Nuclear weapon in space: what goals will pursue Russia in orbit
Public theories are usually divided into two directions: either it is a nuclear weapon in space or a satellite of a radio electronic control of a nuclear installation. If it is a space -based nuclear weapon, it will be neither a new potential nor especially useful for Russia. On the other hand, if it is a satellite of a radio electronic control of a nuclear plant, then there are grounds for greater concern. Let's start with what we know about it and there is not much data.
At a briefing for the press on February 16, 2024, the White House Advisor John Kirby confirmed several things: Russia develops a new sustainable potential, this potential is not deployed and there is no direct threat, and weapons can neither attack people nor cause physical destruction on the ground . Another key information provided by Kirby is here: whatever it is, it will violate the Cosmos (DPK) Treaty, a multilateral treaty of 1967, which is still the basis of cosmic policy.
The DPK does not very much limit the military capacity in space, but it directly prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit, although this does not include spacecraft with nuclear engines. If Russia develops nuclear weapons of space base, intended for harm to other satellites, it is not a new idea or potential.
We have long realized that nuclear events at high altitudes threaten space systems, as evidenced by the testing of the US nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. A nuclear explosion in space creates both an electromagnetic impulse (EMI), which can instantly "kill" electronics on the nearest satellites, and a radiation belt that will become global and will damage the satellites in the next weeks and months.
Russia, of course, has the necessary nuclear and space experience for the development and deployment of nuclear weapons of space base, as well as the United States and a number of other countries. The radiation belt created by such weapons will have a wide and non -treated impact on non -treated satellites on broken orbits.
In fact, it will be an attack by Kamikadze in space - it will probably lead to the destruction of many of Russia's own satellites, as well as the systems to which it will be aimed and satellites of many other countries. It would be an act of despair, largely similar to Russia's repeated threats to use tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. It is unclear what benefit Russia will receive from the placement of such weapons in space if and when it is needed.
In Russia, there is already a park of ballistic missiles capable of at any moment to bring nuclear warheads into space, and this does not violate any contracts (until it is used), and it is almost impossible to protect themselves from them if they are launched behind a trajectory opposite to the United States. All previous nuclear tests in space were conducted from the ground, not in orbit.
Another hypothesis is that it is not a nuclear weapon, but rather a satellite of a radio electronic control of a nuclear plant that can be used to attack other satellites. Relying on nuclear energy instead of solar, the satellite can work continuously without the need to recharge batteries and without limiting the production of electricity with the number of solar panels that it can deploy.
It is noteworthy that Russia has recently considered the possibility of creating a nuclear reactor with a capacity of 1000 kilowatts for satellites. The satellite equipment with a nuclear reactor and a amount of electronic wrestling can allow Russia to stuff the signals between satellites and the ground or cross -connections between satellites. Terrestrial obstacles on motor vehicles, aircraft and ships have a much more limited range of action through curvature and limited energy sources.
They are also vulnerable to attacks by conventional means. For example, Ukrainians, for example, could hit a rocket truck-producer on Earth, but it would be much more complicated and dangerous to confine the Russian satellite, which does the same from space, not to mention that Ukraine has no sustained missiles. It is a weapon that we need to worry because it can be used by Russia without crossing any nuclear red lines, and which will provide Russia with an immediate advantage on the battlefield.
Obstruction is a reversible form of attack that does not lead to any physical destruction, such as space debris. Russia and other countries have demonstrated a willingness to seduce satellite signals, such as GPS and television broadcasts, both in peacetime and during the conflict. If you do this from space with a much more powerful energy source, these attacks will become much more efficient and will be more difficult to repel.
The idea that Russia will launch a nuclear bomb does not make much sense. This will not give Russia any new strategic or tactical advantages that it no longer has due to its terrestrial missiles with nuclear warheads, and will be useful only in the most difficult circumstances. Obviously, Russia needs a powerful muffler in space, which could aim for certain satellite signals and work continuously as needed.
Regardless of what it turns out, we need to use this opportunity to refocus on creating more stable and protected space systems. In the end, it was because of such threats that Congress created the US space forces. There are many ways to make satellites more resistant to obstacles and other forms of attacks. It also allows you to double the effort with our allies to develop a number of plans for what we will do before and after the attack in space.