As the Russians manage to carry out routine rotations on the front: conclusions isw

ISW analysts believe that Russian mobilization, which is mainly based on a recruitment of volunteers and forced mobilization of convicts and migrants, will not be able to ensure the rotation of Russian troops during the intensification of their offensive efforts. The staffing of the Russian troops and the static of the front on both sides enable Russian troops to carry out planned rotations of their personnel.

This conclusion was reached by analysts of the Institute of War Study (ISW) in the report of January 11. Experts emphasize, referring to the statement of the Deputy Chief of the Main Directorate of Intelligence of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Major-General Vadim Skibitsky, who fights the entire resource of the Land Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Ukraine-462 thousand people.

At the same time, the staffing of the Russian units is 92-95%, which allows the army of the Russian Federation to rotate all over the front line. Another factor, according to the Institute, is the absence of counter -offensive actions of the Armed Forces, which relieves pressure on the prompt deployment of Russian troops. According to Skibitsky, the Russians are taken to the rear districts of units, the number of which is 50% or less, and then returned to the front line after recovery.

At the same time, the deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev declared on January 11 that the Russian army successfully mobilized in 2023 more than 500 thousand servicemen with the help of continuous hidden mobilization.

"The obvious ability of Russia to generate forces at a rate equal to Russian losses probably gives Russian troops the opportunity to replenish the units that the Russian command has withdrawn from the collision line through degradation and then return these replenished units to the front," - states.

At the same time, according to analysts of the Institute, the Russian troops were unable to seize the initiative in Kherson region, and regrouping in Avdiiv, Bakhmut, Lymansky and Kupyansk directions made it possible to conduct only local offensive operations.

Despite the ability of the Russian army to rotate at the operational level, ISW experts believe that it is unclear whether they will be able to do so in the long run in the event of intensification of their offensive efforts or an active counter -offensive operation of the Armed Forces.

"Several other operational factors have previously contributed to the culmination of Russian offensive efforts in Ukraine, but the main factor was often a lack of live force and capable compounds," experts emphasize. And they add that Russian troops are mostly conducting heavy infantry attacks in Ukraine, which do not necessarily require a lot of equipment or high level of training.

According to experts, the army of the Russian Federation replenishes losses at the expense of poorly trained and relatively ineffective personnel, which the Russian command considers sufficient for frontal attacks. Therefore, according to ISW, if the Russian command decides to activate offensive operations in Ukraine, Russians may suffer losses that "exceed their ability to generate new forces.

" "Intensification of Russian offensive efforts will lead to more elements on the front line and put pressure on the number of available forces that can take control of the area of ​​responsibility . They question the possibility of the current Russian mobilization campaign, which is mainly based on the recruitment of volunteers and forced mobilization of convicts and migrants, to increase the number of personnel required for rotation during the intensification of Russian offensive efforts.