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Occupation, administration, republic - what Ukraine can do in the occupied territories of the Russian Federation

The seizure of the territory of the Russian Federation puts not only military, but also organizational, humanitarian, political tasks. Understanding them, the analyst Igar Tyshkevich draws several scenarios of events and offers several options for solving issues that arise. Raid actions of the Armed Forces in Kursk region are ongoing. Currently, despite the assurance of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, the Armed Forces control zone is expanding.

Ukraine does not speak about the goals of the offensive in the Russian border management of Ukraine. The words of the President "On the transfer of war to the territory of the aggressor" only characterize the situation. However, there are several scenarios for events, at least two of which provide long -term control over occupied territories. And, as a result, they create new challenges. I propose to think about it.

As of today, we can talk about the Armed Forces raid, which has already reached several political goals. In particular, the Kremlin now creates a shock group in order to regain control of lost territories. To do this, the transfer of combat units from other areas of the front has already begun. And for this, the topic of involvement of soldiers of conscripts before the war against Ukraine is actively discussed.

Accordingly, there are several scenarios of events, from the point of view of Ukrainian interests. They are interconnected with each other and can be implemented both separately, so consistently, when the logic of one scenario is replaced by the logic of another: all of these scenarios involve maintaining control over occupied territories for a while. And then a week or two will have the question-"what to do with civilians?" There is no water transportation, there is no food.

Medical care is unlikely. Utilities do not work. And it is not only electricity, but also water supply, gas, sewage. And the lack of policy of working with these issues after a while can create political challenges for Ukraine. The Russian Federation will not be interested in maintaining peaceful infrastructure in these territories.

In this way, the Kremlin receives a situation where, by accusing Ukraine of reluctant to take care of the lives of civilians, you can try to try to "balance" the accusations against the Russian Federation concerning the spring of 2022. In particular, reflect the accusations of violation of international humanitarian law.

This will not change the position of Ukraine's partners, but will affect the states that seek to preserve neutrality, and will give an argument to political forces in the EU, which advocate for the termination of the war, with a rather rapid return to the regime of cooperation with the Russian Federation. So, the first task that will occur in a few days is the organization of "green corridors". That is, to give some civilians to leave.

A good political trick, but there is one "but" - Russia, agreeing in words, can in every way slow down this process. Politically correct after a while to initiate such a case. That is, to demonstrate care (unlike the Kremlin) about civilians. And finally, Putin will have to agree to the proposals of Ukraine, regarding "Russians". In the case of sabotage by the Russian side, it makes sense to consider the possibility of evacuating part of civilians into the Ukrainian territory.

But here their difficulties are citizens of the aggressor state. And this is an evacuation in the territory that was directly affected by the Russian invasion. That is, in addition to the logistics task, the task is political and humanitarian, which is to demonstrate the ability to humanitarian and humane response. And finally, the propaganda moment - "Russians run from Russia to Ukraine". The next task is to provide infrastructure in the occupied territories. At least its minimal set.

And this is not only civilians, but also the fighters of the Defense Forces of Ukraine. Even for effective defense, it is advisable to have a rear with communication, water, electricity and more. And here the question is whether it will be possible to use Russian resources (gas, electricity) at this stage, to launch a water supply system. In parallel, it is necessary to solve the problem of delivery of humanitarian goods to Ukraine -controlled territory.

Food reserves in the local population will end in a few days. And here the question arises: who will feed them? At least the next week or two. On the spot, this is decided by the distribution of products to the Ukrainian military, but it should be remembered that servicemen will distribute what they are intended for them. So, the question is: "How to spend at least the remaining records of those who stay", "where to get products", "How to deliver them and who will be responsible for the process.

" The above tasks are relevant in the logic of the raid, provided that Ukrainian troops intend to leave the busy territory soon. But if the control is stored, we proceed to the logic of occupation of the territory and the work of occupation administrations. And this is not just a political question. A situation where there are any local problems at the local level, launched, albeit at the grassroots level, a local economy that reduces the cost of maintaining this territory.

And here we have three key options. 1. Occupation regime with full power in the military. Simply put, in the rear, commanders are created, which, in addition to solving, in fact, military tasks, deal with the problems of ensuring the possibility of life for the local population. The undoubted advantage of this approach is complete control over the process and the lack of need to make political decisions in Kiev.

Simply put, the military is fighting, but in addition, control the repairs of transmission lines, water supply and sewage, delivery and distribution of food, medical care. This format may not even need the participation of locals - the necessary specialists bring (either under the task or the watch method) from the territory of Ukraine. The minus the approach is its extraordinary expensiveness. Simply put, Ukraine pays for everything. The military is distracted by atypical functions for them.

And finally, the issue of guaranteeing the safety of civilian staff. 2. Creation of the local military-civilian occupation administration. That is, without political declarations on the future of employed regions and in a format, when local experts are directly subordinated to the military.

This approach will need to start involving structures that can be identified among the locals ready for cooperation, analyze the needs for staff and resources for minimal launching of civilian infrastructure and possibly the economy. But it will also require the creation, if not a regulatory framework, at least some legal boundaries in which the local population will exist. And bodies that will guarantee their implementation.

In particular, if a "peaceful life" is launched, not only medicine but also, for example, police. The advantages of this option are a certain cost savings and the opportunity (if successful) to demonstrate that "normal life" is in Ukraine occupied by Ukraine. The disadvantages include the difficulty in finding local collaborators. Especially, given the lack of political declarations on the future of the territories.

At some stage, you need to answer such people, what will be with them if Ukraine leaves. 3. Creating political power. It can be a play in LDNR's logic when local occupation administrations have become a semblance of state institutions for several months. Or creation of such first. By inviting some Russian politicians, opposition Putin, to the management of this territory.

It can be politically as an analogue of "LDNR" 2014-2015 with a declaration of reintegration from the Russian Federation in case of change of Russian legislation and changes in power. Or the conditional "Russia without Putin" - that is, a script in which the formed political center declares the commitment of politics of "united and indivisible Russia (within 1991)" and its ambitions to expansion until the capture of the entire territory of the Russian Federation.

Plus this option - the territory exists, albeit with the constant support of Ukraine, but still at the expense of its own resources. And the citizens of the Russian Federation are demonstrated "alternative Russia". Which can lead to any migration processes and possible stimulation of civic conflict in Russia. A disadvantage of this option is the need to support the territory even after the formal end of the war. Or taking a wave of "refugees from the conditional Curns or" Russeputin ".

In addition, playing in the analogue" LDNR "creates additional foreign policy risks for Ukraine. And the draw of such a map can deprive us of some external support. Option with" independent state "is also risky Although to a lesser extent, but in recent world history there are cases of former republics of Yugoslavia, Kosovo, South Sudan and other new states. And strengthening power in the new proto-state formation. war. The success of the operation in Russia will depend on solving these problems.