Putin's swan song. Why his Russia will fall apart though now seems to be strong

One of the critics of the argument about collapse formulates it: "After two years, Russia has an alarmingly strong appearance. " If you accept this for the truth, it obviously makes sense to negotiate with the Kremlin now before it becomes even more powerful and stable. It may be a bitter pill for Ukraine and its supporters, but what is the alternative? The alternative is obvious.

In fact, Russia does not become structurally stronger and stable, and almost all the theories of the decay of the system make us expect that something is deeply destabilizing in Russia. When? That's what the rivet. It can be tomorrow; It can be in five years. In any case, the collapse is approaching, although perhaps not in "two years". Arguments in favor of Russia's strengthening are based on peculiar interpretations of existing facts concerning the Putin, War, Economy and Russian Regime.

Putin may radiate confidence-though why should we expect something less than him or any other leader? - But the appearance can be misleading, especially since Putin's public personality is as often prone to ignorance as self -confidence. He arrested his liberal and right critics and created a security apparatus, and his propaganda machine remains as active as before. Are these signs of force? Yes, for obvious reasons, and no, because all these events would not need if he did not feel the threat.

From whom? From political and economic elites, dissatisfied with the war and its impact on the Russian economy and armed forces. A striking example is the attempt of a coup of Prigogine. It was his emergence of dissatisfaction within the army. More importantly, this attempt could not be made without knowledge (and blessing?) Security services. So so, Putin survived the coup. But this event itself means that his situation was and remains shaky.

This is important because Putin's weakness means the weakness of his regime because it is its main nucleus. All authoritarian, totalitarian, fascist and dictatorial systems are hypercentralized by definition. This may be their strength if the supreme leader is the philosophical-platonist, but most often it is fatal weakness. Higher leaders resist changes and reforms. Their central position encourages the translation of responsibility, attempts to strengthen local authorities, and subordinate.

Perhaps the most important thing is that they are prone to strategic mistakes, especially as it aging and loss of ability to demonstrate invincibility, infallibility and charisma.

The most significant mistake of Putin was the pressure on President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych, so that he would refuse the Association Agreement with the European Union at the end of 2013, thus provoked the Revolution of Dignity, which led to Yanukovych's escape and then to the beginning of a full -scale invasion of Ukraine.

Janusz Bugai from the Jamestown Foundation gives arguments in favor of the war is a disaster for and Zaporizhzhia stalled for the winter, after the defeat of the Russian forces in Kiev, Kharkiv and Kherson, the Russian army was destroyed, and its fleet was rejected from the western Black Sea. For two years of fighting, Russia lost at least 315,000 people killed or seriously wounded by land 360,000 people who invaded Ukraine.

It also suffered enormous losses in equipment, including 2200 of about 3500 tanks and a third of armored vehicles. " It's not just random problems. Together, they testify to the fundamental, structural destruction of the Russian Armed Forces. Equally disturbing is the situation with the economy.

Opposition Russian economist Volodymyr Milov showed that the state has invested huge funds into four sectors (ammunition, iron roads, military safety and machine building), directly related to the war, while reducing or only minimally increasing investments in the consumer goods sector. Putin's statements that GDP is growing and inflation is low, hide the reality of ordinary citizens sacrificed to the altar of militarism.

According to Milov, "the Russians have become much poorer in the last five years, and especially in the last two years. " Jeffrey Zonnenefeld of Yale University and his colleagues have convincingly shown that the sanctions have worked and that "Russia is no longer even remotely economic state and has banned minimal reporting on transparent national income statistics that are needed to preserve membership in the IMF. In Chile, Putin's Russia survives simply capturing assets.

The economy in which the state is increasingly dominated by the state, absorbs its own companies to support Putin's military car. " Finally, we approach the Russian population. Yes, it does not work, and yes, it makes him moral accomplices of Putin's crimes. But a significant minor, perhaps one fifth, opposes the war and the fascist regime of Putin. Mostly these are the locals, educated experts living in Moscow and St. Petersburg. They are now intimidated.

But as soon as the opportunity appears, and this will inevitably happen, they will declare themselves, like all urban educated professionals around the world. Therefore, empirical arguments in favor of strong Russia are weak. Meanwhile, theoretical arguments in favor of collapse are strong, since Russia is extremely vulnerable to structural forces that usually lead to systemic collapse. It is important to remember that the structures are similar to tectonic plates.

We can predict that earthquakes will inevitably happen where two plates meet, but we cannot say exactly when. And we can say which regions or states are more or less problems and are increasingly faced with the prospect of collapse. The above analysis revealed them. The fragility of the mode is one of them. The other is the difficult situation of the military. The sinking economy is the third. The protest potential of educated urban elites of Russia is the fourth.

From history, we know that such states are prone to collapse or at least massive people's protests and changes in the regime. According to the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites in 1989-1991. But the same thing happens in many countries of the world, such as Argentina, Nicaragua, Egypt, Syria, Zimbabwe and Libya. Some states, such as Iran Ayatoll, withstand the storms of repetitive shocks and survive. Others, such as chess Iran, do not.

In addition to such banalities as "it all depends on the power of the state or the intelligence of the elite", we simply cannot know what the exact result will be. But we know that in most cases, "contradictions", generated by structural forces, come to the fore, when "sparks" or "triggers" arise. These can be killings, earthquakes, fires, natural disasters or wars, especially unsuccessful wars that create a burden on the already weakened economy, armed forces, regimes and population.

It was the First World War that destroyed the Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian Empires, and the Second World War almost destroyed the Soviet Union, especially after the large -scale structural changes of Joseph Stalin weakened the Soviet system and made it inclined to collapse. Russia's genocidal war against Ukraine is probably just such a spark. The regime, the army and the economy have become weaker, and there is no reason to expect an improvement in the situation in the near future.

This means that the longer the war lasts, the greater the likelihood that the structural forces will encounter each other, the greater the contradictions will be more likely to become the collapse of Russia. Contrary to popular thought in Russia and the West, time is not on Putin's side. He is not younger, and his regime does not get stronger. Therefore, the event should refrain from negotiating with Putin until its country and the regime weaken and it will not be easy to restore.