"Pluton's" Burestant ": Why did the US give up a rocket with a nuclear engine and the Russian Federation - no
Why are the United States behind Russia in this direction and are there arguments that stop the Kremlin? Over the decades that have passed since the cancellation of the American project "Pluto", the Russians have managed to take on its main idea. Unlike Americans, they are not too concerned about the accompanying ethical dilemma. Focus has translated the article of Brandon Weikhert's military analyst for National Interest.
The article is dedicated to the Pluto Project, which they have refused a number of threats to the planet. In the midst of the Cold War, the United States developed the boldest and most horrifying concepts of new weapons. Among them was the Pluto project - a program for the development of a winged rocket with a nuclear engine that can overcome unlimited distances and strike.
This giant nuclear -flowing engine, known as a low -percent of supersonic controlled rocket (SLAM), has become the pinnacle of US achievements in the field of nuclear weapons development and at the same time a sad example of how far the Cold War came. America never implemented this project.
It is noteworthy that in decades, when the Cold War ended with the victory of the United States, it was the Russians who created their own winged rocket with a nuclear engine - the so -called "storm" that threatens Ukraine and Europe. How did it happen? And why have the United States abandoned this megaproject? The Pluto project was officially launched on January 1, 1957 as a joint venture of the USAF (USAF) and atomic energy commissions (AEC).
The project, whose task was to study the use of nuclear reactors in direct-flow air-reactive engines, was headed by the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory (now Livermore National Laboratory named after Lawrence) under the guidance of Theodore Charles Merkel. This concept was based on the earlier ideas of the 1954-55 National Aeronautics Advisory Committee, which appeared in the period of widespread studies of the Air Force in the field of nuclear engines for aircraft and missiles.
The goal was clear: to create a winged rocket that could evade air defense, quickly fly at low altitude and be driven by a nuclear reactor, which provides unlimited flight duration. The SLAM rocket could also carry several nuclear warheads, essentially replacing intercontinental ballistic missiles (MBR). The development soon moved to the Jecaces-Flette test ground in Nevada, where remotely controlled railways were built for transportation.
Until 1963, $ 260 million was spent on the project (or about $ 2 billion in today's rate). Pluto was based on a nuclear rectus engine, the design of which involved the heating of air by means of a division reactor instead of chemical fuel. The air came at supersonic speed, passed through an unprotected active area of the reactor, expanded under the influence of high temperature (up to 1370 degrees Celsius) and was thrown away, creating a thrust.
The reactor, which was called Tory, used ceramic fuel elements from Cors Porcelain Company and high -enrichment uranium oxide and beryllium oxide to slow down. Its initial version produced 46 energy megawatts, and a later version of Tory II-C reached 513 MW, imitating a thrust of about 15. 8 thousand kg/s. The SLAM rocket flew from the ground with rocket accelerators, and then connected the reactor to reach a speed of more than 3 Mach at a height of only 150 meters.
The guidance was carried out with the help of the inertial navigation and radar of the area, which provided accuracy within a few tens of meters at the theoretical flight range of up to 182 thousand km, allowing the rocket to fly around the globe many times. The rocket could even be in the air for several months, dropping up to 16 hydrogen bombs before self -destruction with the help of its own thermonuclear warhead.
In fact, the US Air Force built a Russian Petrel missile - 70 years before the Russians did. Pluto project had one serious drawback: radioactive emissions. While atomic submarines and aircraft carriers were equipped with reactors that prevent release of radiation, the rocket did not have such protective mechanisms. During the flight, its unprotected reactor left a footstep of life -threatening radiation throughout the journey.
Of course, it can be argued that in the case of nuclear war, radiation radiation is inevitable in any case. But even without the SLAM warhead, it was undoubtedly a "weapon of mass destruction", uncontrollably erupting deadly toxic clouds over the Union and neutral countries on its way to the USSR. In fact, flight tests were never carried out due to fears of contamination.
There was no safe route, and the disposal of waste reactors in the ocean was recognized as unacceptable in the conditions of growing ecological consciousness. Thus, despite the technical success, Pluto project closed on July 1, 1964. The development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as "Minitman", gave faster and cheaper alternatives without vulnerable low -percent flight (and obvious side effects).
Budget reduction has led to a $ 8 million funding, which reflected a change in priorities. Geopolitical risks, including the fear of provoked the USSR, as well as ethical considerations on non -selective destruction have finally determined the fate of the project. Over the decades that have passed since the cancellation of Pluto's project, the Russians have borrowed his idea.
The Kremlin has repeatedly tested the Petrel missile in remote regions of the country, despite the fact that the problem of radioactive emissions has not been solved. The rocket was nicknamed "Flying Chernobyl" and has already led to several incidents with radiation, which has killed several civilian Russians. However, unlike Americans, Russians do not worry about ethical dilemma or geopolitical risks that this rocket carries.
Moscow seems to even inspire ethical and geopolitical problems related to the "petrel". Against the background of UAV development and hypersonic technologies, the SLAM rocket with a nuclear power supply looks a little senseless. Despite this, the Russians are not going to give it up as easy as the Americans did. Brandon J. Weikhert is a national security analyst, a former Congress employee and a geopolitical analyst who writes for The Washington Times, Asia Times and The-Pipeline.