Dnipro jump: what caused the activity of the Russian army in the Zaporozhye region

But for this, its groups of troops should increase dramatically in principle, from the army of the Russian Federation you can expect a jump in the Dnieper in the direction of Kherson and Nikolaev, says military analyst Konstantin Mashovets, and this can explain the activity of the enemy in the Zaporozhye region. But for this, his grouping of troops should increase dramatically - and it is unclear how and by anyone. Review.

Today we will return to the old format for a while - we will try to consider the situation exclusively in one direction, in Zaporizhzhya. Because many readers ask about it. 58-A ZVA leads a positional defense on a large part of its lane, except for the area between the fives-to the north of the Valley, where its forces and means have been trying to move in the tactical zone for almost 2 weeks (began somewhere between March 13-15), acting in two directions: in the attacks/assaults.

DSHD), as well as several units of the 503rd SME (from the 19th MSD) and somewhere to the battalion of the 70th SME (from the 42nd MSD). It is obvious that the closest tasks of the enemy's advanced units in this direction are to promote the Kamianske-Orykhiv route on the Steppe-Shcherbaka section, as well as seizure of the reference points of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the area of ​​the villages of Steppe and Shcherbak.

As of yesterday's morning, the enemy, as a result of quite active attacking/assault actions and intense fire at the positions of our advanced units, managed to advance (to be drawn) in these directions to a depth of up to 2 km (towards the road and the village of Shcherbaka) and up to 1. 5 km (in the direction of the village).

The enemy continues to attack the mentioned areas, but apparently feels a number of difficulties in maintaining the intensity of its attacks at the previous level, since its promotion is clearly minimal, even within the "tactical improvement" of the leading positions, and its advanced units, trying to move forward, are clearly suffered.

At this time, the advanced units of the enemy, apparently, try to "cling to" for the southern outskirts of the village of Mali Shcherbaki, managed to approach the above road (on the site about 3 km along the front, between the steppe and small shrubaks) and to enter the fights of the lobby. Located south.

It is obvious that the enemy's command has managed to concentrate the predominant forces and means on this area (primarily on the number of personnel suitable for use in active assault actions, as part of their assault groups and units), using tactics of actions by small infantry groups, with intensive fire support (in particular, with the help of artillery.

At the same time, the issue of the effectiveness of its further actions, especially in increasing the rate of promotion of advanced units, expanding its tactical inquiry into the defense system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this direction remains open. Because, 2 km in 2 weeks, these are not the indicators that can contribute to the special optimism of its command in this regard. Especially if you remember the "price" that it was forced to "pay" for advancement on the same 2 km.

In this regard, there are two hypothetical situations that are possible in this case: in the first case, these actions are clear and logically substantiated.

The enemy in this direction clearly tries to restore the position that existed before the summer-autumn of 2023 (before the start of the Ukrainian offensive in this direction) and at the same time facilitate the task, as well as complicate it for the Armed Forces, cutting the nearest rock in their tactical rear (the road between steppes and the And at this point, it is close to the implementation of this "minimum" program - in fact, the road is already cut, not today, so tomorrow the enemy will also "catch" for Steppe and Shcherbak.

But otherwise everything is a little more complicated. It is obvious that for the further development of this offensive, especially with some operational-tactical sight (for example, for actions on the defense area of ​​the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kamyansky area, or to create conditions for starting/restoration of active offensive actions in the neighboring Orikhiv direction), the enemy will have to be introduced into the battle. And today I am not ready to say where he will take them.

Just because I have not found information about the regrouping of any considerable forces and means (reserves) of the enemy in the 58th Twist of the enemy. Another feature is that all these attacks (battles) of a "local scale" in the Zaporozhye direction can have "auxiliary" or, more simply, "distracting" role. In this regard, it is uniquely worth considering the opponent's attempt to "jump over the Dnieper" or restore active actions in the Orikhiv direction.

After all, these actions clearly do not pull on a larger (strategic) scale of "distraction". Moreover, in both these variants, "mutually exclusive" things would be clear, because their scale is different, as well as the directions of hypothetical actions of the enemy troops.

The first would refer to the concentration of the main forces and means of the Dnepr "in the lane of the 18th name (and there would be massively drawn" equipment for forcing "), in the second everything would happen on the contrary-the command of the Dnepr" would be transferred additional forces from the Dnieper Dnieper. 49th name-34th or 205th OMSBR). Thus, to summarize, there are two main conclusions about the Zaporizhzhya direction.

"Offensive actions" (or more precisely, attacks) of individual parts and units of the 58th name of the enemy in the Zaporozhye direction at this point have a very limited (tactical) scale, and at this level they have some importance. Not more than . . . about some more threat from the enemy in this direction it is too early.

Another thing is, if the enemy "revives" at the same time in the Dnieper direction or in the neighboring Orikhivsky, or will try to sharply and significantly increase the scope and intensity of its attacking/assault actions in Zaporozhye. It is in this case that it will be necessary to understand in more detail in the hypothetical plans and designs of the enemy. The author expresses a personal opinion that may not coincide with the editorial position.