Kadyrov will leave - but Putin will remain. Why hope for the death of Chechen leader is greatly exaggerated
Some have suggested that he was in a hospital in Moscow, where he was treated with kidney problems, others - that he was suffering from the negative effects of drug addiction, and the minor even declared his death. Rumors about the deterioration of Kadyrov's health have been circulating for several years.
The difference this time was that it attracted much more international attention, perhaps because of the key role, which was self -proclaimed by President Vladimir Putin, played in the war in Ukraine, especially on the propaganda front. It seems that in some circles it is hoped that in the case of a grueling illness or death of Kadyrov Chechnya and, as a consequence, Russia will be destabilized, which will help Ukraine to win the war. But this development is unlikely.
In fact, the health of Chechnya is not of great importance. The regime in the Chechen Republic retains a high level of stability both within the country and in relations with Moscow. Kadyrov's power is based on two pillars: the lack of political rivals that can challenge his rule, and his close ties with Putin. Having accepted the steering wheel from his father Ahmat, killed in 2004, Kadyrov systematically sought to eliminate anyone who could threaten his position.
Critics and rivals were killed or were forced to flee abroad where they live, fearing to become victims. Kadyrov also consolidated his position, establishing personal ties with Putin. Their relationship, which is commonly called family, almost parental, is closer than any other Russian presidential relations with a regional leader. In exchange for blind, Putin's loyalty Kadyrov receives considerable funds from the federal budget.
In fact, Chechnya is one of the most subsidized regions of Russia; According to her leader, she will not last a month without funding from Moscow. However, his illness or death will not stop the influx of these funds, as the Kremlin perceives them as a way of buying stability and peace in the republic, which was affected by the two wars in the 1990s. Kadyrov is also not indispensable. Although there is a significant personalization of power in Chechnya, he does not represent the whole regime.
It is at the top of the hierarchy of the regime, but does not bear the same responsibility for its function; There are a number of influential people who manage various aspects of management. Chechnya Parliament Speaker Magomed Daudov and Viceremier Abuside Bismadov are in charge of internal affairs, in particular, repression against the public and maintaining stability. Both have the reputation of people who are prone to extreme violence and were involved in torture.
After a full -scale invasion of Russia into Ukraine, this couple also controlled the transfer of Chechen fighters to the battlefield. Prime Minister Muslim Huchiev manages public administration operations. He is a traditional bureaucrat that has held many government positions. Huchiev also performed the duties of Chechnya, repeatedly replacing Kadyrov, in particular at the beginning of this year, when he went on vacation.
Adam Delimhanov, the most accurate assistant Kadyrov and a member of the Russian Duma, controls informal, often criminal operations of the regime outside Chechnya. He is responsible for suppressing the opposition of Kadyrov among the Chechen diaspora and is accused of organizing several killings. He also played a prominent public role in Russia's military campaign in Ukraine, placing troops in the occupied territories together with Chechen forces.
If Cadyrov becomes incapacitated or dies, these influential figures will be able to continue the activity of his regime, and at the same time one of them will be the acting head of the region. Kadyrov also prepares his eldest son Akhmat as his successor, although he is about seven years old before reaching the age prescribed by law in order to become a governor. In March, on the eve of the wedding, Kadyrov Jr. met with Putin in Moscow.
This meeting became the most striking indicator of Akhmat's authority and marked the beginning of a multi -year -old number of official responsibilities of the eldest son Kadyrov. The Kremlin is likely to accept Akhmat as Ramzan's successor not only because his father wants it, but also because it maintains the current structure of relations. This preserves Chechnya as a political constant, not as an unpredictable vassal region.
Regardless of whether Akhmat will accept power from his father, whether a temporary figure will appear like Daudov or Delimhanov, the Chechnya regime will remain intact if Kadyrov suddenly leaves his position. In the event of a change in leadership, stability in the North Caucasian Republic also guarantees its powerful repressive apparatus, which quickly eradicates any form of opposition for its appearance. Recently, Kadyrov's regime has been showing a lower threshold of force.
For example, in September last year, after Moscow announced partial mobilization, Chechen women went to the thunderstorm to protest against this decision. The protesters of the special services were taken to the City Hall of Grozny and beaten, and their male relatives were forcibly sent to the front to Ukraine. In December, a large-scale action was held in the Chechen city of the Urus-Martan in the Chechen city of Urran-Martan, who witnessed and recorded the incident on their phones.
It is reported that the power in the Grozny annoyed that the locals had fun with this quarrel. The cruelty of the regime can be interpreted as a sign of its fundamental weakness, lack of folk legitimacy. However, it is effective in suppressing protest and maintaining control, and its ability to do it will not deteriorate if something happens to Cadirov. Chechen population opportunities for armed resistance are also limited.
In the 1990s, Chechens fought for independence from Russia, but were defeated in the Second Russo-Chechen War. The local uprising, which lasted over the next decade, was suppressed, and many fighters left the republic. Today, the bulk of the Chechen opposition forces has moved to Ukraine to continue the fight against Russia. Earlier this year, they took part in key battles, successfully defending Kiev, freeing raisins and fighting under Bakhmut.
However, they do not have a clear path to return home. The transition of land from the South Caucasus is now impossible. Georgia is still unfriendly to the Chechens because of their difficult history of conflicts and unsuccessful attempts to use militants from the region. Azerbaijan would also not allow Chechen fighters to pass through their territory for their own safety reasons and unwillingness to merge Moscow.
Any resistance organized in Chechnya will face a serious problem with limited weapons supplies. Some hiding places with weapons remaining after the rebel movements of the 2000s are still hidden in the forest, but their number and suitability for use are doubtful. The Kadyrov regime dealt with the illegal possession of weapons and weapons. The war in Ukraine may increase the availability of weapons within Russia, but this will not be enough to create significant forces of armed resistance.
Kadyrov also takes measures to prevent a new rebellion. He reduced the number of Chechen troops fighting in Ukraine during the first few months of the war, and in the summer of last year he ordered the safety services to be better prepared for underground battles. Of course, he can also count on Moscow's military support in case of internal differences. A grueling disease or even the death of a Chechen head will not reduce the ability of the regime to suppress any dissent or armed resistance.