If Putin does not. Will the war with Ukraine continue if power changes in the Russian Federation

Although such an assumption is reinforced by the well -known conditions for the cessation of wars, it is problematic. History shows that the leader who begins the road, a long war, is rarely ready to finish it without winning - but the story teaches that the change of leader does not always contribute to peace. Focus has translated the new text of Sean Kokran, dedicated to the Russian-Ukrainian war.

For political leaders, the desire to avoid guilt and punishment for the solved war can be decisive when deciding to terminate it. It is well known that the leaders responsible for solving wars are most often accused and punished by their results - so they tend to continue the war even with the poor hope of victory. Accordingly, changing management is often a prerequisite for the end of the war.

Such an opinion can be quite reasonable, but it does not necessarily follow that new leaders who have inherited unfinished war, free from the pressure and risks associated with the end of the war on incomplete conditions.

Within the wars of wars, which are characterized as expensive and prolonged foreign interventions, I evaluated the decision -making and behavior of 85 wartime leaders, as well as compared the leaders involved in the beginning of these wars and their successors who came to power in the war.

Studying documents from more than a dozen countries and personally communicating with former officials and journalists who have relevant first -hand information, I found that new leaders remain susceptible to internal pressure and risks associated with the end of the war - or at least consider themselves prone to risk and behave appropriately.

As a result, many new leaders behave in the same way as their predecessors, and cannot or do not want to reduce the loss of the state and strive for peace. This is because the guilt policy associated with the end of the war is complex, diverse and includes many potential narratives of guilt concerning not only the leader who has started a failed war.

Experts call many potential successors - from Dmitry Medvedev's frank hawk to Sergei Sobanin, who consistently seeks to distance himself from Putin's war in Ukraine. Some even raised the question of the possibility, albeit a small, replacement of Putin by the leader of the opposition Alexei Navalny, who is in prison. Although individual differences are of course, the guilt policy associated with the end of the war is always the same.

Any new leader who will try to remove Russia from the Putin War will probably face serious internal obstacles. The current domestic political situation in Russia, characterized by mutual translation of political and military leadership responsibility, will be especially dangerous for Putin's successor and will prevent any steps in refusing Russia's military goals in Ukraine and the search for peace-at least in the short term.

This applies even those successors who opposed Putin's war or did not support it openly before the post. Thus, the Putin War may well continue without Putin. For over 70 years, scientists have argued that changing political leadership has been an important and even necessary condition for the termination of protracted armed conflict, since the leaders who have launched the war are usually unable to or not want to finish it without winning.

The explanation of this behavior of leaders is based on the logic of political survival or the idea that political decisions are influenced by the desire to avoid guilt and internal political punishment for failure. If the war is unsuccessful, the leaders who solved it will probably be held accountable and punish either the population or other ruling elites. Thus, these leaders tend to continue to fight, despite the growing costs and poor hope for victory.

According to political scientist Sarah Kroco, "the main factor that determines the choice of a leader between the continuation and the termination of the conflict is the likelihood of punishment if he or she agrees to any result less than the victory. " Yes, for a leader who has solved an unsuccessful war, the probability of punishment "is almost always close to one", whereas for the subsequent leaders who simply inherited the war, this risk is "most likely to be zero.

" These new leaders will not face such a difficult choice: to stop war or continue fighting. With regard to the war of Russia in Ukraine, this means that Putin's displacement will eliminate the main obstacle to the end of the war, and Putin's successor will be much more prone to peace, even if that means the abandonment of the state's military goals and recognition of military defeat.

The theory of change of leader as a condition for termination of war, repeated in various forms for many years, has already become generally accepted. However, this theory is imperfect or at least incomplete. It is easy to find examples where a change in political leadership contributed to the cessation of an expensive protracted war. However, even if a change in leadership is a prerequisite for the end of the war, it is rarely sufficient.

In other words, the termination of the war is often preceded by a change in leadership, but most changes in the leadership in wartime do not lead to termination of war. For example, scientists denote Mikhail Gorbachev's coming to power as a key to the exit of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, and also denote the formation of the Mendes-France government in 1954 as promoting the end of the post-colonial war of France in Indochina.

But Gorbachev was the fourth Soviet prime minister, who inherited a 10-year-old Afghan conflict, and France survived at least nine changes in the government in wartime before Pierre Mendes-France admitted a military defeat and led the French army from Indo-Kitya. I considered 85 examples of political leaders involved in expensive and protracted foreign military interventions.

The data show that 86% of the leaders responsible for the beginning of the war continue to fight until they leave their post or achieve what can be released as a victory. Among those new leaders who have simply inherited the ongoing war, 66% are also unable to stop the war without achieving victory. Of course, the military situation matters when the new leader comes to power.

If the war goes on plan and victory is easily achievable at reasonable costs, then any leader will have little incentive for care. The reaction of leaders is of greater interest when the war is more expensive and difficult than expected at the beginning, or when the likelihood of success is reduced. These conditions are difficult to summarize, but the analysis of some cases shows that new leaders prefer to continue to wage wars that have become a little hope for victory.

In some cases, new leaders even intensify the war, although they privately express their conviction in the absurdity of further fighting desire to reduce the loss of state and seek peace. In general, the differences between types of leaders can be statistically significant, but they are not as different quality, with more than half of new leaders behave in the same way as their predecessors are responsible for the beginning of the war.

Based on the results of their research, I argue that new leaders behave as if they were threatened with punishment for unsuccessful war because they are at risk, often standing in front of the same difficult choice as their predecessors. In the absence of a clear military victory or defeat, the internal policy of termination of war becomes the cause of accusations.

The theory of change of leadership during the termination of the war takes into account this moment, but includes too narrow the concept of guilt, overwhelming how the internal audience draws a line of responsibility between politics and political leadership. In particular, traditional theory believes that in wartime, all accusations reflexively turn to the leadership related to the beginning of the war.

However, a deeper study of the guilt policy shows that the internal audience is responsible for the failure of the war in a much more complicated and more diverse way. I assume that there are at least four different narratives of guilt related to the political leadership and the end of the war. Each of these narratives differs from each other, differently imposing responsibility for the unsuccessful war on political leadership.

The key is that only one of them, the narrative of "outlining", is limited to the leader who started the war. Thus, new leaders are still prone to accusations and internal political consequences. This residual risk can greatly influence the decision to end the war and helps to explain why so many new leaders behave in the same way as their predecessors. For Putin, war in Ukraine can be a matter of political survival, as defeat can lead to its removal from power.

But the risk of punishment applies not only to the balance of Putin's stay in power. The defeat in Ukraine will significantly spoil Putin's image and tides his inheritance. Putin considers himself modern Peter the Great and wants him to be remembered exactly. He considers his mission and fate to return Russia to its legitimate status of the world state, erased from memory of defeat in the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The situation in Ukraine puts this personal heritage threatened, and the West should not underestimate how far Putin is ready to go to avoid defeat. But what if Putin is dropped in war, or because of the deterioration of health or internal opposition? For any successor, the current state of Russian domestic policy will become a notorious minefield and will prevent any actions on the exit of Russia from the conflict, at least in the short term.

According to one Russian journalist, in Russia a game of "hot potatoes" broke out, the role of which is played by a special failure of the military operation. In particular, Kremlin officials are trying to shift the guilt from Putin to the higher military leadership, in fact, "creating a crisis in the Ministry of Defense in an attempt to distance President Vladimir Putin from stunning retreats and other shameful failures on the battlefield.

" The military leadership, which is already in tension in connection with a number of release of senior commanders, repels, shifting guilt to other state structures for providing erroneous intelligence, insufficient funding for the army or other forms of military sabotage. The central role of the military in this game is especially problematic.

For the new political leadership, which seeks to end a long war, not achieving its goals, the support of military leadership is critical, given that the researcher of military-civil relations, Peter, calls "the special moral competence of" armed forces in the context of the war. Without such support, the new political leadership is more vulnerable to the hawks of political opposition, as well as accusations of betrayal and correspondence.

But to get the support of military leadership to withdraw troops in such a scenario is not an easy task. Even if the military leadership advocates the war, it is unlikely to support such a step without strong military-civil relations, characterized by mutual trust. Only under this condition, the military leadership will not be afraid that the political leadership will become a dwarf-kick in an attempt to take away guilt. Now the Russian game is far from such conditions.

After changing the political leadership, the time of their creation will also be required, as history shows that the Russian military is very sensitive to the translation of guilt on them. For example, during the First Chechen War (1994-1996), Russian General Alexander Lebed stated in the media: "Every time orders were clear and came out of the highest level . . . and every time we [military] made [politicians] dirty for them Work, they fled and left all the guilt on us . . .

Believe me, the army will never allow it to repeat it. " If Putin leaves his post (voluntarily or not) against the backdrop of war in Ukraine, his successor can decide to stop hostilities, but this decision will not be easy and devoid Navalny. Given his responsibility for the beginning of the war, Putin is very afraid of accusations and punishment for her result and will continue to continue to fight, despite the growing costs and poor hope for victory.

But any new leader who inherits the Putin war is not immune to such internal pressure. In the case of an expensive, protracted war, the guilt policy can influence decisions on the end of the war and potentially encourage new leaders to continue the war, even if they have not supported it before joining the post.

The current domestic political situation in Russia with its game in "hot potatoes" between political and military leadership will be especially problematic for a new political leader who will seek to withdraw Russia from the war. Turning to historical experience, many new leaders, in similar circumstances, decided to continue the war or seek peace of law, as a result of the process of leaving the war was delayed for years.

It is difficult and, perhaps, it is pointless to predict the results of any change in leadership in wartime in the event of Russia's war in Ukraine. However, the event should not be considered that the change of leadership will lead to the end of the war, at least in the short term: Putin's war may well continue without Putin. Sean T. Kokran-Doctor of Science, author of the book War Termination as Civil-Military Bargain, as well as numerous articles on the internal policy of the end of the war.