The side effect of democracy. Why wars in Ukraine and Israel lead to EU abbreviation

European political unity is a myth, ascertain the political analyst Doibbor Rohach in a column for American purpos. It is not now, during the war in Ukraine, and it is unlikely to be achievable after the victory of Ukraine . . . Looking back, future historians can see 2023 as the year when the idea of ​​"strategic autonomy" of Europe was finally buried.

Even though the worldwide confrontation between Western democracies and China, Iran and Russia, Europeans have played a significant role only in the last of them: providing financial assistance to Ukraine, accepting Ukrainian refugees and providing death to Kiev.

Given that there are pro -Russian governments in Hungary and Slovakia in power, it is still unknown whether the EU has the necessary stability in the EU to support Ukraine before its final victory, and whether it will also be able to ensure a peaceful and prosperous future of Ukraine. In other theaters, the EU has become unnecessary.

"Europe is assigned the role of a good -natured non -governmental organization," Matthew Cardnico with Politico writes, "whose humanitarian contribution is welcome, but is being ignored in another. " After the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel, the Presidents of the European Commission and the European Parliament, respectively, Ursula von Der Lyen and Robert Motzol quickly went to Israel to express their solidarity.

Almost immediately after the terrorist attack on October 7, one of the members of the commission Oliver Vargey announced that the EU "immediately" will suspend its assistance to the Palestinian authorities. However, on the same day, Oliver Vargei denied one of his colleagues from the EU, who stated that help "would continue until it is necessary.

" In the end, the commission announced to review its assistance to Palestinian autonomy to make sure that the funds did not fall into the hands of terrorists. Meanwhile, the EU EU Supreme Representative and Security Policy, Josep Borrel, stated that the Palestinians needed more and less assistance. "In just 24 hours," says the cable, "the commission moved from the announcement of termination of all the help of the Palestinians to the signal that it will increase the inflow of funds.

" Meanwhile, the visit of von Der Lyen and Motzola caused a kind of rebellion within the commission: nearly 850 European civil servants signed a letter of protest that criticized the "unconditional" support of Israel by von Der Lyen. Of course, Brussels had very little authority to express thoughts on this issue, and his opinion is already used to ignored.

Unfortunately, the same is true for the EU leadership, whose morally fair and (in my opinion), in fact, the correct reaction to the atrocities committed by Hamas was detached from a much more diverse picture offered by individual EU Member States. In Ireland, President Michael Higgins formulated moral equality between terrorists and the government of Israel, not to mention that he was spreading Hamas's propaganda that a blow to the Arab Hospital "Al-Ahli" in the Gaza Sector is Israeli Hamas.

At the other end of the spectrum, the Czechs discuss the transfer of their embassy to Jerusalem. Czech Foreign Minister Jan Lipavsky was the first foreign government official to visit Israel and expressed his support after the attack. Most recently, the country's defense minister, Jan Chernohov, called for the Czech Republic from the UN after the General Assembly voted for the Humanitarian Armistice.

Although the Czech Republic is extremely unlikely, it is noteworthy that Chernohov is unlikely to have caused controversy in the country, receiving compassionate reviews from the Prime Minister, the Czech President and even from the opposition leader Andrey Babis. Meanwhile, Emmanuel Macron hurried to show his anti -Islamist intentions in Israel, calling for an extension of an existing coalition against heards to take on Hamas.

In its characteristic approach in the direction of the policy "en-même-tempps" (all at the same time) Macron also insisted on the restoration of the peace process. Cacophony, in which EU institutions do not have any choice but to pursue the policy of the smallest common denominator, here is not an exception, but rather a norm.

If the EU has exceeded Ukraine's expectations, both in terms of gradual strengthening of the sanctions regime and in terms of the volume of support it has provided to the country (which is currently much higher than the US contribution), it is partly because these significant expectations were very low. However, there are no great reasons for mania.

EU supplies do not achieve in some critical industries, and most importantly, in increasing their own military production to a scale that allows you to stable to supply ammunition and other military equipment to Ukraine. In addition, there are signs that the widespread support of Ukraine and the clarity with which the EU acted can be one -off.

As Orban and Fitzo play the role of the fifth column of Moscow in the EU, the price that Ukraine will have to pay for European supporters to adhere to the chosen course will only increase. Although the results of the elections in Germany and France, which will take place in 2025 and 2027, respectively, one can only guess, it is fair to assume that they give much more likely to split the unity of the EU on this issue rather than strengthen it.

And how likely the consistent European response is if the block faces such a geographically distant challenge as Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific? Those who still adhere to the EU's vision as an autonomous geopolitical subject suggest that there is a technical solution to the problem: reform of the decision -making rules that would apply the rule of qualified majority to EU foreign policy and EU security policy. This will make it easier to make clear real -time decisions.

However, the current rule of unanimity is not just. It is because EU countries diverge on foreign policy and security policy - such important for their national interests - they prefer to look for consensus (albeit unsatisfactory), rather than obeying the will of a qualified, weighted population of most of their members .

The EU, which avoids consensus on delicate issues, will give a new life to the same centrifugal dynamics that sent the United Kingdom to an independent path after the 2016 referendum. Now it can be argued that reducing the membership base would be useful for the EU. The Hungarian government has transformed its contempt for EU institutes into an art form.

The compulsion of the Hungarians to a decision may be used or not, may be useful for a block that seeks to determine its identity based on common values. However, this is not the argument put forward by supporters of strategic autonomy - quite the opposite. In fact, they often call for a departure from unanimity in the context of preparation for future extensions, especially for Ukraine's accession.

The latter, however, will only make the EU more diverse, thus betting on institutions that can adapt to such a variety, not to blow up the EU. In another context, "strategic autonomy" was presented as an insurance policy from Trump's second term, which can easily undermine the US commitment to Europe's security. The argument is correct: the new isolationist administration in the United States will create significant risks to Europe's security.

However, in terms of, say, Warsaw or Riga, these risks should be compared with the risks of being ignored or rejected by the EU Council by the same Western European partners who have often ignored the interests of "New Europe" in the past.

In other words, it is not necessary to be fascinated by Donald Trump, to be ready to tie the security of his country with an agreement that will give the future President Le Pen or Chancellor Vagenknecht effective power, which allows to ignore Poland or Latvia's most important interests. From an institutional point of view, unsatisfactory status quo is the best choice for Europe if it wants to balance unity with its pluralism.

The EU must act together and decisively in areas where consensus exists, such as Ukraine's future in the European Union. However, trying to do the same in areas where countries categorically disagree is a completely different and much more risky proposal. However, it should be noted that the issue of "autonomy" is only poorly related to the continent's defense capability.

It is difficult to find more Eurosceptic governments than those headed by Poland since 2015, but the increase in Poland's military power and its simultaneous contribution to Europe's security were exemplary. For some countries, a serious attitude to its defense can mean deeper cooperation with European ally-like-minded allies within the schemes such as Pesco or EDF-and this is normal.

For others, such as Poland, it meant buying many equipment of American (and Korean) production-and this is also normal. For example, I was inspired by the leadership of von Der Lyen and Motzoli regarding Israel and Hamas. However, from the very beginning, it was also clear that their sincere and good intentions would not withstand the first contact with internal differences in Europe.