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The military analyst Konstantin Mashovets proposes to understand what nuclear we...

Strategic, tactical and small: what nuclear weapons are in the Russian Federation and what it can apply in Ukraine

The military analyst Konstantin Mashovets proposes to understand what nuclear weapons Russia has and whether it makes sense to use it in Ukraine. So he responds to the disseminated fears about the possibility of Putin's blow in our country. I look that a large number of people continue to feel existential fear about the possibility of struck by nuclear weapons with a bullet in Ukraine. Well, let's understand.

So, the Russian Federation has a number of means of damage that can be attributed to the category of "nuclear weapons". However, all of it in its scale of application is conditionally divided into 2 large categories: strategic nuclear weapons (Xiaz), well, tactical (tactical), as a variant-operational-tactical \ otz (but it is quite conditional, because the affected factors of nuclear explosion are bad In the "level and scale" of combat, so they are usually divided into Xiaz and Druzh.

Although this division is extremely conditional, because this can be applied with operational-tactical and tactical purposes, as well as difficult-with strategic ones, due to the presence of modern nuclear weapons with variational capacity to regulate the power of nuclear explosion.

There are still so -called "small" (up to 10 kt) and "Krymali" (up to 1 kt) charges, but their presence of the Russian Federation has never been officially recognized because these charges are obviously intended for sabotage purposes (" carrier "). After all, to publicly recognize the existence of in peacetime means of nuclear sabotage means to convert "to your ass" a fairly rigid reaction of the world community, first of all, that part of it that itself has nuclear weapons.

"Small" and "superfluous" nuclear charges are usually also referred to as a gravity, they are separated into a separate type of nuclear ammunition only by the power of the explosion (up to 10 kt). At one time, the Kremlin's grandparents who managed the USSR, where, in fact, developed this kind of weapons, were not frozen as the current Pouilo and his Lubian- "cooperative" shooblo, and "shopoplo" and "depoplo" on the account of nuclear wishes.

"They did not chat, although they also sometimes carried out atomic atomic color. So, let us return to the issue of hypothetical use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

This usually begins somewhere in the area of ​​100 kt (for comparison, what has fallen on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it is about about 10 to 20 kt) and is intended to be affected by large or well-protected goals in the strategic depth of the territory enemy (including densely populated regions) or those that have decisive (strategic) importance for the level of its defense capability (key military bases, command centers, defense industry, critical infrastructure, including transport and energy, political and administrative centers Well, etc.

) it is a long -range, mainly at the level of intercontinental, for the range of their ability to "deliver" nuclear warrior to the target, weapons . . . However, not always. Sometimes it is equipped with airbags, medium and short -range missiles, torpedoes, etc.

The use of these weapons is apparently due to catastrophic-phallic consequences for significant areas of territories, and in all directions from the epicenter of the blasting of this kind of charge-first of all, due to its high power and, accordingly, significant in level of intensity and duration of its impact Impressive factors. This is still more "pushed" when the rocket is with the main part that is shared in the flight, with an individual guide to each block.

This makes the use of a country that has at its disposal, for a target not far from its borders, even at a considerable distance - unlikely. Especially when it is planned (or actually used), such weapons are massively massively or with a powerful charge. That is, this makes sense to apply when the goal to be affected is located far (preferably at a strategic distance, at least 1,000 km from you).

And the further-the better… a weapon is a weapon for use in the course of fighting directly in tactical and operational-tactical zones (including rear districts), for the defeat of significant clusters objects. Unlike Xiaz, it is usually less powerful, up to 100 kt (and accordingly, it has less intensity and volume of impact, but their physical nature is the same as in the Syaz, although it can be modeled by the design of the "special charge itself ").

Drag requires the most sophisticated and modern guidance systems, because it is intended for use in the immediate vicinity of its troops . . . According to the method of delivery and use of sore, there is: in the world, then there are still no internationally recognized categories and parameters in the world, for which one or the other The nuclear charge may be unambiguously attributed to the soup. They tried to classify the power, range of actions (use) of carriers, purpose, and even accurate . . .

However, how very quickly turned out to be, in a number of these parameters of the boundary between Syuz and the Druzh . . . Well, very conditional. I have already said about the modeled power, the range of carriers is also a very discussion parameter (long -range winged missiles, refueling of strategic aviation in the air, etc. ).

The purpose is also a very controversial criterion, because, for example, the application of a strategic submarine of a nuclear strike on any front-line naval base of the enemy How to classify? How do you use a sore, do you still have it? Well, and not all that is so unambiguous. " There are samples of Xiaz, which successfully ensure a precision at the level of the sore, and vice versa - a soda, which can be "not reaching" this indicator . . .

So, knowing all this, let's try to determine the likelihood "nuclei" in the territory of Ukraine. Here, it is best to compare three parameters: and this will give us a more or less real picture of those initial data, in the presence of which the Kremlin will make the appropriate decision.

The land or marine start of the "heavy" rocket - it is necessary to reconfigure the rocket itself, to dig in the systems of its guidance, to attach the trajectory of the flight that lies "through space", well, etc. After all, she is intended for Washington and London, not for Fastov or Berdichev . . .

Aviation charge of the Category on board the aircraft will be discovered before he release him at the line of start which, obviously, everyone is under 24 -hour surveillance, not so much Ukraine as "other states"). Therefore, the most likely option is to use a rocket from a submarine… well, or if they make a decision, they will try to launch a long -haired or strategic aviation aircraft.

If the Ukrainian air defense misses, the enemy will be able to hit (of course, to one degree or another), a significant region of Ukraine (about 2-3 regions) with a large regional destruction area . . . However, before the end of the war on marsh conditions, this is still not will lead. The consequences, not only for Ukraine, but also for the Kremlin itself will also be catastrophic.

In addition to the fact that a significant proportion of these "consequences" will be carried directly to the swamps themselves, also to the world, obviously, "not like" the death of our population, large -scale destruction, etc. , but "atomic pollution" will not be liked. A large part of the 30% of the most fertilized steady lands of this planet. In this case, the pleshine of the CMO and all its blocks will be reached from any bins and "assholes of the world".

At the same time, they will not save any money . . . Of course, the situation will not correct the situation, but they will die for a long time and extremely "pain. " Not to go to the fortune teller, "the pen" will even be detained by China . . . including, after 2 factors-limited capacity (and accordingly, the volume and size of possible consequences) and technical and technological variability . . . After all, in this case-possibly banal art-carrier.

and possibly some fanatical cotton-scraped rubb "with a nuclear backpack" to send to Bindrof Lviv or Kiev. Moreover, in this case, the purpose and place of undermining the tactical special charge can be chosen in a fairly wide spectrum. The result is likely to be difficult for us. Of course, not in the scale of the whole region, but "in place", except that again a significant number of our people will die, something is destroyed for us, or even symbolic.

But it will not stop the war on marsh conditions more . . . Well, the consequences for the Kremlin itself will not only be difficult, but "very heavy". In this case, I predict even more rigid isolation than in North Korea, but short . . . Further-tectonic socio-political upsets on swamps (perhaps even disintegration).

The country, built on the export of raw materials and resources and the entrance of all necessary "for life and battle" from abroad, in conditions of rigid and continuous isolation caused by the real use of "nucleus bonba", in another way will not be able to . . .

in Moscow, Peter and Peter and Some Ekaterinburg grass, as in the DPRK, will not be… It will end with a very quickly introduction into the territory of the Russian Federation "Stabilization contingent" of international military forces (including Chinese). And the construction of the so -called "global south" will continue without the Russian Federation as a centralized and independent state . . .

In general, the probability of using the Kremlin of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, exists - it, of course, "do not stretch" to zero, but small… in order to have it She jumped to the 100th, there should be several key conditions: the main reason that the likelihood of using the Kremlin of nuclear weapons in Ukraine is small - because it will in no way bring it closer to the victory in the war . . .