Conflict with consequences for other countries: why war with China can go beyond Taiwan

About it writes The Strategist in the article "Australia to prepare: war in Taiwan as a regional threat", which was translated by focus. The second visit of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to China, scheduled for this month, will take place a few weeks before the 98th anniversary of the People's Liberation Army. August 1, 2025 - a date filled with symbolism when Beijing marks one of the milestones of his military modernization, which should end by 2027.

Since 2021, US military and scouts have warned that 2027 marks another key milestone: the date to which Xi Jinping ordered his military to prepare for the Taiwan invasion. This opinion was confirmed by the US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegset at the Shangr-L La Defense Conference in Singapore in June this year. The Australian Prime Minister will also mean this warning, since China for Australia is not only the most important economic partner, but also the increasing threat of security.

If the People's Republic decides to seize Taiwan by force, it will not just an invasion of the island, but a war that is likely to lead to a large-scale Indo-Pacific conflict with serious consequences for Australia. The China considers Taiwan as a "sacred and integral part of China. " Chinese NVAK has become one of the most capable forces of the planet - with the growing nuclear arsenal, the world's largest permanent army and fleet, as well as modern rocket troops.

It is a rapid growth of military power, which some compares with the rapid increase in the economic power of China as a superpower, was accompanied by a sharp deterioration in relations between Taiwan and China. China suspended official ties with the island and restricted tourist trips. China also intensified its military operations in and around Taiwan.

Following the visit of the US Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan in August 2022, China began the largest military training in the region, including the flight of ballistic missiles over Taiwan. These demonstrations of strength, accompanied by more hostile rhetoric, have become the norm. Last year, the Chinese military published graphic simulation of rockets that impress Taiwan targets.

During the Shangri-L La Conference, the same year, the current Defense Minister of China Admiral Dun Tsun stated that the ruling democratic progressive Party of Taiwan (PPP) would be "nailed to the shameful column of history" and that "anyone who dare to separate Taiwan. " It was in this context that Hegset called the threat from China "inevitable" at the same conference.

My recent trips to Taiwan indicate that mixed moods about the likelihood of a Chinese military invasion prevail in the military community. At the end of 2023, the then President of the PPP Tsi In-Vien stated that the current economic and political problems of China would probably keep him from attempting to invade the invasion in the near future.

However, in May 2025, the current President of Taiwan, in general, restrained about the prospects of invasion, compared the current situation of Taiwan with Europe in the 1930s. A survey of 1,200 Taiwans conducted in September 2024 by the National Security and Defense Research by the country showed that although most view China's "territorial ambitions as a serious threat", they do not think that it may be manifested in the attack on Taiwan. This thought is quite clear.

The geographical location of Taiwan, shallow coastal waters, mountainous terrain and limited weather conditions for the invasion make any military attack a grand task. This is such a difficult task that the United States abandoned the Taiwan invasion plans during the Second World War as part of the Kozi Operation. However, despite the difficulties, China clearly prepares its armed forces and the economy for the possibility of invading Taiwan.

Over the past year, it has created stocks of key resources - grain, oil, cobalt, copper and iron ore - and focused on strengthening amphibian potential, including barges with bridge structures suitable for planting on shallow beaches Taiwan. Against the background of the intensification of military exercises and more sharp rhetoric, these preparations indicate that the invasion remains a real opportunity - and every day becomes more likely.

The main disadvantage of Australian discussions about Taiwan is the simplified formulation "Will we interfere?", Which assumes that any conflict will be limited to Taiwan. In fact, the invasion will be much more complicated. The Geography of the Taiwanese Strait, the weather and defense of Taiwan are already making this task difficult.

The task is complicated by the expected intervention of the United States and Japan from bases in Japan and in the Philippines, which China will try to neutralize in advance. Any invasion almost certainly provokes a wider regional conflict involving one of Australia's key allies and at least two of its closest security partners.

In the case of a general regional conflict, the interests of Australia's national security will be in danger, and it will not have a different choice other than taking appropriate measures. The key role will be to protect Australia and its maritime communications. Even having brought the current rotation of US troops or the role of Australia as a strategic platform of American operations, we simply unimaginable to stay away from the point of view of our national interests.

Australia's security, including maritime trade, will be in direct threat. And this is not to mention Australia's obligations under the Anzus treaty in 1951. The fighting will cause serious damage to Australia's authority among key security partners and neighbors in the region. Moreover, if China resorts to Taiwan, it is unlikely to stop on the island. Beijing has marine and territorial disputes with Southeast Asia, South Korea and Japan. Successful invasion encourages further aggression.

China's invasion of Taiwan will not be an isolated act - it provokes a regional conflict with direct consequences for Australia's security. Do not seem inevitable, but the clear preparation of China require serious attention. Australia should invest in its defense - not because the war is inevitable, but because restraint depends on the potential. If the restraint does not work, we must be ready to protect our vital interests.