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Under the Great Novosilka, the enemy had a seductive possibility of a deep break...

They were struck under the Great Novosilka: why the offensive of the Russian Federation in the southern section of the front slowed

Under the Great Novosilka, the enemy had a seductive possibility of a deep breakthrough. But, obviously, his strength is no longer enough, suggesting the military analyst Konstantin Mashovets, as a less large -scale and risky operation is selected. Today we will consider the situation in the Wremov direction, specifically in the area of ​​the Great Novosilka, since there were no fundamental changes in Kurakhiv or Pokrovsky directions, at least for the last three days.

Regarding the current situation, it has obviously deteriorated in the last 1. 5 months. First of all, in the Wremov direction. The enemy in this lane in cooperation with the troops of the 68th AK and the 8th General of "Yug" was able to force the Kashalach River west from the village of Comedar, as well as to break through in the area of ​​the village. Gold in the north and northwestern directions.

This, in turn, led to the enemy managed to occupy an extensive area of ​​the terrain, in particular the village of coal (respectively, by completely eliminating our coal bridgehead/performance and to relieve the immediate threat to Volnovakha), north of Kashalach. And most importantly - to leave the south to the river dry spruce, creating a direct threat to the coverage and bypass of our troops throughout the Kurakhiv speech.

It also led to the fact that the enemy managed to bypass the village. Greater Novosilka (one of the key areas of the Armed Forces in this direction) on the wide front, from the east and north and to create a direct threat to the local (tactical) environment of our units as in the area of ​​the village. Ganivka, Uspenivka, and southwestern-in the area of ​​the village. Makarivka.

To date, the southern fas (flank) of the larger (operative-tactical) pumping (in cooperation with the troops of the Center ", which occur on the Pokrovsky and northern flank of Kurakhiv directions) of our troops acting on the sides of Zaporozhye - Donetsk. As of yesterday's morning, the enemy tried to continue and develop his offensive in the specified lane . . .

As I know, the enemy's command actively seeks to break through almost all key points of this area - in the village of Sukha Yala, in the area of ​​the village. Constantinople and Amber, as well as attacks it through the village. Work in the direction of Uspenivka. There is currently no information that the enemy has managed to break through the river dry spruce, but obviously the Armed Forces are leading heavy and grueling battles throughout this turn (ie, dry fir).

The situation is even more complicated by the fact that from the north to the Uspenivka come from the side. Far advanced units of the 20th MSD of the 8th General, actually directly on the tactical rear of our units, which are still defending east from it . . . Honestly, I believed that the advanced units of the Armed Forces would go beyond the Assumption 2-3 days ago, because it is obvious, because it is obvious, because it is obvious, because that the subsequent maintenance of the village.

Romanivka, Ganivka and Uspenivka completely threatens them. But at the time of writing this review, they continued to defend themselves there with the almost "inverted" front. In the west, apparently, the advanced units of the 40th enemy MP, even after they were rejected in the area of ​​the village. The new mosquito, continue their attempts to break through the directions of Razdolne - the newly man -friendly and towards the same village. New mosquito.

The meaning of these actions is also quite clear - the enemy seeks to cut both major roads that lead from the village. Great Novosilka to the north. One, on the village. The rich man, he has already cut the southeast from the village. Rozdolny, and an attempt to cut another one that leads to the village. Mosquito (having occupied the village of new mosquito), so far for him failed. Attacks of the 36th General (37th OMSBR, 5th OTBR) of the enemy are continued from the east and south to the village.

Great Novosilka. They also, after the capture of the village. Blessed, still unsuccessful. It is not possible to break into the border of the Great Novosilka by the enemy (or at least at the time of writing). The 60th OMSBR of the enemy, apparently, with the support of some separate units of the 34th OMSBR tries to clamp our units that defend themselves south of the new Novosilka, in the area of ​​the village. Makarivka and village.

Nescic, through unsuccessful attacks across the Mokry River, in the general directorate from east to west. In this sense, another formation of this army (5th General), its 127 MSD after the capture of the village. Equilibrium and promotion to the outskirts of Novodarivka, obviously, "slowed down". However, its advanced units are likely to continue to attack the narrow area between the equivalent and Makarivka, clearly trying to displace our units from the village.

Makarivka is threatened with their local (tactical) environment. So, if you summarize the current situation in the Seemivka direction, it should be described as quite complicated, but not critical . . . If you touch more generalized grades and conclusions, several things come into the eye.

The enemy, breaking through our defense for almost all of its tactical depth on the area between the Golden Niva and the Hugelar several weeks ago, did not take full advantage of the capabilities that it gave it (below what I think).

Obviously, in an operational sense, the Russian command made mistakes when planning actions against all our Kurakhiv-Vougledar speech (bridgehead) at the end of the summer, distributing the main reserves and resources in favor of its northern flanking troops (in the "Center") (UV "Vostok"). Although, for the sake of justice, it is worth saying that it had all the "formal" grounds for this purpose.

It is not paradoxical, but at the moment a number of decisions of the command of the enemy "East", in particular, and, obviously, the direction of part of the forces of his right flank and the center to the area of ​​defense of the Armed Forces in the village. The Greater Novosilka, in terms of operational expediency, at the moment seem, say, controversial . . . Now I will explain what I mean.

Having a tactical breakthrough in the lane of the Right Flank forces in "East" a few weeks ago (to be candid, in the area of ​​gold Niva - coledar, when the enemy forced Kashalagach River and began to move rapidly north west from colmedar, our front simply "fell") , the enemy managed to move in the general dimension only to a depth of 18. 5-18. 7 km, and not in the most optimal and appropriate direction.

I fully understand that the command of UV "Vostok", obviously, with one of the main tasks of "collapse" the defense of the Armed Forces before the front of the 8th and 68th AK, made the "point of the main effort" offensive on the right flank of our units, which At that moment, they were stubbornly defended in the Konstantinovka area and then Elizabeth.

And so, having a whole set of opportunities (directions for further promotion), they decided and began to do so in the direction of Maximivka and Epiphany. Although they could do it "width and large -scale". For example, from the course to break in the direction of Yasna Polyana - spilling and trying to reach the deep rear of our group, which now leads stubborn harrows to the Suntska, Zorya and Shevchenko.

If the enemy broke through the rich man, Constantinople, Andreevka, the scope and scale of this "wake up" would be more sensitive to the Armed Forces (I wrote earlier about this opportunity). After all, in this case, everything that would be east, including our units that are now defending in the area of ​​Uspenivka and Ganivka, and who now the enemy seeks to "get into the pressures", trying to "go for the flank" through the Sukha fir, would be doomed.

However, however, the enemy chose the "tit in the hands" (Uspens), instead of "Crane in the sky" (rich), so to speak-forced to narrowing the front of its active offensive, and now stubbornly stood our defense on the dry pupils. In the tactical area, this area is quite optional. Personally, I only "for". I will not say that the Russian command did not see this opportunity. It obviously saw her.

After all, the gradual promotion of advanced Russian units in Rozdolne and towards the village spilled convincingly. But, probably, its gradual "extinction" was conditioned not by the desires of the Russian command itself, but by the real evaluation of its own capacity (that is, the presence of reserves and resources for such further development of its offensive).

In this sense, now the enemy in the Vremiv direction has part of the forces of three formations of the level of "brigade", which he can try to "discharge the situation" in his favor and in this direction-336-arrah MP (obviously, introduced into the battle Only one battalion), 57th OMSBR (most likely, she will try to "develop a breakthrough to the north") and somewhere half of the 34th OMSBR (the other has already been introduced into battle, but probably hold it for fighting in the largest Novosilka and Vremiyivtsi).

In general, this "echelon of success" and the operational reserve of UV "East" is obviously inferior to the fact that it is concentrated in the strip of "Center". But from a formal point of view, it is quite justified-the forces of the Center are acting simultaneously in 3 "spread" directions-Toretsky, Pokrovsky and Kurakhivsky. He objectively needs more troops and forces . . . When the advanced units of the enemy (obviously the 40th MP) broke into Rozdolne and went out to the village.

The new mosquito, the Russian command was quite clear - where next? The dilemma was quite obvious - either "bend" further north, towards the rich, trying to cut in our deep rear the highway of the Zaporozhye - Donetsk, or "to deal with the issue of the Great Novosilka in our deep rear. " The command of UV "East" seems to have chosen the second . . .

At first glance, it seems as false as the "choice" in the strip of the 36th OMSBR-instead of "Mneas and Deep, was chosen less large-scale, but with greater chances on Success (because at the same time, using a tactical breakthrough in the Golden Niva area, the 36th name of the enemy has already proceeded to the fertile and eastern outskirts of the Greater Novosilka).

To attack only two brigades (40th MP and 36th OMSBR), even adding another (57th OMSBR) to the north, to the Zaporizhzhya highway, with a wide front and at the same time not to secure the left flank (leaving left An unbroken Novosilka) is a game of "Russian roulette" with a very big chance to lose (that is, to get some insidious counter -struggle in the left "Bochin" at the most responsible moment The mosquito only confirmed that the level of combat capability of the Ukrainian troops in front of the front of the 5th and 36th ID is different from those forces that are laid out south, on the river Sukhi, so they are quite capable of this kind of impromptu.