The victory of Ukraine or the preservation of Russia. Such a difficult choice should be made by the event right now

And they do not want to be afraid to be involved in the war with Russia. But we ask that we are now only a clear signal, and the introduction itself took place after the war! And here the masks fall. Berlin and Washington do not suit this option, because they understand that even the release of the Armed Forces to the borders of 1991 does not mean the end of the war.

It is unlikely that the Russian Federation will just move away from the Ukrainian territories, which it has already recorded in the Constitution as Russian. That is, the only possible variant of Ukraine's victory is the transformation of Russia itself or the depletion of its military resources to a stage when it is simply unable to fight. What again will clearly lead to the transformation of the empire.

But! The United States and Germany (as well as France, which now plays the role of "good police" and a number of NATO countries) are afraid of such a victory for Ukraine, probably more than Putin's victory over Ukraine. These are the phantom fears of the emergence of the Yugoslav model, which are enhanced by the nuclear factor. The fears are irrational because it is more correct to be afraid of what is now, not what may be, or may not be.

Hence the problem of NATO's duality regarding the result of the Russian-Ukrainian war. On the one hand, the Alliance leaders do not want Ukraine to lose war and do everything for it. But on the other, they are afraid of the only possible variant of victory that can really provide long -term peace - the fall of Putin's regime and the transformation of the Russian Federation. And if they are afraid, they do not seek such a victory.

And what do they want? Not the victory of Ukraine, but the stabilization of the conflict - "termination of hostilities". We have already passed, this is probably the most commonly used phrase in the sidelines of the Minsk process. Stabilization may be a Korean version or the same Minsk. And for this, Putin needs to give some gingerbread, which will allow him to go to a compromise peace, keeping his face.

Ukraine's inability to NATO is the sweetest of all such gingerbreads, since territorial concessions are unacceptable to Kiev. And in the case of NATO, nothing depends on Kiev. That is why we are not invited to join NATO even after the war. Because such an invitation will mean the impossibility of negotiations from the Russian Federation about compromise (and therefore temporary) peace. Which Washington and Berlin are considered today the most likely option to stop hostilities.

Conclusion: The main problem is not that we are not called to NATO, but that there is no single vision of the defeat of Russia. Although the real defeat has only one possible option. And if they do not set such a goal, then they do not seek them. That is, they do not seek our real victory. Improperly marked the purpose of a priori will lead to the wrong result. A compromise peace is a war -delayed war.

Ukraine may not even be caused by military defeat, but due to human military losses, outflow of population, economic degradation, internal political processes, exacerbated by the intensification of nationalist and radical sentiment. It seems to be well understood in Moscow, strongly bringing us to the Korean version, but they do not take into account in the West. Both we and Russia are too big and too different. We are not one divided people like in Korea.

Our struggle is not for the territory and not for ideology - it is existential! Either we or the Russian Federation - someone should fall, the other end of the war can not be. Our partners need to be determined not with NATO's membership.