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Russian society has learned not to worry about the war, writes American historia...

Three -quarters of the Russian Federation approves the invasion: how the Russians learned not to worry about the war

Russian society has learned not to worry about the war, writes American historian of Ukrainian origin Alexander Motyl. In the end, it turns out that three -quarters of the country approve of war and genocide . . .

Do the average Russians blame for the war against Ukraine? How about responsibility? Do they get rid of the moral hook? The recent report of two Russian experts related to the Carnegie Foundation for the International Peace suggests that the answer lies somewhere between the first two options. The report called "Alternative reality: how Russian society has learned not to worry about the war" is a sad reading.

"For almost two years that have passed since on February 24, 2022, Russia has started a" special military operation "against Ukraine, Russian society has become accustomed to living against the backdrop of a cruel armed conflict," - wrote co -authors Denis Volkov and Andriy Kolesnikov. This is not surprising: even Ukrainians who physically live among violence are already used to war. Some Russians actively oppose war and regime.

Some, Turbo-Patriots, "sincerely and aggressively support" the illegitimate president and dictator of Russia Vladimir Putin. Unfortunately, the authors write, "the vast majority is apathetic and simply passive and automatically" maintains "what makes the regime, waiting for" when it all over ". Their support of Putin's criminal regime is quite bad. The population has chosen to become apathetic: their condition can be called "learned indifference.

" Putin in the eyes of such people is a legitimate leader, so his "special military operation" should be the same. " When you make a choice, you are aware of the alternatives and consciously, deliberately expressing the advantage of one over the other. Unsevive people who believe X have not chosen faith in X. It is just part of their mental composition.

Therefore, when Russians prefer to be indifferent to the atrocities committed on their behalf in Ukraine, they are fully aware of these crimes, but still prefer to support Putin and his war. Note that it is not an active opposition. Given the deeply repressive nature of the Putin regime and the horror of sanctions, which it imposes even on minor manifestations of dissent, it is clear and even forgive that the Russians avoid going outside, risking losing everything.

But the Russians who preferred to remain indifferent did so during public opinion surveys, not on demonstrations. They were practically risky, answering the question "I do not know" or "can't say". Instead, they preferred to support Putin and the war, just as they decided not to express their opposition or neutrality about the conflict. In short, they chose to be either guilty or responsible or both.

At least it is clear that "a fifth of the Russian population, which is active and uncompromising supporters of the war" certainly carries guilt for atrocities created by Russia in Ukraine. Unfortunately, according to Volkov and Kolesnikov's study, only about 20 percent oppose the war and therefore do not carry any guilt or responsibility. You like it or not, but with everyone else - everything is the opposite.

When three -quarters or more population approve of war and genocide, we are in the field that goes beyond public opinion surveys and includes culture. The Russians are not savage. But they seem too ready to recognize the legitimacy and power of wild rulers: bloodthirsty, cruel and arrogant tyrants, which, with rare exceptions, were initially ruled by Muscovy and then the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.

The Russians rebelled throughout history, and therefore the assumption of Volkov and Kolesnikov that they would never oppose Putin's regime, is refuted by the past. But the norm was subordination, while the requirements of freedom, no matter how anarchic they may be, were deviations from it. As a KGB personnel officer, Putin knew it when he came to power in 1999.

And he understood that the requirement that his propaganda apparatus relied on this cultural heritage, only increased the plausibility of his message - that Russia would again become great and that Putin is the person who can provide it - and thus strengthen his reign. As a result, as many Russians and Ukrainians say, "we have what we have": a slave population who prefers crime rather than justice, but which, if circumstances, assist, attract their owners, burn and plunder their estates.