Pressure of the Chinese Fleet: As the army will protect Australia from the threat from the sea
Many noted that the passage of an operational group of three ships about 500 kilometers from the east coast of Australia took place in international waters - China will release this statement, and its officials accused Australian politicians of "deliberately blowing up" this problem. Focus translated Professor Ien Langford's article on Australia's defensive capabilities against the background of threats by the Chinese military fleet.
Many analysts have taken advantage of this opportunity to emphasize that the Australian military shipbuilding program for many generations has not been able to provide enough ships for national security. They also indicate that the current construction of surface ships will only take effect in the 2030s.
However, a subtle point does not take into account: if the Chinese fleet made an outing of our waters or, worse, decided to intervene in our air and marine maneuvers, calling, for example, to the defense zone of air defense, as is the case in the waters near Taiwan every time the Taiwan communist? Will we be able to do anything? The answer to this question is at the heart of Australia's defensive policy in 2025.
The military strategy is often described as "goals, ways and tools", which serves as a utility model explaining the application of the strategy. In this context, the goal is expressed in the National Defense Strategy of 2024, which is aimed at restraining any hostile action against the territory of Australia, its population and international interests. Restraint is achieved through effective diplomacy, a strong economy and, in this case, military power.
When restraint is enshrined in politics as a goal, the ways of achieving it are logically. Judging by our observations over the last two weeks, the paths will be manifested in the form of an operational concept or plan to deprive the Chinese open access to our inland waters. This may require an operational maritime target group under the Australian flag that can quickly turn around and ensure that the Chinese are restrained.
As a rule, such a target group will consist of frigates, submarines and supply vessels. Other methods include the use of aviation, such as marine intelligence aircraft and shock aircraft of the royal Air Force Australia. When goals and paths are defined, the latest element of the military strategy is the means that are the forces and platforms necessary for military operations.
Here, the Australian defense forces may face problems up to 2030, since most of the government's potential within the national defense strategy will not be able to put into order by the end of this decade. Although the national defense strategy outlines goals, ways and means in the early 2030s, there is a certain risk to create tools for military strategy in the intermediate period.
This returns us to the dilemma, which was put in front of us by the Chinese naval group off the coast of Australia in the last two weeks. Despite the fact that a group of ships remained in international waters, and many stated that this activity did not cause fear about our future defense capability, it, nevertheless, reflects our current military potential and emphasizes the urgent need to constantly improve the projection of force, control over the sea.
Increasing the number of ships, submarines, and a long -range missile will be necessary after 2030. But how to be with the present? One of the possible decisions is the use of the Australian army, whose success in creating the forces of the future, focused on maritime and coastal approaches to Australia, is often not taken into account in political discussions on the forces of the country's defense forces.
As for the striking capabilities of land base, the government can go to a certain risk to accelerate the purchase of anti -ship missiles. These systems are capable of keeping any foreign fleet or hostile state from home water. The army can restrain a deep -water fleet from its waters, just as the Ukrainian army was restrained by the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
Although the Pacific is enormous, and the ground -based strokes have restrictions, this strategy offers immediate potential to protect inland waters and respond to recent events, unlike ships and missiles that should appear no earlier than 2030. Having quickly put into operation an army system that complements the development of the Navy and the Air Force, Australia will be able to maintain its goals, ways and means both now, and after 2030 as large projects are being implemented.
Last week, the emergence of a Chinese naval operational group in international waters near our east coast showed what a sudden and sharp pressure could exert a Chinese fleet on its neighbors. Australia must implement an effective military strategy now; She can't wait until 2030. Yen Langford is a professor at the University of New South Wales, Executive Director of the Security Defense Plus research organization and a former senior army officer who is fond of special purpose forces.