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People's Deputy Alexei Goncharenko in an exclusive interview with focus shared h...

"Russia is doomed." Alexei Goncharenko about the President of Zelensky, difficult winter and traitors in the Council

People's Deputy Alexei Goncharenko in an exclusive interview with focus shared his thoughts on the counter -offensive of Ukrainian defenders, scenarios of war development, necessary sanctions against the Russian Federation, possible collaborators in Ukrainian authorities, President Vladimir Zelensky, the situation in the Odessa region and more.

Focus decided to communicate with Oleksiy Goncharenko, one of the most media Ukrainian parliamentarians, about the situation at the front, recent statements of his native Odessa head Gennady Trukhanov and the future of Russia. You have been elected to the Council from the district in Odesa region. And the situation in the region is quite difficult. On the one hand, the Black Sea, where the Black Sea fleet continues. On the other hand, Transnistria -controlled, which is bordered by your district.

Do you think the threat of invasion from the sea and Transnistria remains for Odessa? There is no threat in the short term. Obviously, such an operation was planned, it was part of the surgery to invade Ukraine. It was planned to strike on three sides on Odessa. To cut the route of Odesa-Kyiv to the north of Odessa, going out through Voznesensk, where Russian troops were torn after bypassing Nikolaev is a major blow. And two auxiliary - from Transnistria and Marine Airborne.

Today, Russia has no stroke on none of these blows. The discovery of the "grain corridor" actually marked by Russia's recognition that they are not capable of serious operations in the northwestern part of the Black Sea. This is after the loss of Moscow, the release of snake, etc. Russia cannot break into Nikolaev. And now we are already seeing the Ukrainian counter -offensive on Kherson.

That is, for Russia now is a super -task - to keep control over Kherson and a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper. It will be difficult for them. As for the situation in Transnistria, after it became clear that there is no blitzkrig. They have no desire to go there. And in general, I think that for them the worst dream is when Russia will be near them.

There is a certain oligarchic quasi -Rosespubble, which is covered on one side by Russia, and on the other hand - does not want to be near it at all, because they understand that they will all turn into cannon meat. Therefore, Russia has no prerequisites for attack on Odessa today. However, this does not mean that they will never be. This war has been going on for the ninth year.

And Putin wants to reach a ceasefire with Ukraine in some way, then "digest" those territories that he managed to seize at this moment, and, having kept the bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper, later, after regrouping, reconstruction of the army, etc. ]. Odesa for him is a strategic goal, not prompt, there is not even any chance. But strategic goal # 1.

It is the admiration of Odessa, the cutting of Ukraine from the Black Sea (we saw everything how important the Black Sea is in the world context), the exit to the borders with Transnistria, a simultaneous operation to capture Moldova is possible. That is, I think for him a strategic task for the Russian Empire. Therefore, we must be ready for this and, when deciding, during this part of the war, too, to understand and prevent it.

For example, it is absolutely right that we need to throw Russians from the right bank of the Dnieper, to deprive them of this bridgehead. From one freelance adviser to the President's office, it sounded that if he asks Chisinau, the Armed Forces would help him to eliminate the so -called Transnistrian Moldavian Republic in a matter of days.

How high is the likelihood of such events and whether Ukraine needs such a second front or the continuation of the main front? Again, you need to separate "now" and "strategically". Now I believe that this is absolutely not necessary in Ukraine. We are running a very difficult war with a strong enemy. We have shown the world that it is not so strong and invincible. It is absolutely possible to defeat it. But it is a strong enemy. Therefore, we do not need to increase the fronts today.

It should be understood that in Transnistria there are also people and forces who hold on this status quo. They do not want to go to war with Ukraine, but if they directly protect their way of life, earnings and existence, it is possible that they will also fight. I do not think at all that Ukraine should resolve this issue for Moldova. And I can say clearly that we do not need any additional fronts. It seems to me that such statements are irresponsible. On the other hand - strategically.

This is a matter of long -term perspective. It is obvious that Transnistria is a challenge to the safety of southern Ukraine. Just as Belarus in its current state is a challenge to Ukraine's safety in general. And, of course, we need to build our policies in such a way as to remove these sources of danger from their borders and help other players - Moldova, the EU, the Baltic countries - to close such dangerous things.

How do you feel about the mayor of Odessa Gennady Trukhanov and his latest statements, including "negotiations with the Russians" and monument to Catherine II? I have never been a supporter of Mr Trukhanov. In the last elections in Odessa we put forward a democratic candidate, Petro Obukhov. And he was not enough to go on a second round with Trukhanov. The problem was that the democratic pro -Ukrainian forces in Odessa did not unite.

And so, unfortunately, Trukhanov and a representative of the IPP met in the second round. There was a confrontation between "bad" and "very bad" variants. Regarding his statements. This is Putin's narrative, "now let's talk, stop the fighting in the positions that are with a passionate fifth of Ukraine, and we will start some meaningless long -term negotiations. " I do not reject the possibility of negotiation, because they can always be conducted, there is no betrayal.

But this should not be due to the termination of hostilities, Ukraine has to do everything to liberate its territory. And only if, God forbid, we will see that either not all we can release, or in some other circumstances - not because we will stop ourselves, but if we find that we cannot go anywhere - then one story . But the task is to release all territories. Therefore, such statements are certainly repeating the Russian narrative, and they are dangerous.

As for Catherine, I think that she is not a place in the center of Odessa. This sculpture should be removed. It does not need to be destroyed, it may well stand in the museum. But in the central square of the city of Odessa, in the capital of the Ukrainian south, to do nothing on February 24 after February 24. I emphasize - Catherine is not some prominent artist or scientist. This is the Russian Empress. And its monument is like a label that the city is the territory of the Russian Empire.

And it is not and will never be. And from a historical point it is all a great myth. In fact, Odesa, of course, existed before the "decree" of Catherine. Moreover, there is no "decree on the creation of Odessa", there is a decree on the creation of a port and its expansion and construction of a military harbor. Of course, it was an impetus for the development of the city, but the city existed before. The monument to Catherine in Odessa is already doomed.

And it decided not to Odessa, not Trukhanov, but it decided to Putin when he hit Odessa with rockets. And what should be done with monuments in Odessa to other figures of the Russian Empire? There is no general approach here. Pushkin monument - there are no problems at all. Pushkin is a world -class artist, he has nothing to do with any anti -Ukrainian activity. And, importantly, Pushkin lived in Odessa really, wrote about Odessa. There is no problem with the monument.

How is the counter -offensive of Ukrainian defenders advance? Is it only in the south of Ukraine or in other areas of the front? (The conversation was vigored on September 5, - Ed. ). I, unlike some advisers and others, is not a military specialist or a representative of the General Staff. I will say my subjective point of view. High -folding is an important strategic success. It was from him that the Kryvyi Rih was fired. This is the approach of us to the Dnieper and so on.

This is important, and we move there. However, I would draw your attention to the response of Russian propaganda - if in the first days they said that there is no counter -offensive, that it is all fake, that Ukraine is in no way capable, that it is all conversations, now the rhetoric has changed completely.

They spoke that the Armed Forces is very powerful that very difficult fights, Strelkov said that the Russian army, if not mobilization was not carried out, remains two to three months before it began to fall. That is, the rhetoric has changed completely. And this, in my opinion, is a testament to the fact that the counter -offensive develops quite successfully. All these estimates - some say that we specifically make it slower - that is all of us, are some phraseological turnover.

This is the battle. We do as we allow us to make the enemy. And the enemy fights, it is important for the enemy to keep this bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper. Therefore, of course, it is not easy. In addition, we are tasked with, as far as I understand, not only release, but also release with minimal destruction, with minimal victims of both military personnel and civilians. Because it is our territory. And you do not want Kherson to be injured.

The ideal option is to force the Russians to leave, as they went from the snake, a "gesture of goodwill. " This is an optimistic script, but for me, it is quite realistic. As for other areas of the front. ISW gave an analytics that we have captured a certain bridgehead on the northern bank of the Seversky Donets, we have some counter -offensive actions. I understand that they are more tactical. The main events take place here in the south, in the Kherson region.

How many released settlements from the beginning of this counter -offensive can we already state confidently? I think to a dozen. The counter -offensive is not as fast as many Ukrainians would like, and it is difficult. Even in a few months, the Russians managed to strengthen their positions in Kherson that it is extremely difficult to punch them.

Will we really be able to deopen the military through ORDLO and Crimea, which were strengthened for 8 years? I think that a mechanical transfer of the situation in the Kherson region to the Donbas or Crimea cannot be done here. I would like to remind that, for example, in the First World War, Germany lost when her troops were standing near Paris. And on any piece of Germany then there were no soldiers of a foreign state.

From a mechanical point of view, Germany at that time controlled most of the non -German territories. But at the same time she lost the war to the ground - it was a defeat, and she surrendered. Therefore, this is not measured by such things. Dynamics is very important here. The situation within Russia itself is important. For example, I think Kherson's release will have serious consequences for Russia.

Not for nothing, they now change their propaganda and already prepare people - they need to show some success. What is the murderous empire? Losing the imperialist war. It was so many times in history. I emphasize that this is not military opinion, but more political, but I do not think we will have to be released physically every piece of Ukrainian territory.

I think that at a certain stage, when we see the onset of such a fracture that we are approaching now, and serious loss of Russian troops will begin, it can have the effect of dominoes and it can all fall apart in just one day. In just one day, the Putin regime can cease to exist. This is the difference: democratic systems, at first glance, are unstable all the time - something is happening, something changes. But they are fundamentally very stable. Because they rely on huge masses of people.

Therefore, you cannot translate exactly. It is not the matter how they strengthened Crimea. We will not have it to break it. We have already shown that we can hit military sites in Crimea. This is a very important and very correct step. And the point in general dynamics. Whether Russia can keep any occupied Ukrainian territories or not. I want to say unambiguously that I will not. In the long run, the Russian Empire is doomed. And Putin accelerated everything on February 24.

That is, what could have existed for decades, now, I think, this is a good event. Ukraine is fighting against Putin and his regime or all Russians? If the regime falls, will the Russians have the desire to continue the war? Or maybe they do not have such a mass desire to continue the war, as Russian propaganda says? Of course, Ukraine is fighting against the Russian regime. In general, I think it is a vertical war against the horizontal.

The Russian state is a vertical, there is no Russian society. We cannot fight with Russian society simply because it does not exist. We are fighting against the Russian authorities, the Russian state. Ukraine is a horizontal. In fact, no one in Ukraine is fighting for Zelensky or another politician. People fight for their land, for their will, for the future, for their children, grandchildren. It may sound pathetic, but that is what everyone feels. We protect our home.

The army is at war, volunteers help - most Ukrainians are actually involved. With the fall of this regime, there will be a lot of sobering in Russian society. It is deeply ill, it requires denacification, deputies, deimperialization. But these processes will go quickly. The sobering will be very tough, I think. It will be something like what happened in Nazi Germany after losing in World War II.

You have registered in the Council a Project Resolution on the recognition of state sovereignty of the Chechen Republic Ichkera. In your opinion, will it really vote in the Council? Will national movements in the Russian Federation change the situation in Russia? From the side, it may seem that citizens in conditional Tatarstan or Buryatia are satisfied, not protesting, do not seek to gain their own sovereignty.

If we talk about Ichkeria, then it is obvious that citizens there sought to gain their own independence. Today we have faced with a Russian war car that was afraid of the whole world. We have largely debunked this myth. But at the moment, this machine is powerful and complex. And the whole world helps us. The little one has fought with her for years without any support from the outside. It is, in fact, a huge feat.

And they have a tremendous desire to gain independence that could not disappear anywhere. The fact that they were tamed were actually destroyed by 20% of all residents of Ichkeria. The fact that the Chechen genocide has happened - the second in the last hundred years is true. But the fact that there is a tremendous potential for will and independence, it seems to me to everyone. And the same applies to Tatarstan or other national republics in the Russian Federation.

In such societies, all this seems quiet until it turns into a volcano at one point. Therefore, I am sure that Ukraine needs to shake Russia from the inside. The sooner we make in this direction, the better. This in any case distracts the enemy's strength. And it can be a decisive moment. Therefore, I think we have to take the appropriate political course and take appropriate political steps.

I do not understand why, for example, this resolution is not considered in the profile committee of the Council. Why we did not break diplomatic relations with Lukashenko. Why we do not work with the enslaved peoples of the Russian Federation. It is not only Chechen, not just the Caucasus. This should be part of our policy. We have nowhere to retreat after February 24. All. We have an existential confrontation with the Russian Empire.

I say not in the short term, not 1-2 years, but in promising medium-term. Either we defeat Russia, or it will not allow us to live normally. What sanctions against the Russian Federation are not enough from the West? What is needed for its military machine to stop working? Obviously: oil, gas. You can also say more: there are banks, among which only a small part, and SWIFT, which also disconnected a small part, and personal sanctions, came under comprehensive sanctions.

These are all important steps, it should be done. But the oil and gas sector of Russia is radically, because it is 2/3 of their exports, half of the state budget of the Russian Federation. Therefore, everything that is now discussed in this direction, including setting a marginal price, is the right steps. I do not know how it works, because it is to some extent a unique phenomenon in modern history. And we have an understanding that not all of the powerful countries are ready to join it.

Yes, it is far from the fact that India and China will want to join the marginal price. But will they want to use this situation where they will actually dictate Russia? I think the answer is obvious. They have no sentiments to the Russian Federation. They have their interests. The abandonment of Russian oil and gas resources can hit the economies of developed countries, so it is difficult for them to take these steps.

However, here it is necessary to press and explain that this war for exhaustion must be won. Any war can have three finishing options. The victory of one of the countries or PJSC. While the situation is more like Pat. There is no victory of the Russian Federation, however, the victory of Ukraine in the short term is unlikely to be. But Pat is a very bad option for the whole world. Because it will mean a deterioration of all possible crises.

Until February 24, you actively criticized the existing authorities and, in particular, Zelensky. Has your attitude towards the President changed after a full -scale invasion? I criticized the President of Zelensky. Але в умовах війни для мене не існує президента Зеленського, а є верховний головнокомандувач Зеленський.

Нам треба всім об'єднатися і максимально підтримувати верховного головнокомандувача, що я й намагаюся робити. Підтримка — це допомагати і щось робити. Однак дуже важливо звертати увагу на проблеми й недоліки. Я це роблю, але дуже рідко, причому всередині країни.

Я, до речі, й до 24 лютого не використовував закордонні майданчики для внутрішньополітичної боротьби. Я вважаю це в принципі неправильним. Намагаюся підтримувати там, де можу, зокрема й на дипломатичному фронті, інформаційному, волонтерському.

Що стосується більш персонального ставлення. Безумовно, я вважаю, що Зеленський після 24 лютого повів себе гідно. Він боронить країну, докладає до цього всі свої зусилля. Він гідно виконує обов'язки верховного головнокомандувача.

І на міжнародному фронті представляє державу і робить це ефективно, результативно. У мене є багато питань по тому, що відбувалося до 24 лютого, однак сьогодні вже немає особливого сенсу їх ставити, бо це вже пройшло. Найголовніше — щоб з цього були зроблені висновки.

Ці питання ми все одно будемо обговорювати, але вже після перемоги і повернення до якогось нормального життя. Нині Зеленський, мені здається, більше вірить персоналіям, ніж інституціям. Це була системна проблема до і вона залишається зараз.

Втім, нині це може бути навіть виправдано — все-таки воєнний час. Безумовно, будь-який воєнний час створює певні ризики для демократії і верховенства права. І, на жаль, я бачу певні речі, і про них я говорю.

Якісь незрозумілі позбавлення громадянства, ігри "хто куди їде" і якийсь волюнтаризм. У Зеленського зараз серйозне випробування світового масштабу. Я бачу певні тенденції, які мене непокоять.

І я сподіваюся, що Зеленський і його найближче оточення будуть пам'ятати, що ми воюємо не тільки за незалежність, але й за наші цінності. Українці ніколи й нікому не дозволять тут побудувати другу Росію.

Дуже важливо, щоб ми, перемігши в цій війні, зберегли демократію й верховенство права. Нардеп Олексій Ковальов став відкритим колаборантом і перейшов на сторону РФ. На Вашу думку, чи багато ще у Раді таких потенційних або "сплячих" колаборантів? Хороше запитання.

Я, звичайно, точно не знаю, але припускаю, що він — далеко не поодинокий випадок. Просто його рідна територія була окупована. Якби, не дай боже, окупація охопила б більшу частину України, то цілком можливо, що ми могли побачити більше таких ковальових.

Я хочу нагадати, що Ковальов був депутатом від правлячої партії, купляв телеканал і вів активну діяльність. І у мене є великі сумніви, що він після початку вторгнення вирішив, що любить Росію. Я припускаю, що він був довгий час агентом.

А це означає, що він міг довгий час працювати в Раді, шукаючи і вербуючи інших. Крім того у нас є окрема група. Якщо щось виглядає як качка, крякає як качка і літає як качка, то це напевно і є качка.

Я кажу про ОПЗЖ, представники якої виглядали і діяли переважно як російські агенти. І представники цієї партії фактично стали ядром для окупаційних адміністрацій. Партія заборонена, фракція розвалилася, а всі депутати абсолютно на місці.

Виходячи зі складу фракції політсили, від якої їх обрали, вони створили прямі юридичні підстави для позбавлення їх мандатів. Ми можемо, не порушуючи Конституцію, прийняти рішення щонайменше по більшості з них.

Ще одна підстава — виїзд депутата з України на постійне місце проживання в іншу країну. І у нас є дані, що частина депутатів колишньої ОПЗЖ виїхали ще до вторгнення (що теж, до речі, багато про що говорить) і відтоді не заїжджали в Україну.

Звичайно, тут має працювати СБУ і слідство в першу чергу, однак ми й політично маємо прибрати цей "русскій мір" з українського парламенту. А в інших гілках української влади, окрім парламенту, є потенційні колаборанти? Вони точно є, в цьому немає сумнівів.

Навіть серед співробітників СБУ є підозрювані, затримані через можливу роботу на РФ. А це ж Служба безпеки. А скільки таких агентів в уряді, в інших органах влади. На жаль, Україна певною мірою була просякнута цією агентурою. Їх потрібно знаходити й знешкоджувати.

А наша агентура є у російській владі? Я сподіваюся, що є. Але я не знаю відповіді на це запитання. Якщо б знав, то все одно не міг би відповісти. Однак багатьох у світі здивувала українська армія. І я думаю, що українські спецслужби багато в чому здивували.

Я вірю нашим українським офіцерам, патріотам. Скільки, на вашу думку, триватиме війна? До нашої перемоги. А по часу скільки це може зайняти? Пів року, рік, два? Різні оцінки звучать. Це як робити припущення на кавовій гущі.

Станом на зараз найімовірнішим виглядає те, що ми виходимо в наступний рік, що зимою буде послаблення бойових дій у зв'язку з погодними умовами і виснаженням обох сторін.

Зима буде таким етапом з військової точки зору, коли кожна зі сторін буде намагатися максимально посилитися. З політичної точки зору, найкращим російським генералом завжди був один — це "генерал мороз". Тому Росія спробує максимально цим скористатися.

Ми це вже бачимо по Празі, по Парижу. Я думаю, що все це буде поглиблюватися, створюючи кризи всередині вільного світу. Це буде дуже складна й гаряча зима. І, мені здається, що великою мірою весною визначиться результат цієї війни.

Однак є й інші сценарії, оптимістичніші для нас. Все може посипатися і швидше. Дуже умовно кажучи, цього вечора може статися переворот в Кремлі і якісь події можуть розгорнутися в іншому ключі.

Гірший для нас сценарій — що вони можуть поновити серйозний наступ, захопити нові серйозні українські території — я вважаю неймовірним взагалі. І є ще один сценарій, про який я маю сказати для ваших читачів. Зима буде дуже складною для України.

Я звернувся би до людей з тим, що потрібно готуватися. Можливо, що Росія вдарить по інфраструктурі великих міст. І до цього треба готуватися, розуміючи що і як ви будете робити для того, щоб пережити цю зиму. А Росія точно сподівається на зиму.