The direction of the main blow: why the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will be elected between Pokrovsk and Toretsk

After Avdiivka, Russian troops try to step in several directions. But their forces are not limitless, and they already have to restrain their appetites, focusing on some one direction, confident military analyst Konstantin Mashovets. Review, today is the Pokrovsky direction. As far as I understand, the command of the Russian group of troops (UV) "Center" is trying to make "titanical" efforts to "not lose the pace of the offensive" in this direction.

As I wrote earlier, the "restoration" of the troops (forces) of the 41st General Army (ID) in the second echelon of UV "Center" lasted relatively long. The enemy began a gradual "return" to the battle of its crews. Obviously, I mentioned earlier than the reeds of the reeds - Umansky remains for UMA "Center" the main task for the near future.

In this sense, the emergence of units of the 35th Separate Rifle Brigade (OMSBR) from the 41st General in the offensive of the 30th OMSBR of the 2nd IDA, near the 132nd OMSBR. The command of the enemy, introducing into battle to the right of the 30th OMSBR, in the direction of Novokalin, 35th OMSBR, clearly tries to increase the pace grouping.

In general, for several extreme days, the enemy organized and conducted a series of attacking actions in the Pokrovsky direction for further promotion, in particular, in the direction of Novokalin, attacked the advanced units of the 132nd OMSBR, not particularly successful. The enemy managed to cling to the eastern part of the village, but it is impossible to move further to the ceramics.

The advanced units of the 30th OMSBR of the enemy, stepping along the railway, were able to tie battles in Novobakhmutivka and even "cling" for several extreme houses in the southeastern part of the reed. However, while the Armed Forces continue to cling to Novobakhmutivka and keep the nightingale, the further active actions of the enemy in the reeds look, say, "problematic" for him. First of all, because it is stretched to the reed "cat" of the 30th OMSBR of the enemy risks to be cut off.

I think that it was for the release of 1-2 motorized rifle battalions (IAS) that the 30th OMSBR for active action to provide its left flank under the Novobakhmutivka Directorate-Solovyovo and was put into battle of the 35th OMSBR to the right of the 30th OMSBR. In the area of ​​the village. Berdychi enemy introduced units of the 74th OMSBR, also from the 41st General.

They attacked the general northwestern direction, clearly trying to move forward, and thus even more "unleash" the 30th Omsbr hands for action in the direction of Ocheretin and concentrate it on this task. The 1st OMSBR of the 1st Army Corps (AK), which operates as part of UV "Center", attacked the leading positions of the Armed Forces Easier with. Uman. As far as I understand, seeking to break through the north of the stupid river in this area.

At this point, as far as I know, it was not possible to achieve this enemy. The advanced units of the Armed Forces continue to hold the position of the west with. Orlovka along this river, thus shaking the actions of the enemy (1st OMSBR) in the direction of the village. Uman. Therefore, in view of all of the above, we can distinguish two features about the current situation in the Pokrovsky direction.

The maintenance of the SUU units, and in particular the Armed Forces, Rubezh Novobakhmutivka - West Berdychi - Semenivka - Umansky is already beginning to significantly influence the pace of promotion of enemy troops from the Center. His command is already beginning to look for some "alternative" ways and directions to enter the reed - Umanske. This applies primarily to the flank areas.

As we can see, in this sense, the enemy has already begun to increase efforts to the reeds, I think, in the near future, similar "processes" will take place in the direction of Yusnobrodivka and Nedaylovo. Another question is how much the enemy will have the strength and means to continue to increase their efforts and change the directions and areas of their application in conditions where the common band of the onset of the group has a constant tendency to expand.

In this sense, I would also identify two features. Uneven (I would even say, very uneven) distribution of forces and means between Pokrovsky and Toretsky directions where the center operates. The first is concentrated by the absolute maximum, whereas at the Toretsky command of UV "Center" it costs a minimum of troops-one OMSBR and somewhere up to 5 rifle regiments (in the reserve-no more than the battalion).

The obvious fact of the existence of certain restrictions in the field of possibility of command of the "Center" command, regarding the independent increase of their efforts in a particular direction. They are clearly not endless.

At the moment, in the so-called "reserve and queues" (this is what we usually call "fast reserves") there are 3 motor-raimens (SMEs)-all of the category of "territorial troops", and up to 4-5 formations in volume "to the battalion", of which at least 2 are the so -called "reserve" (in fact, "Mobilization drives" replenishment).

In general, in the UV "Center" (in 2 directions-Pokrovsky and Toretsky) one and a half days ago the enemy had: it is obvious that the enemy's desire to "reduce the rate" of the onset of the Pokrovsky direction was dictated by a completely utilitarian reasoning-if you stop, then to stop, then to stop, then to stop. The Ukrainian defense system will "cement", strengthen - and break it in the future will become much more difficult.

Especially on convenient for defense of the borders and in areas that are best suited. Therefore, it will even be out of "last forces" in this direction (or better to say, try to do it). But, in this regard, I will remind. I am more and more convinced that the moment of "election of something one, specific" for the enemy was approaching even more.

The simultaneous offensive (or better-an attempt) at once in 2-3 operating directions leads to the fact that the enemy will be forced to "croat Tricoshkin Kafan" in promptly in the near future. This becomes even more relevant to him when the Ukrainian command will still have the opportunities (albeit partial) to overcome the difficulties with ammunition and replenishment of the personnel of their formations. In this sense, time is clearly not in favor of the Russians.