The event loses right now. As the refusal of Ukraine support brings the victory of
Unfortunately, both sides seem to lose meaning after a period of amazing determination and unity, and now a radical adjustment of how we build war is needed. Too many people seem to be aware that this is the most military clash in Europe since 1945, which overshadows even the difficult counter -terrorist operation of Israel in the Gaza Sector.
It is the conquered war that Russia began in 2014, sharply intensified almost two years ago, and therefore it should not be determined by the success or failure of any attack of any of the parties within one season. It is important to repeat, because many present reflections on what to do next come from the inability of the summer counter -offensive of Ukraine to ensure a breakthrough.
If Ukraine is not able to win, then what is the goal for the event? Wouldn't it be better to show a little "tough love" by forcing President Vladimir Zelensky to a contractual ceasefire? These questions are wrong because they arise from two false prerequisites: first, peace talks depend on Ukraine; And secondly, the US and Europe have rallied around Kiev since 2022 to achieve "victory" over Russia. The reality is that peace negotiations depend more on Russia-the occupier.
Moreover, there are no signs that President Vladimir Putin is ready to agree to a long -term ceasefire on the available front lines. Russia's actions, not to mention the rhetoric of the Kremlin, which is still increasing, and the annexation of the territories that it does not yet control, indicate the opposite. Similarly, the US and Europe came to the aid of Kiev not to defeat Russia, but to protect itself, preventing Russian expansion that promised long -term instability for Europe.
These interests remain vital, without even affecting the more vague, based on the values of goals, such as protection of democracy or international law. They are also more achievable than it seemed immediately after the Russian invasion of 2022. Honestly, Putin would be illogical to give up his goals now, when Ukraine's funding and military support are threatened on both sides of the Atlantic.
This week, the White House warned that by the end of December, he would end up in support of Ukraine, which, according to the accurate words of Biden administration official, will "undermine" the ability of Ukraine to defend against the Russian offensive.
Meanwhile, Putin's ally, Hungary Prime Minister Viktor Orban, clearly made it clear that he intends either to use or to disrupt as creating an EU fund of 50 billion euros ($ 54 billion) for Ukraine, and the EU plan to offer a plan Kyiv negotiations on membership in this union.
From the Kremlin's point of view, the most encouraging is that Donald Trump - a person who has deep personal claims to Ukraine - is leading in public opinion polls on the eve of the US presidential election, which will take place in a year. Putin also has his own political program. Next year, he is waiting for elections that, whatever free and unfair they are, remain important to strengthen his power and legitimacy.
The conclusion of an agreement can now encourage Russians to doubt the huge price that they are asked to pay. What many people do not understand in the event, says Nikolai Beleskov, a researcher at the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Kiev, so that "Russia will not reconcile with Ukraine" and still believes that it can win by force. They "increased the production of weapons, mobilize new forces, and they need the result.
" As a result, Ukraine cannot stop hostilities, which would not happen with its financing and supplying weapons from the Allies. The only question is how many additional lives and additional territories will be lost if the determination of the West disappears, depriving the Ukrainians of the means to repel with sufficient force to convince Putin that he can win nothing more. Time is something that Ukraine needs to carry out purposeful, not a desperate defense.
Its task is to weaken the Russian forces and continue the distant air campaign to make Crimea - and therefore the lines of supply of Russian troops in the south - vulnerable, while waiting for the defeat of Trump. This combination can force Putin to review his costs and benefits and negotiate the real cessation of the war.
Persistent protection is a much less inspirational history than a triumph in a counter-offensive, but at this point it is also a much better way forward for Ukraine and its supporters than any doomed attempt to negotiate. The war proved how difficult it is-if it is not impossible-to attack the enemy who has strengthened well without having an advantage in the air or any other important technological advantage, and the same applies to Russia.
Putin generals threw great forces on the offensive on Avdiivka, in eastern Ukraine, losing the shocking number of soldiers and equipment. Successful protection for the exhaustion of this kind is a victory for Ukraine; Just takes more time to bear fruit. It is here that I disagree with the two revered foreign policy minds of the United States, Richard Haas and Charles Kupchan, who also call for a rethinking of the West Strategy on Ukraine in the last issue of Foreign Relations magazine.
Based on the failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive, the absence of any real prospect of breakthrough and the return of all the occupied territories, the fatigue of the West and the prevailing resources of Russia, these two are in favor of persuading Ukrainians to start ceasefire negotiations right now. Even if Putin refuses that they recognize probable, they claim that Ukraine will receive a moral advantage and may have avoided worse fate in the future.
Haas and Kupchany understand the danger of continued "counter -offensive for the sake of victory", but it is also a false message. The Ukrainian command has already recognized the need to move to defense. They do not ask for more tanks, but require rockets for more range, artillery shells, anti -aircraft batteries and aircraft needed for the exhaustion strategy. The article also ignores the risks inherent in its own offer.
Putin would probably not immediately give up the ceasefire, as he did not do in the past, but instead put the conditions on which, as he knows, Ukraine should give up. This will cause the inevitable debate among Kyiv allies about whether to agree, and when not, it will give oxygen to the one (such as Orban), who stand for the termination of Ukraine's support.
The reality is that stability in Europe still depends on whether Putin is able to show that he cannot achieve his historically grand objectives for the restoration of Russian lands and spheres of influence, which was lost in 1918, later returned during Stalin's time and It was again lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Kremlin in no way stops attempts. Only some empires have taken collapse without struggle, and Russia is no exception.