As the Fleet of Russia dies: What does Ukraine's victory mean on the Black Sea for military affairs
But this does not mean that ordinary warships are outdated-and of course, it is not the reason that the naval forces should not have aircraft carriers. In fact, this even strengthened their positions. Let's look at the reason why it is. First, the Black Sea Fleet of Russia was seriously injured because of the need to act very close to the territory controlled by the enemy.
Initially, Sevastopol, and now Novorossiysk, are within the mild reach of the arsenal of Ukrainian surface drones and missile missiles. Most ships destroyed by Ukrainian drones and rockets were amazed when they were rolled up or standing on ancho: neither one nor the other is undesirable in the area of reaching the enemy attack. In other words, the range of action - which is your greatest protection against long -term threats - inaccessible to the Russians. The Black Sea is not very big.
Secondly, the Black Sea, relatively small, generally not inclined to lift really big waves. The high -speed boat, drone or manned, theoretically faster than the ship, but not if there is waves. The warship can theoretically overtake a faster small ship for excitement much higher than the third (wave height - 1. 25 meters). The same applies to Ukrainian marine drones-in fact, high-speed robot boats. On average, the conditions on the Black Sea prefer Ukraine.
Third, Russia's ability to observe a strategic level or even get a recognizable air image is strongly undermined. In the Marine War, it is absolutely necessary to have access to the onboard radars that can cover hundreds of miles of sea. The radar on the ship cannot see the flying items, or the floating horizon, which is at no more than 30 miles.
But Russia could not transfer any of its maritime patrol planes to the Tu-142 aircraft-all of them needed in the north to guarantee the safety of its submarines of nuclear restraint. In January above the Azov Sea, the Russians lost a precious A-50 radar surveillance aircraft, and then, in February, another deep in the Russian airspace. This means that the Black Sea Fleet of Russia cannot track the movement of Ukrainian drones or vessels with grain in the western Black Sea.
If he could, he would impress the grain trucks with the winged "caliber" rockets or would cause air strikes, cutting off the vital trade in Ukraine. With the correct radar image, Russia will be able to detect drones as soon as they leave the harbor or even earlier, and then they can be intercepted long before they reach their goals.
This, by the way, is one of the main reasons why the naval forces need aircraft carriers: they should carry radar planes that are the only way to scan large areas of the sea and the sky. An alternative is land air tights, but they cannot move and are therefore excellent targets for drones and rockets, as the Russians have already found out. And in any Marine War may not appear available land bases-so it was, for example, we have in the Falkland Islands.
Fourth, the Black Sea Fleet persistently ignores one of the basic principles of marine maneuvering: echelorated protection. Any marine operational group should have all three levels: an external level provided by friendly fighters (another reason you need aircraft carrier), an average level consisting of heavy air defense missiles, and the last internal level consisting of Near defense on every ship.
The Black Sea Fleet, at least theoretically, had it all when a full -scale invasion of Ukraine began, although its fighters were and remain a ground base. But the Russians do not unite these layers to protect their naval forces. Last year, Sevastopol defended only the average echelon: the Ukrainian special forces took out his, and the base was drew up with winged Storm Shadow/Scalp rockets.
It should be noted that, despite all the conversations about drones (and there is no doubt that Ukrainian drones were very effective), most ships lost by the Russians were actually destroyed by modern Western missiles. Sometimes there are no effective layers at all. This is evidenced by the fact that the Russian flagship "Moscow", which had to have two levels of protection only with its own weapons, was lined and then drowning only with two base rusters.
Everyone may have a bad day, but there was nothing in Moscow's actions that indicated that her crew knew what he was doing. Video of subsequent attacks of surface drones show that the Russians are still insufficiently organized. There is a fifth factor - the Montre Convention in 1936, which gives Turkey the right to control everything that enters and exits the Bosphorus. This means that Russia cannot replace lost ships or introduce reinforcements. Ukraine cannot.
People like to call Ukraine a "country without a fleet. " In fact, she now has a small fleet of warships donated by allies or purchased in foreign shipyards, but like most of Russia's naval forces, they are not allowed through Bosphorus and they cannot fight. This is another anomaly that is characteristic of this war. Nothing of this diminishes every importance of unmanned air, surface and underwater vehicles.
Drones are undoubtedly a military direction for efficiency, mortality and value reasons (which are regularly dominated by thinking, although it should not be so). The royal fleet has the most striking and best views on this problem, and their thinking is mature and first -class (see as an example of Ark Royal. ) The US is working on it as careful and, inevitably, attract the best resources.
They recently stated that by 2030, all maritime movements that do not require people will be carried out with the help of unmanned systems. But the one who suggests that Ukraine's success in the development of surface drones will change the nature of the Marine War and/or make our Navy outdated, does not understand the features of the Black Sea, the general principles of the Marine War. The author expresses a personal opinion that may not coincide with the editorial position.