Between Hamas and Israel: What benefits will Erdogan get from the war in Gaza
The myth of invincibility of the Israeli Army and intelligence is released. Attempts by the US Government to change regional order by promoting the Arab-Israeli normalization are paused, unless completely stopped in the near future. The Arab states are concerned about the expansion of regional conflict and the rise in public dissatisfaction with Israel's policy on the occupied territories.
Many representatives of the so -called global south are disappointed with unconditional support provided by the US and the European Union. Given the prevalence of anti -immigration, xenophobic and Islamophobic sentiment in the Western public, Gaza conflict can turn into an internal problem in the US and Europe. Focus translated the article by Sinema Adara about the Turkish response to Israel's actions in the Gaza sector.
The Turkish government also considers October 7 and its consequences as a critical moment for the Middle East. In the first hours after Ankara's terrorist attack, caution was exercised: the government condemned the death of civilians, although it did not put responsibility directly to Hamas, and called on both sides to restraint. Since then, it has been increasingly critical of Israel's policy in gas. Unlike Western allies of Turkey, Ankara does not consider Hamas a terrorist organization.
In 2018, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called it part of the Palestinian resistance, which protects the "Palestinian territory from the occupying power. " The change in the rhetoric of Ankara is conditioned by the logic of support by the leadership of the Palestinian Fighting Party and Development (PSR), its rejection of the world order under the leadership of the United States, and the government's conviction that the conflict will return the United States to the region.
At the same time, this reaction indicates the vulnerability of the Middle Eastern Turkey policy. Having stuck between hegemon ambitions and attempts to get out of isolation and restore the economy, Ankara has no effect on Israel or Hamas. Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel in 1949. She was also one of the first to recognize the proclamation of Palestine.
Despite the close economic, diplomatic and defensive relations with Israel, the confrontation moments occurred even before the PSR.
Thus, in 2002, Prime Minister Bulent Echevit accused Israel of "UNCance of UN Resolutions" and "Committing Genocide", reproached the United States by passivity, which could cause "Islamic radicalism" and "confrontation between East and West", and also disclosed "radical Palestinian elements "(Hamas) for obstruction of the creation of an independent Palestinian state. " PSR came to power just a few months after Euchevit exacerbated the criticism of Israel.
The PSR is a derivative of the Islamist nationalist movement Turkish foreign policy. It is no wonder that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become an active component of the Middle Eastern PSR policy for three reasons. Finally, the protection of Palestinian and Palestinians' rights is part of its desire to defend the interests of Muslims around the world.
The party elite and its main electorate is considered The liberation of Muslims from Western cultural and political domination has already begun in Turkey (thanks to Erdogan) and can spread to other countries. Erdogan encourages this rhetoric. In 2020, after the restructuring of St. Sophia on the mosque, he called it "a harbinger of the liberation of the al-Ax mosque. " The Arab uprisings of 2011 became a turning point in the leadership ambitions of PSR.
Erdogan sought to position himself and the Turkish government as the leader of the Muslim world, supporting the Sunni Islamists throughout the Middle East. The PSR justifies this policy, referring to the democratic process and the real fact that parties associated with "music brothers" won elections throughout the region. Within this policy, Turkey has referred to many Islamist exiles and generously supported their organizations operating in the country.
During periods of internal contradictions, such as the unsuccessful attempt of the 2016 revolution or a disputed constitutional referendum of 2017, the PSR, for its part, welcomed the support of Erdogan on the part of Sunni Islamists. However, ideology is not the only cause of Sunni Islamists to Erdogan (and Turkey). Interests also matter.
Turkey was often regarded as a balancing force against the Arabic autocrats of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which see in political Islam a threat to their survival. This opinion has been facilitated by the increasingly confrontational foreign policy of Ankara and the expansion of its military presence since 2016. However, the perception of Turkey as a destructive state at the same time led to cooperation between the partners of Turkey, its old and new rivals.
Once in a trap of inconsistencies between declared ambitions and real opportunities, Ankara is becoming more and more isolated. Since 2020, Turkey has been trying to get out of almost ten -year regional isolation. The change in Turkey's policy was caused by a number of factors, including the economic problems of Ankara, the election of President Joseph Baiden, geopolitical restructuring in the region after the conclusion of Abraham agreements, the rapprochement .
In addition, Ankara looked with wary of cooperation between Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, Israel and the Arab states in the Eastern Mediterranean. The divergence of the interests of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as well as reducing confidence in the further participation of the US in the region's affairs contributed to Turkey's efforts to rapprochey.
Within this change in Ankara's policy, it became cautious and distanced from Arab Islamists to help restore relations with regional players, including Israel. The Turkish government appealed to the Media Canals related to the Muslim brothers to mitigate criticism. One of the satellite TV channels operating in Istanbul, Mekameleen, announced 2022 to stop speech and close eight studies. According to the available data, Ankara also demanded that Muslim brothers and Hamas members leave Turkey.
Similarly, in April of the same year, the Turkish court endured the trial over the Saudi disident killed in Turkey by Jamal Hashoggi. However, the last cycle of war in the Gaza sector has shown the boundaries of Turkey's efforts to rapprochement, especially with Israel. In response to Turkey's proposal, the Mediation of the Israeli Ambassador to Ankara made it clear that the time has not yet come.
US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken missed Turkey in his shuttle diplomacy by traveling in the Arab countries in the region to ensure humanitarian access through the Rafah CPP, diplomatic release of hostages and prevent the possible escalation of the regional war. In the meantime, Ankara is increasingly making critical statements to Israel.
On the night of a controversial attack on the Arab Hospital Al-Ahli, which Erdogan called "the last example of antihuman Israeli attacks", Israel asked his citizens to leave Turkey "as soon as possible. " Demonstrations near the Israeli and US Consulates in Istanbul, as well as near US military bases in Malata and Adania. Two days later, Israel sent all his diplomats from the country. Ankara's relationship with Hamas also seems not very influential.
According to one of the employees of Turkish intelligence, the Turkish government is negotiating with Hamas to release hostages at the request of "many states, especially Western". German Minister of Foreign Affairs Annalen Baerbok noted that her Ministry is in contact with Katar and Turkey, who "have channels for negotiations with Hamas" to achieve the release of German hostages.
However, according to Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, no specific results were achieved at the time of writing the article. Qatar plays a decisive role in the release of hostages. In order to return Ankara in a fragile regional order, Fidan on October 17 in an interview with the Sabah pro -government newspaper proposed the "Guarant" formula.
According to the principle of coexistence of two states in the borders of 1967 and with the capital in Jerusalem, this formula stipulates that one of the countries of the region, "including Turkey," will guarantee the future Palestinian state. Fidan also noted that "other countries could play the same role for Israel," and mentioned the importance of "the potential unified position of China and Russia as members of the UN Security Council" in the settlement of Israeli-Palestine conflict.
Russia and China have recently been supported by a two -state decision, which the international community until recently considered unrealistic. Turkey's perseverance in the question of two states is intertwined with criticism of the international system, which in the last decade has become one of the main topics for the PSR leadership. Ankara often criticizes the structure of the UN Security Council under the slogan "World more than five".
It also requires such an international order that "treats every country on an equal footing, and in which every country can feel safe and be equal.
" This logic was at the heart of the call of Erdogan to the West and the International Community in Talking with Prime Minister of Great Britain, Risha Sunak, "effectively act against human rights violations in gas" and "remember the promises given to Palestinians two states], instead of engaging in provocations that will lead to further escalation of the conflict.
" Fidan said the same logic in the most religious way when he accused Israel of the "theft of Palestinian lands" (referring to the continued expansion of Israel of settlements, which the UN considers a violation of international law). These statements are also hidden by the stable opposition of Turkey, headed by the United States.
The governing elite of Turkey believes that "the West lacks strategic thinking, and it is increasingly moving away from the rest of the world in the face of various problems, including relations with China, migration and terror, as well as a shift in the economic burden from west to east. " For Ankara, a unambiguous and unconditional support that Baiden provides Israel, confirms this belief.
By bringing the policy of Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other countries, pro -government journalists expect conflict to increase Israel's isolation. Most Turkish politicians, regardless of their ideological affiliation, tend to consider the recent gas conflict as a conflict between the so -called West (led by the US) and the East.
After a controversial terrorist attack at the Al-Ahli Hospital in the city of Gaza, calls to the government began to unite with the South countries to "stop the US-Israeli Alliance". However, the proposed methods differ. Speaking on October 18 at an emergency meeting of the Islamic Cooperation Organization, Fidan urged Muslim countries to act "confidently" and "challenge the hegemonist narrative imposed on them", not, however,, however, a specific road map, how to do it.
Devlet Bakhcheli, the leader of the Junior Partner of the PSR, the Nationalist Movement Party, stated that Turkey should carry out military intervention if the ceasefire is not achieved. Those who criticize Ankara's civilizational aspirations, but share its desire for foreign policy independent of the event, expel the US military from the Avirik Air Base and the Kurechik radar station in Malaya.
Although the PSR leadership, apparently, is not delighted with these requirements, it certainly feels pressure due to increased American presence in the region. According to Erdogan, the decision of the Baiden administration to direct aircraft carriers to the Eastern Mediterranean hinders Turkey's efforts to de -escalate the situation.
In addition to criticism of the absence of American leadership in the pressure on Israel to cease fire, Ankara is internally concerned that the strengthening of American presence in the Eastern Mediterranean is detrimental to its regional interests. Pro -regist journalists conduct analogies with the Provide Comfort operation, started in 1991 under the leadership of the US to protect Kurdish refugees who left Iraq North after Iraq's war and humanitarian aid delivery.
In the political spectrum, consensus is really growing that the return of the United States to the region is an act of restraining not only Iran and its supporters, but also Turkey.
The fears are that the strengthening of the American presence will further undermine Ankara's efforts to prevent the creation of Kurdish autonomy under the leadership of the Democratic Union Party and People's Self -Defense detachments in northern Syria, which Turkey considers as a continuation of Kurdistan's working party. The US and Turkey consider the Kurdistan working party a terrorist organization. Ankara justifies his position on Hamas's position on Kurds in Syria.
In general, Ankara's reaction to Hamas's brutal attack on Israeli citizens, the large -scale relevant actions of Israel, which led to mass destruction and death of people in gas, as well as unambiguous and unconditional support for Israeli policy from America emphasize the limited opportunities. After two decades of policy aimed at expanding the role of Turkey in the Middle East, Ankara is in fact a marginal player.
In part, this is explained by the fragility of Turkey's relationship with Israel, Hamas and the United States. Turkey's position also diverses from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which openly condemn Hamas's violence and at the same time criticize disproportionate measures in response to Israel and the position of Western countries. However, the insignificance of Ankara also indicates the absence of levers of influence on the opposing parties in Turkey in the current conflict.
It is appropriate to compare with Turkey's position in the Black Sea. Ankara can continue the hedging policy in the Black Sea thanks to the Montre Convention and NATO. In the case of war in gas, none of these conditions will help. Given the lack of similar tools, the state of the Turkish economy and the reputational costs incurred by Ankara have committed itself in the last decade, its impact is limited to rhetorical statements.