Russia is preparing to attack: where, when and what will the Armed Forces do
Did anyone doubted that the mole wanted to continue to come? There are many variables in the topic of the next large -scale offensive, which is not clear anywhere. And it is that I will try to help you help you. Although this is only my subjective thought, and it is not a priori's quintessence of truth. Therefore. Today we can clearly outline 5 bridges and 7 locations in the war zone.
It is the left -bank Kherson region, part of the occupied Zaporizhzhya region, Donetsk region and Luhansk with locations occupied in 2022 and 2014, as well as temporarily occupied the Crimea Peninsula. As of today, the Armed Forces can prepare a counter -offensive at 3 locations. Left Bank Kherson region, Zaporizhzhya region, Luhansk region. There will be a thorough defense in Donetsk for a long time, and we cannot speak of the Crimea until the South is released.
For their part, Russian invaders can take offensive actions at only one bridgehead - Donetsk region. Other bridgeheads for them in the event of an offensive operation will become a platform for a jump in a meat grinder. And that's why. To date, units 8, 49, 58 ova, 22 AK, 35, 36 ova, 3 AK and others have been concentrated on the southern bridgehead. Quantitatively - it is up to 30 BTGR, the main part of which is concentrated in the triangle Vasylivka - Tokmak - Melitopol.
The mole regularly demonstrates readiness for offensive actions, especially in the direction of Orikhov and Gulyaypol, but there is one very important but. Currently, the RVV on this bridgehead is in a state of "rest" and receive, if not complete, then acceptable security. The provision of the entire southern group of the moles is carried out through the Crimea and the only logistics artery - the Crimean bridge.
For known reasons, the provision is limited, but sufficient as long as the grouping is resting. But they should get out of the state of "rest" and go on the offensive, the needs will increase sharply, and the resource of the transit node of the Crimea will be enough for no more than 2 weeks of active offensive actions. That is, in the offensive, the moles will exhale very quickly on this bridgehead and… and all. Goodbye, southern bridgehead.
The Russians lose control of the south with thermonuclear acceleration. From this we can conclude that any activity in the south for moles will be suicide. At the same time, in the case of the Armed Forces, the need for the MTO will also increase, as they will have to go into defense, which also increases the costs of everything and everything. That is, any activity, which is offensive or defensive, is undesirable for moles. The situation is somewhat different compared to the Zaporozhye region.
First of all, in the presence of direct logistics from Russia, it can be divided into 2 zones - Swativ and Starobilsk. If we talk about the offensive, then the threat is only from the Swatt-Kremin Location. But it is here that the main arteries, including the R-66 route, are already under the fire control of the Armed Forces.
In addition, the units are concentrated in this sector, although numerous, but to put it mildly, they are not staffed with equipment to the level that "lost their combat capability. " If we talk about the offensive of the Lugansk bridgehead, their problem will be a very rapid waste of the resource and the inability of maintenance of occupied territories, as well as loss as a result of the counter -offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine occupied in 2022 locations. Actually . . . not an option.
It is the only bridgehead from which the mole can now make the offensive. Logistics is somehow, but it works better than others. The presence of forces and means is very large. Only 32 BTGRs were concentrated near the Bakhmut bridgehead, however, of varying degrees of combat capability. In the case of an increase in the Donetsk group to an additional 30 BTGR and more moles, the offensive in this area may well be more active than suicidal reflections under Bakhmut.
But in this threatening perspective, it also has its own. And not one thing. First of all, in this location, one of the most saturated and stable lines of defense of the Armed Forces, and therefore even in the presence of a Blitzkrig resource will not work. Possible jerk with situational effectiveness of tactical levels and tremendous losses. Not more. Another very significant but is the presence of additional 30 BTGRs or more.
In the current environment, the emergence of such a resource in this location is possible only in the case of collection of them from other bridgeheads, which is a weakening. And where the weakening of the bridgehead is the inevitable counter -offensive of the Armed Forces. For the offensive of Russia is limited the choice of bridgeheads. Yes, it can be used by everyone, but only one or less can be suitable for offensive surgery. However, it requires a resource that is not available now.
Can he appear? But can. Continuation of mobilization in a larger and more repressive format can provide the rov with the necessary resource for the offensive. But it will be an exclusively infantry component, since it is not capable of providing troops in such a number of MIC. Preventing the offensive in this format is possible in the presence of a number of factors, but I will only mention two.
The first is a sufficient amount of artillery and BC so that all this mobilization potential of the Russian Federation is stored in its embryo. The second is the counter -offensive of the Armed Forces at one of the bridges. The second is due to its utility because compensation for the losses for the moles is an urgent and very painful problem. And not because they are sorry for their people - no, but because they have a problem with their formation, providing and general compensation for losses.