The secret of the Russian offensive: why the Armed Forces Command can't counter
In particular, I already wrote that the tendency of the Russian military command to "detours and oven" is quite obvious and understandable in the context of the basic provisions of operational arts, which are professed at the moment in the Russian army. But every time, this is somehow becomes a frank "open" to command the operational-tactical level of the Armed Forces.
In the course of planning and organizing fighting, it again and again tries to keep and defend the "basic nodes" with weak, and even not at all covered flanks . . .
instead of creating "against the flanks" of more or less powerful tactical groups in depth (let tactical) Defense that could, if needed, if not contradacular units of the enemy trying to bypass or cover one or another area (knot) of our defense, then at least not allow the enemy to expand its inquers on its flanks - the Armed Forces command continues to focus maintaining specific "nodal points". And it does this in the conditions of obvious inability to provide the flanks of these "nodes".
Well, when the enemy, for one reason or another, cannot bypass them, as is the time in the area of the ravine, and he is forced to storm the forehead. But in the vast majority of cases with such difficulties, he does not face in the realization of his ideas (plans) . . .
Eventually, of them (in the sense, "nodes") still have to depart (often, with far optional losses), because the opponent is confident They are bypassed on the flanks and in the case of untimely decision -making, simply cuts the ways of bringing the MTZ and transferring reinforcement in them. So it was in Avdiivka, so it was in Villagledar, Selidovo, so now the enemy is doing in the Kurakhov area and, apparently, on a larger scale will try to do it during the winter in Toretsk and Pokrovsk.
Methodology is obvious-powerful flanking shock groups (usually in the form of a reinforced all-military army, which has a full motor or tank division) and 1 or 2 stopping "from the front" Operative-tactical groups (in the form of 2-3 brigades Or even the rifle riming regiments of the mobreserv). How does it look like in practice? And as it is now in Kurakhiv and Veremiev.
Two flank shock groups: well, two moving groups: which, in fact, displace our troops "on the front", crushing and dissecting certain parts in separate tactical directions. I cannot say that the Ukrainian command in this sense, something "cardinal" does not understand, or does not realize the meaning of the enemy's plans (plans). The nature of his reaction becomes clear that it obviously understands what the opponent does.
However, most likely, he simply does not have the strength and resources to respond to these actions of the enemy sufficiently… For example, the stubborn defense of Ukrainian units in the Constantinople (Nizhn) - Uspenivka - Ganivka - Labor on the Sukhi Sukha River, obviously, somewhat slowed down The extreme right flank of UV "East".
Just like the stubborn defensive battles of the Armed Forces in the Sun and Zorya area, they obviously pushed a little in time a "quick" occupation by the enemy of the village. Kurakhov "from the course". However, again, the enemy, even having faced such a counter, finds a way to bend "his line" stubbornly. It simply expands the scale and width of "bypass". It did not work through the sun - we will break to the north, on the Ukrainian.
We rested in Uspenivka - not a problem, we will break through a spill and a spill… well, etc. That is, the main principle is clear. The enemy's command is obviously known about the lack of people and OVTs in the advanced units and connections of the Armed Forces and tries to "stretch the front" (by creating an urgent need to cover the flanks), making their level of combat capability, let's say so is problematic.
It is clear that from each additional "cut" km into the strip of defense of a particular brigade its overall level of stability is far from improving. At this point, the enemy can afford it because it has an obvious advantage in people and OVT, although, of course, it is not endless-because it is obvious that from some "tempted proposals" at the operational-tactical level and he has to, because of limited resources, everything To give up, or at least to disable their implementation in time.
How to deal with this and how to counteract this? There are several quite acceptable methods for the current conditions. For clear reasons, I will not describe them here, but they are well known in the history of martial arts. And I think, the Ukrainian command is quite familiar with them . . .
Let me, but at this point, I do not see any special reasons for "very fashionable" now on social networks and media to the media and "loud statements", the “Front Front” fell and falls apart ”… The Armed Forces continue to fight in a planned, not chaotic and accident. Yes, they defend and move away in a number of directions.
But even under those conditions, they are conducting stubborn harrows that cost the advancing enemy very cheap, which, in particular, objectively "heals" its further ability to attack the assault actions in permanent mode. In fact, at this point, the Russian command "exchanges" a large part of its strategic reserves, which it has accumulated in 2024, for all these curakhov and coal (well, partly, on a piece of its "Kurki Volost") . . .