Opinions

Plan G in action. What does the Armed Forces offensive look like Putin

Tom Cooper Austrian Military Analyst, specializing in the history of combat aviation Timothy Ash: Putin has constantly reduced his military plans, gradually reoriented to the Donetsk region (photo: Reuters) Putin still has prospects sooner or later to declare victory. And this is all that matters for him I do not want to spoil the party, but I think it is time for a serious analysis of the situation in Ukraine. I also think we need to try to understand the situation from Putin's point of view.

In fact, yes, purely from his point of view. Video of the day and why, you ask. Well, I will remind, this war against Ukraine began Putin solely for his Putin purposes. And the very first of them is the desire to stay up -to -date. Non -reporting to anyone, especially in Russia. If you get back into the past and limit its activities in this regard only this year, the plan A was to overthrow the government in Kiev and replace it with a "friendly". It failed.

Plan B was to capture all of Ukraine east of the Dnieper, as well as Kherson. It failed. The C plan C was to complete the conquest of not only Lugansk and Donetsk, but also Kherson and Zaporozhye. But when Putin was over the troops, only Lugansk and Kherson was being implemented. Plans D, E and F were somewhat reduced variants of the C plan, which concerned primarily Donetsk: thus Putin was constantly reducing his military plans, gradually reorientation to the Donetsk region.

At the same time, he has a "plan G": capture Kherson, Lugansk and leave something in Zaporozhye - and eventually get the whole Donetsk region. For this he simply did not have enough troops. Yes, he introduced this III Army Corps under the fanfare. He intends to add another, by the end of this month. But none of them had either 30,000 nor 90,000 troops. In the III Army Corps, at best, about 10,000-12,000 people.

Thus, this is not enough to implement the plan G - and Putin wants to implement it, as can be seen from continuous (in fact, more and more strong) storms of Bakhmut and Sand for the last few days. Thus, he had to "find additional troops. " On the other hand, contrary to all the promises of local officers, Kharkiv gave Putin Dirlewangs anything, but not a friendly reception.

So why to squat the III Army Corps in Kharkiv? For what? Try to think like Putin: what could be better than "punish liars while saving troops"? Do not worry: I do not buy the official position of Keystone Cops in Moscow (so the author calls the Ministry of Defense of Russia - NV) about the next "reorganization" and the like.

But it cannot be deny that Putin did nothing to stop the release of Eastern Kharkiv in recent days, while all the time giving orders to additional storms of Bakhmut and Sands. And his Dirlevangers in Kherson are still firmly holding.

So, now an overview of what was achieved: - Yes, the eastern part of Kharkiv region to the Oskol River is in the process of liberation in Ukraine; - Yes, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the auxiliary forces lost up to 8000-10,000 servicemen and large reserves of ammunition and other stocks. But Putin does not bother.

On the contrary: these are the same Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, which (from Putin's point of view) failed Slavyansk from the area of ​​Izium, not being able to take it in three months (not to mention all previous failures; See 1 GTA in Kharkiv and Sumy, then again in Popasna, etc. ). Putin is indifferent to the loss, but he is concerned about failures.

For him, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is the biggest failure of this war (just look at Shoiga's face and Gerasimov during their last joint speeches with Putin, and you will understand what I am). On the contrary, VAT seems to have avoided this in the Kharkiv region at the cost of "only" two weak BTGs. With similar losses, the "beloved" Putin PVCs went. The SBR and Omon were really injured. All together, we are unsuccessful, but tolerate " - from Putin's point of view.

Even the separatists managed to escape. The most affected by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. And no one in Russia bypass the case of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: it is consumable material. In turn, today the Armed Forces are so employed only to ensure the safety of the territory from Balakliya to Vovchansk, White Well, the Great Burluk and the two -year (which is a huge territory) that they have neither time nor continue to move through the Oska on Svatovo.

It is reported that the city has been left by Russian troops for two days, but there seems to be no Ukrainian troops there: at best, only guerrillas and SCOs. It remains only to hope that the Armed Forces have enough troops to continue the offensive in the direction of Sand-Radkovsky, Borovy, Svatov and Severodonetsk.

I know that the departure of the Russians from the students in the direction of the Sands area is monitored, for example, but I see nothing about "using opportunities" there: maybe troops just can't keep up at the Russian pace? First of all, throughout this time:-The Russians (still) fiercely resist any promotion of Ukrainians to Kherson, and-meanwhile, fierce-day and night-storm Bakhmut and northwest of the Sands.

So, I still have an impression: "Of course, full of mistakes, but still": there is a large "exchanging of the territory for troops". Something like "get rid of futile losers, incompetent military and liars in Eastern Kharkiv for the implementation of the plan G. " Putin did not inform the local commanders of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and did not invite Ukrainians to attack. But as soon as they did it, "it got it completely.

" Given how the events are developing now, his troops are going to establish a new front line along the Oskol River; In Kherson, they continue to resist, thus promising at least some prospects to complete the full capture of Donetsk. The offensive of Ukrainians will cost the Armed Forces, will take the troops needed to strengthen Bakhmut and Sands, and will end with the fact that they will have to transfer additional units along the border with Russia - instead of placing them on the forefront.