The second wave. What exactly and when the command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation chooses for its "big summer offensive"
So let's try today to understand what to expect in this operating direction.
Thus, in this operational direction, the main forces of the troops (UV) of the enemy "Yug" (ie its southern part) are operating-the 8th general military army (ID), in the composition of the most-the 1st Army Corps ( AK), the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (IAS), which is almost all of all here, as well as half of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division (ICD), which operates here without one of its "full-time" Rifle Regiment (SME)-102nd SME tank-68th TP (both in Kramatorsk).
The 8th name in this direction is reinforced by the forces and means of the 68th Army Corps (AK), the constant deployment area-O. Sakhalin and Kuril Islands. It operates in this direction as part of the 39th Separate Rifle Brigade \ OMSBR (at least 2 motor-rifle battalions \ ICP + up to 2 motor-rifle regiments From the composition of the 18th machine-gun-artillery division (Kad).
Together with them, two separate brigades of the Marine Corps (MP) of the Pacific Fleet-40-A and 155-A MP, 40th acts in the lane of responsibility of UV "Vostok" (on its right flank), the second-155- And the MP, operating in the lane of the 20th MSD of the 8th ID.
In the sense of interacting with the "Yug", the forces and means of UV "East" (more precisely his right flank)-about the 40th MP, I have already said above, except for her, here are also operating units of the 36th OMSBR from the 29th OMSBR.
The name, a tactical group of the 14th separate special purpose brigade (SPP) and a number of so-called "shooting regiments of the mobilization reserve" (JV MR), formed from "mobicles", both recruited on the occupied part of the Donbass, and in the territory of the Russian Federation .
So, directly in the Kurakhiv direction operate: to this should be added from the warehouse "East": that is, the enemy has in this operating direction not just an advantage in the forces and means, but I would even describe it as a "crush" advantage . . . One feature. It is the most convenient, in the sense of aviation support for the actions of its terrestrial troops, the direction for the enemy.
Its army and operational-tactical aviation has the opportunity of close-located stationary airbase (AB)-Yaysk, Taganrog, Rostov-on-Don, Zerograd, Kushchevskaya, Primorsko-Akhtarsk, as well as the network of aerodromes of advanced base ("Podkokok") Aviation support for their land troops. The main factor is a small base time . . .
Over the last few days, the enemy has taken offensive actions in the following directions and areas: the enemy after a few stubborn attempts to move to the north of Mikilsky along a pair of landings a few weeks ago stopped this mastism and now behaves.
So, we can state in relation to the Kurakhiv-Vugledar speech, now the enemy is "concerned" by the formation of the North Fas (Flank), trying to move as deeply as possible in the direction of Kurakhovo and Konstantinovka, where the main forces of the 9th OMSBD, the 20th MSD and half 150. Ї enemy MSD. Moreover, the enemy can strengthen both directions, returning here the main forces of the 155th MP and involving the full 163rd TP of the 150th MSD.
Is it worth considering this direction as the future place of the enemy's operational offensive (or, as some call it, "the rotary wave of the Bolsha Latenese Redends") on the summer campaign of 2024? As for me, it is worth it, but in the second place, after the Toretsk or Slavic-Kramatorsk agglomeration . . . The fact is that even given the fact that, unlike the area of Toretsk, it is necessary to "form" only one faculty. (Flank)-North, because in the south it is already formed . . .
It still does not have time to do it. The pace of promotion in the Kurakhiv direction, although there are (the enemy still moves on both St. George and along the road to, in fact, Kurakhov), but they are too slow and small. And without this attempt to plan and organize a "great cut" of Kurakhiv-Vuglledar performance risks turning into a repetition of "Bolsha's attack on Kharkov".
Moreover, in his worst option for the enemy - "frontal" offensive, with muddy front storms and, accordingly, "gap" losses. Moreover, the desire of the command of the South to displace our troops by the Vovcha River in the Kurakhovo area is quite clear, though it seems possible, but in the near future.
First of all, from the point of view of the continuation of the fighting in Krasnogorivka and the minimum advancement of the enemy along the road Marinka - coal from the north (the enemy is essentially here further S. Pobeda has not advanced). And this, in turn, directly influences the "restraining way" on its ability to act in the "main" direction - both on Kurakhov and towards St. George and Maksimilyanivka . . .
In other words, we have a matter here again with "old song about the head of the head", That is . . . with the unstable flank of the enemy. Yes, it has a significant advantage in the amount and volume of forces and means deployed in this direction, which enables him to cover his flanks primarily of his tactical group, which is now torn into Kurakhov (20-A and 150-A MSD + 9th OMSBR ). However, only to a certain extent . . .
For the fighting in the Krasnogorivka area continue (the 5th OMSBR there will be copied for some time), and "on the outskirts" it is not possible to "renew movement". Exactly the same now with the "Operyn breakthrough" of the enemy in the Pokrovsky direction and the creation of the southern Fas of the Toretsky speech - flanks, flanks and flanks again . . . I think, during the first half of June it will be quite clear: exactly and when the command of the enemy chose for his " a great summer offensive.