The end of Russia's influence and a chance for Eurasia. As the post -Soviet space changes

Feeling the fragility of the Russian authorities, the governments of the countries of the region began to create precedents on the ground, which have long been allowed by the post -imperial power of Russia. From the beginning of the "special military operation" against Ukraine, worried neighbors, such as Kazakhstan, have demonstratively rejected Russia. For the last few weeks, there have also been conflicts in Eurasia, which can be a harbinger of future instability.

Regional states, especially China and Turkey, are more open to Russian influence. In addition, mobilization in Russia has caused the flow of migration to other Eurasian states - especially in Armenia, Georgia and Kazakhstan. This turns back the long-standing tendency of migration from these countries to Russia and leaves many ordinary Russians face to face with dissatisfaction, which is still felt in many post-colonial societies.

Focus has translated the analytical material of Jeffrey Makoff about how the influence of the Russian Federation in the Eurasian space changes through "special operation" against Ukraine. These events are the first signs of what will probably become one of the most durable results of the war: reducing Russia's influence throughout the post -Soviet Eurasia space and the emergence of a more dynamic, albeit more complex regional order.

In other words, this result is exactly the opposite of what Moscow was hoped to achieve its invasion of Ukraine and the actual occupation of Belarus. As the restoration of hostilities in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia shows, reducing Russian influence can lead to the restoration of hot phases of old conflicts that will bring new suffering to people in the region.

However, in the long run, it can contribute to the emergence of stronger and more efficient states - especially if the United States and their European allies can provide a more liberal alternative to growing the influence of China and Turkey. The coverage of military failures and recent mobilization in Russia has left important events in other regions in the periphery of the Old Soviet Empire.

The restoration of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, indicates that, by floating blood in Ukraine, Moscow loses the ability to manipulate other post -imperial conflicts that have its border areas. In fact, Russia was forced to withdraw troops from these regions to replenish its losses in Ukraine.

This allowed other regional states to use Russia's problems to achieve their own goals in the self -proclaimed sphere of "special interests" of Moscow. When Russian troops were knocked out from Kharkiv, fighting began at the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan-countries that have been fighting for the disputed region of Nagorny Karabakh since the 1980s.

Shortly thereafter, the Tajik troops began to fire Kyrgyzstan, raising the rates in a conflict, which has been smoldering on their tortuous border for several years. Although the main burden of hostilities is carried by locals, the reputation of Russia as a regional hegemon, capable of maintaining or imposing in order on its periphery, was also injured.

Russia played an important role in ensuring the ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which put an end to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War at the end of 2020, and sent its forces as peacekeepers for monitoring and implementing the agreement. It is noteworthy that Moscow was a mediator in the ceasefire after the Azerbaijani troops struck outside the Nagorno -Karabakh and in Armenia itself, which, according to the Kremlin, is under the October security umbrella.

This time, when Azerbaijan resumed the offensive, the calls of Yerevan to support the CDC, headed by Russia, remained unanswered. Having failed in Ukraine, Moscow in March brought out about 800 servicemen, as well as numerous peacekeepers, from Armenia. Compared to 2020, Russia is now cautious about provoked tensions in relations with Azerbaijan's ally Turkey, taking into account the role of Ankara as a mediator of Russian trade and investment in Western sanctions.

If Azerbaijan concludes that he can act without taking into account the opinion of Russia, then Armenia remains to be realized that the security guarantee, which it nominally uses within the collective security contract, is of little value. At the same time, the United States and the European Union have taken the initiative to negotiate a strong peace agreement between Baku and Yerevan.

Like Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are members of the CPU and have long been placed by significant contingents of Russian troops. The Russian presence in Central Asia was mainly aimed at combating the spread of instability, jihadism, drug trafficking and other international challenges, while helping to restrain the territorial disputes that arose as a result of the disorderly distribution of the Ferganian Valley between Kyrgizstan, Tajijkistan.

For example, when in April 2021 clashes on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border exacerbated, Russia played mainly a constructive role, encouraging both sides to observe the ceasefire. However, the Kyrgyz-Tajik fighting resumed in September 2022. Due to the fighting, which was conducted by nationalist politicians on both sides, more than 100 people were killed and tens of thousands were forced to flee.

Since Tajikistan President Emomala Rachmon is one of the few post -Soviet leaders who do not deny Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Moscow seems to be leaning towards Tajikistan to the detriment of his mediator. At the beginning of October, Kyrgyzstan abolished the planned training in his territory, and Bishkek and Dushanbe ignored the intermediary efforts of the organization.

Another sign of the weakening of Russia's influence was the assumption of Kyrgyz officials that foreign militants from Afghanistan, whom Moscow sought to displace from Asia for a long time, participated in Tajikistan. As in the South Caucasus, the leaders of both countries recognize that Russia is unable to impose any settlement, since it has already had to relocate more than 1500 servicemen to replenish the losses in Ukraine.

Local players in the South Caucasus and Central Asia are not the only ones who are inspired by Russia's difficulties. Other regional states also used the distraction and demoralization of Russia to promote their plans. China and Turkey were the greatest activity - two former Russian partners with long -standing interests in Eurasia. Initially, neither Ankara nor Beijing completely agreed to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

NATO ally Turkey provides military assistance to Ukraine, in particular, by providing Bayraktar TB2 drones. In a recent interview with the Public Broadcasting Service, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan confirmed that Turkey did not recognize any territorial changes and urged Russia to end the war, repeating the proposal for Turkey's mediation.

Although China, in the face of Xi, rhetorically supported Russia, accusing NATO of solving war, he refused to provide military assistance or to help Russia bypass Western sanctions. At the Shanhai Organization of Cooperation in Tashkent in mid -September, SI expressed "questions and concerns" about the war in Ukraine. Along with other players such as India, the United Arab Emirates and the European Union, China and Turkey have significantly expanded their presence in post -Soviet Eurasia.

Although Turkey continues to support Azerbaijan, it seeks to open its border and normalize relations with Armenia. It can be more difficult than Erdogan hopes, but Ankara sees the opportunity to change the economic geography of the region here. The connection of Armenia to transit corridors from east to west through the Caucasus will contribute to the expansion of links with Central Asia and at the same time reduce Yerevan's dependence on Russia (and Iran).

At the same time, Turkey also intensifies its interaction with the states of Central Asia, achieving the reorganization and strengthening of the Organization of Turkic states, seeking membership in the Shanghai cooperation and signing new agreements on economic and military cooperation with such potential allies of Russia as Kazakhstan and Kirgisstan. The expansion of China was even more rapid.

Although Chinese trade and investment, especially in Central Asia, increased long before the start of a full -scale invasion of Russia, the sanction and decline of the Russian economy will accelerate the economic turn of Eurasia towards China. As foreign companies are running away from Russia through sanctions, China is also increasingly turning to transit routes through Central Asia and the Caucasus to enter Europe.

According to one of the regional trade associations, the volume of transit of goods through Central Asia and the Caucasus this year will be 6 times exceeding the volume of transportation through the region in 2021. The governments of Central Asia are also increasingly turning to China for security, including weapons, training and collaboration. The question of the presence and efficiency of Russian troops in the region will only increase this trend.

At the same time, China is using a warming of relations to force the governments of Central Asia to reconcile with its cruel repression against Uigur in neighboring Xinjiang. Russia has long been the main guarantor of safety in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia, trying to manipulate the rivalry between its smaller neighbors to ensure their own influence and at the same time holding back regional disputes.

Since the collapse of the USSR, the elite was mostly considered to be an unwavering force of post -Soviet Eurasia. They hoped that Moscow would understand their internal disputes and provide security umbrellas both through bilateral agreements and through a multilateral organization of a collective security agreement.

For their part, Russian officials and third -party observers considered the post -Soviet states of Eastern Europe (including Ukraine), the South Caucasus and Central Asia as part of the fact that Dmitry once called the Russian "sphere of interests". After Russia's catastrophic war in Ukraine, this idea is becoming more and more unable to.

Armenia conflicts with Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan with Tajikistan show how erosion of Russian influence can bring even more violence and suffering in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia. However, in the long run, reducing Russian influence can be the basis for the emergence of stronger and more stable states in these regions, since regional elites will have to take much responsibility for solving their own problems.

The geopolitical pluralism that occurs in the region will also allow smaller Eurasian states to become more independent, as they will be able to choose between several external partners. They benefit from the opportunity to receive more income from trade and transit, as well as from future investments in their energy sector. The increase in the influence of China and Turkey is unlikely to be especially liberal, and it will help solve numerous problems of leadership in the region.

However, Russia's weakness gives a chance to the US and the EU, especially as the post -Soviet generation of elites. Even now, when the United States and their allies are focused on the help of Ukraine in the fight against the Russian invasion, it is time to start thinking about how to promote the further emergence of small Eurasian states from the shadow of Russia.

The flow of investment, partnership with civil society and the development of mechanisms of regional cooperation - all this plays a vital role in the fact that Central Asia becomes more democratic and safer after the defeat of Russia. Jeffrey Mancoff is a honored researcher at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National University of Defense and Senior Employee-Non-resident of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).