Their goal is to control Ukraine. Why the aggressor does not fire Kyiv and not announces great mobilization - interview with Bugava with ISW

The ISW researcher Natalia Bugaeva predicts the long -term counter -offensive of the Armed Forces and states: Russian propaganda is now in such a difficult situation that it does not stop its military bloggers who report the real situation on the front. The lightning success of the counter -offensive of the Ukrainian army in the Kharkiv region, holding their breath, was monitored not only by Ukrainians, but also by many analytical and expert organizations of the world.

Among them, the American Analytical Center for War Study (ISW) is popular in Ukraine, which regularly dismantles the current situation on the fronts and makes realistic predictions about Russia's actions and strategy. Video Day, IAS, Ukrainian Army Supervisor, Ukrainian Army, analyzed and watched directly from the sidelines of the 17th annual meeting of the Yalta European Strategy (YES), held in Kyiv on September 9-10 with the support of Viktor Pinchuk Foundation.

About how ISW works, and what to expect from Russia in the near future, Bugaev talked to HB. - What are the main problems of the Russian leadership and the Russian army in the war in Ukraine at the moment? -First, they spent a lot of military power to capture rather limited goals, and it is about personnel military capable of fighting effectively. The task of replenishing this force is very relevant now. The places where they can replenish this resource is a limited amount.

We see already that they began to move from a set of soldiers to the army in the peripheral regions of the Russian Federation to recruitment in the central regions, including the same St. Petersburg, and this process is not quite successful. The second problem is the integration of new people, their training, the creation of agreed units. This requires officer resources that are increasingly limited.

The third problem is that they are not very able to consolidate administrative control in the occupied territories. There is resistance, guerrilla movement, incompetence from Russia, they do not understand the Ukrainian cultural context, there is a problem with the settings. Global problems, if you divide the problem in two parts, people and weapons, it is Russian MIC.

In the long run, serious problems will arise, provided that the event will continue to exercise export control over microelectronics. This is an approach that will not allow Russia to bypass sanctions that have already been imposed on it. And the third problem, though not so relevant, is how the Russians respond to the failures of their army.

In principle, Russians do not respond to losses among the military, they do not respond to atrocities of their own army, but they accurately respond to military failures. When the cruiser of Moscow was buried, when there was a gesture of goodwill about the island of Snake or when Russian troops departed from Kiev and now, when there was a rapid counter -offensive in the Kharkiv region.