Three Russian bubbles: as Kursk Operation destroyed what Putin built his game

One of the most significant consequences of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces, journalist Alexei Kovalev considers the destruction of several basic myths that Russia sought to impose on the world. In the Foreign Policy column, he notes that Russia and Putin were much weaker than it was to think.

For two weeks, the soldiers of the fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin considers the Nazi regime to cross the border during the first foreign occupation of the territory of Russia since the Second World War. Putin and his propaganda apparatus - from the media to schools and scientists who rewrite books in history - treat this moment as a huge threat to Russia's survival, which can be compared with the real Nazi invasion of 1941.

It doesn't matter where they live and what they do-the Russians cannot avoid the allegory with the Second World War, which call them to mobilize against any invaders. However, the reaction of most Russians to the offensive of Ukraine to Kursk, which has been going on for the third week, was passive, fatalistic - simply shrugging.

Indeed, the occupation of the Armed Forces of about 1000 square kilometers of sacred Russian land, which Putin forces are still trying to restrain, destroyed numerous information bubbles in Russia and, as a consequence, changed the idea of ​​the regime and motivation of the people in the event of the West. The first bubble that was peeled was the Kremlin's perennial propaganda about the existential existential threat of Russia coming from Ukraine.

As the X professor of international relations of Jones Hopkins, Judzhins Finkel, asked the X professor of international relations: "By the way, have you noticed a wave of nationalist zeal and mobilization, which has become a lot of Russia in response to a military invasion?" On the contrary, there was neither mass social protest, nor the spontaneous formation of militia, nor long queues of volunteers in military enlistment offices.

Russian volunteers are now offered for contracts absurdly huge bonuses that exceed the annual salary of the average Russian, otherwise there would be no willing at all. No passionate speeches have united the Russians in defense of the Motherland, and no banners with patriotic slogans decorate the streets of Moscow. The Kremlin did not even give an order for general mobilization to reflect the invasion.

And the chief pressecretic of the Russian government Dmitry Peskov did not even manage to interrupt his vacation after the invasion of the Ukrainian forces. Most Russian anger is directed against Moscow, not against the likely Nazis from Kiev. The Kremlin -controlled public opinion surveys record a sharp increase in government dissatisfaction. Most of this anger comes from the inhabitants of the Kursk region, more than 100,000 people, of whom have escaped from the fighting.

Many of them complained that local authorities and Moscow were thrown and ignored. In the great disappointment of patriotic bloggers, no one in the Kursk region has resisted, joined the guerrilla units and did not even protest against the occupiers, as happened in many places of Ukraine. Throughout the Russian Federation, recruits are protesting against the placement of their unprepared sons in the area of ​​active fighting.

Social networks and telegram channels are full of videos that show massive surrender to Russian soldiers, many of which are inexperienced teenage conscripts. But the rest of the Russian public, whether because of self -preservation, or because of "learned helplessness", whether for some other reason, it seems that some or nothing at all is occupied by part of Russia by foreigners or not.

The Russians seem to understand that, contrary to their own propaganda, Ukrainians are trying not to destroy Russia, but only to return their country. Even military television experts say that Kiev could use the occupied territories of Russia in the exchange of "land for land". In other words, they correctly view the invasion as part of a strategy for the expulsion of Russia from Ukraine, not as a threat to Russia itself.

The second bubble, which flashed after Ukraine's invasion, is Putin's image as an authoritarian leader, built on the strength, order and promise to make Russia a lot again. His obvious inability to protect the borders of the country forces Putin, who linked his reign with the restoration of the lost Russian Empire, to seem weak. Putin has almost disappeared from the public view, as the Kremlin tries to diminish the value of the invasion.

On his official website, statements written by a high -steady bureaucratic language seem to normalize an unpleasant event. In his speech in the Security Council of Russia, Putin Euphemistically called the invasion of a "terrorist situation. " Calling local authorities in Kursk to deal with this "situation", Putin seems to seek to distance himself from chaos on the border.

It took Russian state television for several days to make Kursk the main news, but it never interrupted its regular entertainment programs for the sake of this topic. The news reports have added another portion of the absurd, as the fictional victories of the Russian army continued to take place closer and closer to Moscow. In television talk shows, prominent experts destroy propaganda building.

One of them suggested to "sacrifice" the border regions of Russia in favor of Ukraine - it is unlikely to be an idea of ​​power. Another demanded that the management stop lying and be more honest with military failures, and the third called for harsh censorship to protect the population from confusion. For the Kremlin controlled media, this cacophony was a fresh absence of conventional coordinated messages. There was even more honesty on telegrams that remain outside the Kremlin's control.

The third bubble that has been destroyed by the invasion of Ukraine is the promises of escalation of the conflict if it is jeopardized. The Kremlin does not consider the events in the Kursk region. NATO threat is no longer a topic for conversation. Russia did not turn to its own defense alliance, organizing a collective security agreement - as it could be expected if its existence had been put on the map.

And surprisingly, they shouted little about the tanks of German production that came to Kursk, where the largest tank battle of World War II took place between the Russians and the Germans. In 2016, Putin shamefully stated that Russia's borders would not end anywhere. Today it turns out that they also do not start with any specific point. This is probably the most significant result of the invasion of Ukraine into the Russian territory.

Each of Putin's former threats, including nuclear, was empty - and now even the actual border of Russia does not seem to be a "red line". So, another bubble that has flashed through the Kursk operation is the Western theory of Destcalation and "red lines" that make Russia look much stronger and decisive than it really is. Finally, the invasion undermines the idea that the Russians collectively support the war only because the polls sponsored by the government show.