New skills, technicians and commanders: how to change the Armed Forces to win in the war

What do you think is that the infantryman and his unit on the battlefield are most needed today? No, it is no longer a machine gun or even a drone. You can have weapons, but if you are blind - it will not be effective. The main thing in the modern war is a tablet with programs like Delta and "Nettle". It all starts with this - with situational awareness, when the fighter looks at the battlefield not through the armor window, and not even through "Mavik".

To be "sight", you need programs with big data. It's not just cards - it is a multilayered map with a large array of data: where, which is replaced, where the enemy positions are located, where yesterday the enemy tank worked, but where the mortar is . . . now data is entered even with the points of arrival The remote fire capabilities of the enemy, and about potential shelters from his shelling, and something else, which I will say below.

This is where the combat task begins: to be able to see and analyze a large array of data. If the unit commander has been looking at a paper card for 20 years, it will be difficult for him to master new approaches. Another huge front -line problem today is the Reb, both on the car of the fighter and in the trench. Today it is no longer possible to ride the front as we chased 2 years ago. Because the drones of the enemy everywhere. They can just lie down and wait for the goal.

Therefore, all (!) Mobile equipment on the front should be with modern systems of HRs that are mocking frequencies. This is not a panacea, but an eighty percentage will ensure that the fighter will not be destroyed while moving to positions. It is more difficult with the trenches - the fighter turns it on to protect himself. The trouble is that this now will be silenced by our birds. I will not say the numbers, but they are significant - when our drones fall through the action of our HIs.

In order to solve this problem, the command should not only provide rebels, but also organize such interaction that every bird that flies from us (and they are tens, and sometimes hundreds a day only from one brigade), had a corridor without radio interruption. Did they teach this at the Soviet Military Academies? I will say more - no army of the world faced such a problem. Because it is the first war of drones. Another important problem is communication and psychological.

The Soviet Army model "I am a chief, you are a fool" - today is not working. Not those times, not those people. Today everything should be built on incentives. And it is not just fashionable rhetoric - it is a factor of efficiency dictated by the reality of a new war. One thing is when you are a platoon commander and your fighters need to dig a trench. Everything is clear here - if the process does not go, then you can scream, swear, and gradually collapse.

Now imagine that you are a platoon commander, whose task is to adjust the drones at the low frequencies so that they fly a hostile rebel. To do this, you need to find the necessary modules somewhere, eat old ones, solder new ones, and most importantly - to know: where, how and where. And here, if there is no normal communication with the fighters, though crying, though mumps - the personnel will only close in themselves, and the result will not be. And specialists - little.

They are actually received in fact in combat conditions, so replacing someone - just not real. As a result, the minimum is the lost time; The maximum is the failure of combat mission and human lives. To understand: the war of drones is the most dynamic sphere of the front. What worked yesterday is no longer effective today. Most FPV-oues that come from the state are subject to processing. This is not a secret information. The drones come at the same frequency, and the unit needs another.

If the bird is not upgraded, then it will just fall, along with explosives. In the direct sense - money in the wind. Therefore, all advanced crews have their own workshops, where the fighters process drones daily into specific circumstances and specific tasks. As a rule, this work does not provide staffing units. And soldering iron with a bunch of equipment should be purchased independently, or look for sponsors.

It sounds strange? But this is a reality - the unit should look for sponsors! A similar situation with projectiles for drones. 99% of BC for teams is made or processed in the teams themselves. Which, of course, is not envisaged by our military bureaucracy. And the fighter for such work in the rear should pay not 50 thousand UAH as now, but more, because the risk is no less than that of the guy in the trench.

To unscrew these problems, you need to have the courage, adequacy, creativity and managerial qualities. Old textbooks do not teach this . . . Another new challenge is a massive mine. The times when the sapper went into the gray zone, put stretch marks and turned back. In such a large -scale war, there should be a large -scale mine. And how to provide it if everything is visible and shot? Remote mines. And these are drones again.

And again - tablets to understand where to change and where it is already replaced. In addition, the enemy detours mines with artillery shelling - here they are handed in the margin of the Voronoks from the Russian shelling. If the commanders of the level of the mouth-brigad understand these trends-the losses will be minimal, the tasks will be performed. If the commanders are fighting "as once", according to Soviet textbooks - their units are doomed . . .

And hence - problems not only on the front but also in the rear: from the difficulties of mobilization to the loss of victory and trust in power. All this text is that the modern world is changing the war, and therefore, the armed forces should change. They should be adequate to the modern war not only in technological but also in organizational and psychological plans.

And these changes should be made by people who are modern, the value of which is determined not by age or shoulder straps, but by scratches, compliance with the current conditions of war. Now the question is very simple: we will either change the organization, adapt and become a unique modern army. Or . . . no or! We are simply obliged to become better. Such is our fate. The author expresses a personal opinion that may not coincide with the editorial position.