migrants who are under investigation, residents of depressed regions, mercenaries from abroad.
This mechanism made it possible to cover losses and even accumulate personnel for offensive actions. A simple example - I wrote a post in February, and in April the invasion in the Pokrovsky direction intensified. But such a mechanism has their "minuses". In particular, the so -called "lifting". People who have signed contracts with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in a number of regions receive "lifting" (one -time payments from the subject of the Federation) to 2.
1 million Russian rubles. This is considerable money, especially for low -income citizens. However, the practice is ongoing, and such persons should be credited to the state of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Therefore, the number of the army must be increased. What happened. Can you put a point? No. Hidden Russian mobilization has its own specificity - it allows you to compensate for losses and even accumulate human resource. But gradually.
That is, if you need to collect in three months, conditionally, 200 thousand people, you will not achieve the usual methods. More precisely, you can try, but significantly increasing "lifting". What Putin and his environment do not want to do, despite the available financial resources. Ordinary mobilization is extremely scared of the average Russian. As an illustration, I will again give data to the data. But the average Russian is scared of the Kremlin's reaction to events in the Kursk region.
Demonstration of loss of "great state" status or demonstration of weakness is a blow on the basis of the worldview of the population of the Russian Federation. That is, the Kremlin should also go to the demonstration of any mobilization measures, and to do so, if possible, imperceptibly for the ordinary inhabitant of the Russian Federation. On this we return to the topic of Putin's decree.
The number of the army is increasing, but it is not necessary to expect a sharp increase in the number of hired. It is possible to cover this difference by transferring the ages to a contract (which is already quite active), as well as mobilization measures . . . in the occupied territories of Ukraine. The latter is absolutely invisible to the "ordinary inhabitant of the Russian Federation", because in his perception there is "Russia" and there are some "new territories" that "not quite Russia".
And how many people will be sent there for slaughter, he is indifferent. And formally, the Kremlin managed to declare these territories in its own. So, you can take Ukrainians massively and send them to the front, fight against Ukraine. To then remember the old propaganda cliché of the "civil war in Ukrainian territories" on the external sites. The second component remains - it is a demonstration of some mobilization measures for the average Russian.
In order not to get to the front, but also to put the shape. And here, on the same day, another news comes. I give a quote: "The Government of the Russian Federation supported the bill on the right of heads of regions to create armed units for the protection of order and assistance to security officers during the martial law. " Simply put, in the subjects of the Federation, in addition to the territorial defense "in the border areas", state unitary enterprises are created.
In which citizens who are in the "mobilization reserve of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation" are recruited. That is, those who could get under mobilization. But in reality, they remain at home and several days a week perform the functions of promoting law enforcement agencies. For the population it is a demonstration of some action, the emergence of new raised in shape. For governors - the ability to maintain the labor potential of the region.
And for the Kremlin, when mobilization is still annoyed (which is probably enough) - a ready and selected contingent for sending to the front. But so far in the priority of the Russian Federation, I repeat - to send Ukrainians from the occupied territories to the front, and the residents of "Russia in the borders of 1991" should be held at home. The author expresses a personal opinion that may not coincide with the editorial position.