Why do the US Army need to create a cyber command now
But he conducted an innumerable number of offensive clerks, maneuvering in hostile networks to get closer to the digital opponent and destroy it, so the army decided that such experience was the best training for commanding the infantry company. Focus has translated the article by Erica Lonergan, Todd Arnold and Niki Stark about the US cybernetic forces. Now imagine another scenario. Google has just announced new minimum requirements for candidates for the start of the initial level engineer.
In addition to certain educational and technical skills, candidates will have to demonstrate that they can throw a 4. 5-kilogram medical ball back through their heads for a certain number of meters within the test for physical training. These hypothetical requirements will seem ridiculous to anyone who served in the infantry battalion or held a technical position in a technological company.
When it comes to the US Armed Forces, no agency will accept and, moreover, a commander who lacks fundamental knowledge and experience to command the most important operational formations that are key to the mission of each service. Yet, as noted by servicemen in their recent reviews, this approach to the selection and appointment of staff is a common phenomenon in the cybernetic formations of the army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Corps of Marines.
There is one clear solution that will help solve the problem of the current approach to the formation of forces for cyberspace operations: creating a new type of armed forces for cyberspace. Since the creation of US cyber team 2010, its powers, resources and activities have expanded significantly.
In his recent speech in a congress dedicated to cyberspace, General Timothy Houg noted that the command "maximally uses the powers, resources and support that USCYBERCOM (US cyber team) received after the joint combat command of 2018", including "Options with" Opto Forces and operations to combat opponents seeking a strategic advantage in cyberspace and with the help of a level lower than the level of armed conflict.
" This includes 22 traffic operations conducted by the National Cybernetic Mission for 2023, the Cyber Operations of the full spectrum to support Ukraine's defense and constant efforts to protect the future elections in 2024. However, despite significant progress in the use of their cybernetic military forces, their ability to effectively recruit, educate and keep staff for key cyber roles and missions remains a constant problem.
It is no secret that for the US Armed Forces the formation of cyber forces is a problem. Many practitioners, experts and politicians are well aware of existing restrictions. The government report for 2022 revealed a number of problems related to the approach to the formation of cybernetic forces.
The recent scientific work also reveals systematic problems with readiness in all services, including shortcomings in the set and maintenance of staff, inconsistent development of skills and training, mistakes in the process of promotion and deterioration of the operational potential of the units. The older military command also recognizes this problem.
Speaking about the future organization of cyberspace, the retired General Paul Navasne stated that "all the options except the status quo are considered. " Recently, US cyber team executives have announced the start of the Cybercom 2. 0 project - a full reorganization project, including power formation models.
At the Congress level, a representative Micha Galahler noted at the recent hearing that over the last decade, Congress "tried to resolve the issue of formation and readiness of forces with the help of 24 different legislative acts. And yet . . . Human resources remain as complex as in the last ten years. " Developing an effective approach to the formation of cybernetic forces is an urgent task for the United States in the face of opponents who continue to develop.
The current approach to the formation of cybernetic forces in the Ministry of Defense is based on all agencies engaged in the set, training and maintenance of cybernetic forces. Each service is free to apply its own individual selection criteria, based on their key competencies, when selecting cyberpersonal and determining its roles.
Then each service develops and conducts separate preparation and training programs, as well as implements programs for the promotion and maintenance of cyberpersonal. Therefore, in different agencies there is no consistent, effective and reliable approach to the formation of forces. Moreover, the formation of forces for cyberspace is a unique task for military organizations.
The availability of the necessary tools, opportunities, organizations and powers - all this is important for the effective cyber operations. However, the most important factor is highly qualified and technically competent staff, especially command. It is difficult to recruit such staff (especially taking into account the restrictive requirements for physical training and other standards), it is expensive to teach and even more difficult to keep.
Since no agency corresponds primarily to the organization, training and equipment for cyberspace operations, the formation of forces for cyberspace is the duty of every agency and for none of them is a priority. The formation of forces to work in cyberspace at best is a minor issue for agencies, whose main care is certainly a recruitment of staff for their main activity. Therefore, each service simply adapts its existing personnel management systems to work in cyberspace, with variable success.
There is an active discussion on how to solve these problems. Some stand for a step -by -step approach: slow and consistent changes aimed at improving the powers, opportunities and resources of US cyber team, preserving the distributed (or disconnected) model of power formation.
Others call for a more fundamental revision of the military approach to the formation of cybernetic forces, repeating the calls of leaders such as retired Colonel Greg Conti and Admiral retired James Stavridis, the creation of independent military service for cyberspace. Both groups in silence agree that the powers of the military department are needed to create cyber forces - they only diverge in terms of who should belong to such powers.
In these discussions, it is customary to evaluate the results of the Armed Forces, how to compare with what they started with. On this scale, significant successes were achieved. However, our analysis begins with the basic principles. We formulate what the ideal model for the formation of cyber forces in the Ministry of Defense should be to meet the stated requirements of America's national security.
Then we make arguments in favor of creating a new, independent type of armed forces - the US Cybernetic Forces. Starting from the Goldoter -Nicholas Law in 1986, the US government has identified different roles and responsibilities for military services and commands. According to the policy of the Ministry of Defense, military services are responsible for providing forces for military operations, "organizing, teaching, equipping and providing land, naval, air, space and cyberspace forces.
" Services are also responsible for the development of concepts, doctrines, tactics, techniques and procedures, determining the needs and assessment of their readiness. In contrast, the commander of the combat forces "[exercise] power, management and control over the command and forces attributed to this command. " Combat commands use forces and fulfill missions to their competence.
The exception is the command of special operations of the United States, which has "departmental" powers to "organization, training, equipment and granting forces of special operations, doctrines, procedures and equipment" to perform specific tasks belonging to special operations.
These differences are important because there are specific responsibilities, especially for the recruitment, training, training, evaluation and promotion of military personnel that can only be performed by military agency. Even the exception confirms the rule. Although the US Special Operations Command has unique control opportunities, it still rests with military agencies in matters of selection, training and work for work.
Unlike the cybernetic sphere, each of the military agencies has unique opportunities for the creation of forces that correspond to the distinctive features of special operations in each of the combat regions required by command. The current structure of the Armed Forces is based on the idea that the environment in which servicemen are involved in hostilities is determined by unique logic and requirements.
The main duty of agencies is the preparation of forces necessary for confrontation and victory in terrestrial, air, maritime and space spheres. After making a decision to create space forces in 2019, each of the battle spaces, with the exception of cyberspace, will meet the military department responsible for the formation of forces with the appropriate experience to fulfill military missions in the appropriate space.
The decision to create a new military service for outer space was due to two major factors: the same factors are valid for cyberspace, which is already the most important part of modern confrontations and conflicts and is constantly faced with problems of power formation.
Over the last 14 years, the agencies have shown that they are unable to form sufficient forces, resulting in the ministry "lack of qualified cyberpersonal, which can potentially affect the operational readiness of the entire ministry and threaten national security. " Given this fact, it is unrealistic to expect that competing agencies will not only be able to provide sufficient levels, but also achieve preferences in the cybersphere.
Only an independent and specialized service - the US cybernetic forces - can solve the main task of formation of forces in cyberspace: purposeful recruitment, training and maintenance of qualified personnel for cybernetic operations. Although combat competence in a particular industry is important for all servicemen, the quality of staff has always has a significant and direct impact on cyberspace operations.
According to General Nakasone in an interview with 2019, the most effective cyber -staff person "is often exponentially better than his colleagues - 10 or 20 times. " Therefore, for the effective formation of cybernetic forces, it is necessary to look for the right personnel, paying special attention to quality, not quantity. This includes the ability to identify the necessary skills and the number of staff to perform a cyber mission.
Based on these initial data, for cybernetic forces you need to find staff with technical skills and skills, who are ready to take initiative and experiment, "passionate technology and [likes] to overcome or bypass the restrictions. " Further, agencies should train and educate staff and provide them with adequate career opportunities. This requires the creation of viable career paths for cyberpersonal with the possibilities of personal growth, the development of knowledge, skills and abilities.
Professional kiborosvita should meet the requirements of the mission, career growth and development of personnel, provide opportunities for expanding knowledge and experience in the cybergsphere, as well as to promote the development of both technical and leadership qualities as cyberpersonal advanced and increasing its responsibility. Currently, vocational education is usually focused on the specific needs of each service, not cyber -staff.
For example, the professional education of junior officers in the army is designed for a tactical echelon, while the cyberperson in these titles is usually involved at the level of united commands. And finally, the formation of cybernetic forces should ensure the sustainable development of its labor.
First, constant interaction with the enemy creates the need for the structure of cybernetic forces, optimized for deployment, mostly in place, as in the US space forces (however, as in the US space forces, some elements are thrown forward, for example, the tracking groups or tracking groups or tracking groups Cyber operators, deployed as part of special operations forces).
Stress from constant work affects the moral and psychological state of the personnel, which leads to burnout and leakage of personnel. Keeping problems are even more intensified by competition with the private sector for the required cyberpersonal skills. Therefore, agencies should have a consistent and agreed personnel support strategy through special support programs and detention strategies, including additional incentive and bonuses.
Organizations in the private sector, which value talented cybersiones, pursue a purposeful policy of talent management. These actions are within the limits of opportunities and powers of agencies. Why did the agencies restricted their use and have not taken these steps? In practice, each of these decisions is an exception to standard personnel practice and systems of each department.
Therefore, it is more appropriate to create a special agency intended for the formation of cybernetic forces than to rely on the fact that each service will voluntarily develop, implement and support numerous exceptions, especially when the priorities of the services are the formation of forces for their main area of responsibility.
The only way to achieve the consistency and scalability necessary for adequate organization, preparation and equipment of operational cyberwar is the creation of a centralized, sole organization for managing all aspects of power formation. Proponents of the current approach claim that gradual improvements will help to solve the problem of lack of cyber forces.
The main logic is that it takes time to achieve positive results, and that the United States "to some extent are hostages to the path we are moving now. " Many refer to the gradual provision of more "service" authority to cyber commands as evidence of continuous improvement by urging US cyber team to actually take over the US Special Operations Command Model. This view does not take into account two main points.
First, the expansion of US cyber team responsibilities is due to the fact that the agencies are not improved. Secondly, such powers will not resolve many personnel issues that underlie the available problems of power formation. For example, enhanced budget control provides US cyber team with more control over purchases and training. Stated in the law of 2022, these additional powers have come into force only in the last few months, so they have not yet been fully tested.
However, even in the case of full exercise, these powers will allow the US cyber team only to improve the training of staff already presented by agencies. These additional powers do not allow command to change decisions that adversely affect the readiness of cybernetic forces. For example, this will not limit the consistent rotation of cyberpersonal from cyber units, which will result in the US cyber team will be forced to "perform cyber operations with variable composition".
Similarly, this will not prevent the army from shifting the priorities of staffing and training towards the radio electronic struggle to the detriment of cyber preparation. Proponents of the current approach also argue that cyber Agency will duplicate each other.
It is a counterin -intensive argument, given that the current system relies on five agencies, each of which forms forces for different interpretations of a shared mission standard in different ways and, in some cases, competes with each other for the same people. Another counter -argument regarding the US cybernetic forces is that services will still need some cybernetic forces, especially for defense operations in cyberspace.
This is due to the concern, which some expresses regarding the consequences of technical integration of cyberchnology into equipment designed for specific industries. Further analysis will be useful to distinguish responsibility for defense operations in cyberspace and network operations. This problem is also solved by the historically strong side of the Ministry of Defense - the ability to conduct joint operations. Creating a US cybernetic forces is not a resolved fact.
Однак, з огляду на широкий консенсус щодо того, що нинішня модель формування кібернетичних сил не оптимізована для розв'язання поточних і майбутніх стратегічних завдань, необхідно істотно змінити статус-кво.
Конгрес має можливість у наступному Законі про повноваження в галузі національної оборони доручити проведення незалежної оцінки або аналізу, який сформулює чіткий шлях вперед для формування кібернетичних сил.
Під час такої оцінки необхідно буде розглянути весь спектр необхідних рішень і змін у всьому комплексі доктрини, організації, навчання, матеріальних засобів, керівництва та освіти, персоналу, об'єктів і політики.
Удосконалення формування кібернетичних сил необхідне вже зараз, до того, як Сполучені Штати опиняться в ситуації кризи або конфлікту з найближчим супротивником. Еріка Д.
Лонерґан — доцентка Школи міжнародних і суспільних відносин Колумбійського університету, раніше обіймала посаду старшого директора в Комісії із соляризації кіберпростору США. У співавторстві з Шоном В. Лонерганом вона написала книгу Escalation Dynamics in Cyberspace (Oxford University Press, 2023).
Тодд Арнольд — офіцер армії США, який наразі є професором академії в Армійському кібернетичному інституті у Вест-Пойнті та доцентом кафедри електротехніки та комп'ютерних наук.
Як колишній армійський офіцер-кібернетик, він зробив ключовий внесок у створення кібернетичного напрямку в армії.
Нік Старк — офіцер кібернетичної служби армії США, нині працює науковим співробітником в Армійському кібернетичному інституті та викладачем у Військовій академії США. Його дослідження присвячені конфіденційності даних та інформаційним операціям.