Asymmetrical threats and accessible ships. As Ukraine changes war on sea
Ukraine, on the contrary, is a heroic state on the edge of the confrontation between the Russian invasion. Thanks to the help of the event and effective innovation, the Ukrainian military, although mostly in the handicraft manner, quickly found the use of commercially accessible drone, developing and introducing unmanned systems for air, marine and ground attacks.
Despite the lack of its own warships, Ukraine does not allow to relax the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation either in the sea or in the ports. In short, using commercially accessible or own inexpensive drone systems and anti -ship winged rockets, you can challenge the enemy forces that technologically and numerically prevail. Focus has translated Mike NickerBoker's article about asymmetrical threats and non -exicipal ships in the Black and Red Seas.
Missiles are modern technique, but boats with explosives are not quite. Their use began during the Civil War in the United States, and recently they proved efficiency when Al-Qaida struck the US Navy ship in 2000. Methods for the use of winged rockets and flying unmanned platforms are simple, as well as protection against them.
The US Navy, their partners and allies should use commercial unmanned technologies to increase the survival of floating agents in the face of threats associated with unmanned systems and winged missiles. These solutions are somewhere in the middle between the main and expensive platforms, which are currently being developed, especially in the field of non -ex -circular surfaces, and mass, "costly" options that create within the Replicator initiative.
Successes, albeit sporadic, demonstrated the potential of unpretentious drones and rocket attacks. It will have far -reaching consequences outside the Black and Red Seas. Currently, the world's most powerful armed forces seek to create both commercially accessible and more complex, high -tech unmanned systems.
However, it was clearly understood by the US Navy in their plans to unite the non -expelled and crew platforms in the future fleet, capital ships and crews will not disappear in the near future. This means that the US Navy will have to decide how to invest funds to increase its own capabilities with the help of unmanned systems and to protect against asymmetric unmanned threats emanating from state and non -state entities.
In many cases, the best way to resist any potential is to have a similar potential. Considering the threat of unmanned systems in the marine environment, it is important to study the current options for their use and how they support or reinforce old man -made platforms. Unmanned systems increase intelligence, observation and reconnaissance efficiency; mortality by capturing the goals or causing accurate blows; logistics and supply operations; as well as the protection of one's own strength.
Although many experts draw the future when the war is conducted by armies, which are fully composed of unmanned autonomous systems, technologies and international law yet. In the near future, leaders will probably continue to demand people from making key solutions when defining and destroying goals.
Reliable - read, expensive - unmanned platforms can seem like a solution in the event of high -tech confrontation, but the presence of less expensive aircraft and demonstrated by them push for the use of a mixed approach. As recent clashes in the Red Sea have shown, we must take into account the cost of a weapon or platform that can be destroyed or damaged during a collision with an inexpensive threat.
If the systems are expensive, they cannot be affected, since the cost and time of their replacement may be excessively high during budget restrictions. Less expensive systems produced in large numbers can be a more cost -effective solution, based on circumstances related to the mission requirements. In particular, the US Navy should not completely give up plans to create large and medium -sized surfaces, but they should review costs.
The cost of reliable platforms varies from $ 35 to more than $ 100 million apiece, while small platforms, deployed on crew ships, are much cheaper. Effective conducting distributed maritime operations in conditions of intensive confrontation depends on the increase not only of the capacity, but also the survivability of key platforms, provided that the opportunities and results of intelligence, observation and reconstruction, as well as radio -electronic control against the enemy forces.
However, completely autonomous systems can now operate in combination with ships, performing the functions of their protection. Similar to unmanned aircraft with a fixed wing, non -ex -watering ships should be developed to accompany and expand the capabilities of manned ships, especially in the field of electronic warfare, non -ex -circular surface protection and integrated defense.
Current considerations that unmanned systems will support the protection of forces based on increasing situational awareness of terrestrial forces. This requires that the systems fly in front of or next to the column, using different sensors to detect potential ambushes or homemade explosive devices. Similarly, large intelligence platforms, such as MQ-4C Triton, provide awareness of the sea space for commanders in the sea, identifying and identifying marine contacts.
Such methods of protection of forces are intended to increase the response time to the threat. The US Navy even plans to experiment with armed non -exchanged surface ships to protect ships and marines on the shore. There is only a lacking platform that would be actively involved in defensive actions by the protected object or port.
The US Navy and their allies should develop platforms in which priority is given to counteracting, as well as physical blocking and restraint of entrance vessels in order to resist rocket threats and explosive non -exhibit surfaces.
Anti -air defense lessons obtained during the Falkland War, as well as gaps and shortcomings found in existing defensive systems, convincingly prove the need to equip the unmanned physical and electronic counteraction to increase the potential and capabilities a non -traveling surface that accompanies. The tactics of mild lesions remain more effective in terms of success and cost.
A vulnerable platform capable of applying mild lesions and physically intercept of input overwater threats, explosive non -trafficed overwill vessels or pirates, but at the same time quite compact for placement on various military and civilian vessels, will become an economically effective means of combating asymmetric and rocket.
In addition to protecting ships in the sea, a non -ex -surface of the accompaniment can provide critically important scalable potential that can be spread in various seaports to strengthen deep -penetrated defense of civilian port and deployed port units, whether the Navy or the USE.
The non-traffic supplement of the accompaniment can be equipped with a version of the Mark 36 OFF-BOARD CAFF Launcher, a pre-charged combination of six anti-aircraft shells, designed for remote or autonomous interaction with a radio-electronic fight assembly assigned to it. The non -traveling defense vessel will be able to maneuver depending on the wind to ensure optimal use of anti -aircraft shells.
Such a scheme will work in areas where the protected ship is limited in maneuverability, for example, if it performs flight operations or passes through a barrier. If the non -traveling defense vessel is able to carry six shells and the protected ship will be able to deploy four drones, it will double the affordable measures to counter for the ARleigh Burke destroyer. The future variants of this concept should include a built -in complex of radio electronic struggle to detect and muffle signals.
This will allow the non -traveling vessel to protect themselves from incoming threats and possibly knock down missiles from the course through active obstacles. Low board and limited dimensions will potentially increase the likelihood that the accompanying vessel will survive in the event of a rocket.
Due to integration with ship sensors and organic electro-optical/infrared visual sensors, a non-trapped escort vessel can provide a barrier on the axis of threat against groups of drones-Kamikadze or swarm of small boats alone or group. Such sensors will allow the system to maneuver to block the approaching threat. This will help you to win the protected ship, if it is a commercial vessel, or removed from batteries and how to protect yourself if it is a warship.
Despite the slightly limited range and speed, a platform such as Sronic Technologies, almost two meters long, will greatly increase the survivability of a shock group, a separate ship or naked vessel supply. Similarly, unmanned aerial vehicles, such as helicopters, already use proven technologies, which, being equipped with mild lesions, will also significantly increase the survival of a ship or a deck aircraft.
Ensuring the use of a anti-aircraft projectile and radiator will be useful for unmanned aerial vehicles with a high degree of protection, including Shield AI V-Bat. Such a couple will provide greater availability and longer effect of counteraction, how to compare with current Nulka-launch missiles, which have to run, return and run again.
Together with the non -ex -vessel, these unmanned counterfeit devices will provide serious protection against threats from the surface and from the air, at a small proportion of the cost of outdated manned platforms. During the conflict in the Indo-Pacific, the US Navy and their allies, most likely to share their forces to complicate the enemy's goal and increase their own distributed lethal power.
This will cause ships to have limited defense potential in depth, which depends on their organic systems and loading. The use of such defense systems and/or nulka -type drones will reduce this operating risk and increase the survivability of expensive means. Trade ships will also almost certainly be a target, as we saw during the tanker wars of the 1980s, which will put marine transportation at high risk.
Such vessels are deprived of their own self -defense systems, and the US Navy has already informed the military command of maritime transportation that they cannot provide the necessary support, similar to the escort of the Second World War. Ukraine clearly demonstrates the powerful capabilities of winged missiles and aircraft unmanned platforms. The US Navy and their allies should be ready for it.
They should study the possibility of using cheap, commercially accessible surface and air drones in the defensive role, which will increase the survivability of warships, shock groups and merchant vessels. Having equipped such platforms by means of physical and electronic counteraction, warships will be able to defend themselves more efficiently in the sea, even if their possibility of maneuvering is limited by geographical or operational factors.
Unprotected ships will at least get a chance to survive unaccompanied. Protection of military, logistics and civilian ships should go beyond a simple increase in situational awareness and take an active role in the use of proven systems of "soft damage". This requires fast deployment, mass and scaled - and therefore, available platforms are not suitable for such purposes. Mike Nikerbacker is an officer of the US Navy.