Protect the islands. Why war on folklands teaches marines
How not to allow revision autocracy to invade the neighboring island? If the invasion takes place on the shores of this country, how do you force an enemy with its numerical advantage to retreat, acting for hundreds or even thousands of kilometers from the main logistics centers? In 1982, the British had to solve this problem when the argentina's military junta invaded the Falkland Islands after many years of claims for sovereignty over the British overseas territory.
Focus has translated the new text of Nollan Vinlen, dedicated to the lessons of war in the Falkland Islands. The US Marine Corps has a priority to solve the problem of strengthening rivalry between the great states in the Indo-Pacific.
British troops on folklands acted at about the same as our commander imagined the actions of marine infantry in the future: small units distributed over vast maritime spaces, relatively limited support for indirect fire and limited traditional nearby aviation support. Airplanes with a vertical rise played a crucial role in ensuring maneuverability and logistical support for the United Kingdom in the South Atlantic. But these planes are virtually absent in the new concepts of the Marine Corps.
To eliminate these inconsistencies, I offer a brief overview of the lessons that Corporate brought us, and then indicate how to add them in the concept of marine infantry, in particular to maximizing the current and future capabilities of aircraft with a vertical take -off. On April 2, 1982, Argentina's armed forces invaded the British territory of the Falkland Islands in the Southern Atlantic.
British administrations that changed each other concluded that any argentina planting would mean the fact that has not been appealed. However, the Prime Minister-Minderian government, Margaret, has quickly undertaken to return the Falkland Islands to the United Kingdom. In a few hours, the Corporate operation was started, which aimed to displace Argentina from the Rocky Archipelago. The first warships left the British ports less than three days after the invasion.
The quickly formed united operational group overcame all the difficulties and went over 12,800 kilometers to finally seize the islands by June 14. The victory was not guaranteed. From the moment of the operation of the operational group, there was no need to use aviation with a vertical rise, and even ambiguous relations between the command and the structure of forces in which amphibious operations were given a secondary role.
The British Operations Group consisted mainly of the aircraft carrier combat group to establish the preference in the air and at sea, and the amphibious-assault group, which included 3 commandos brigade, was aimed at capturing the islands. The rapid deployment of the British naval operational group was striking, but at first it was conducted to coercive political settlement, hoping that the military decision would not be needed.
When the British Operational Group sailed from the historical ports of Sir Francis Drake and Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson, her material and technical inventories and equipment were mostly stored without taking into account the possible amphibious operation. The Ascension Island, a single intermediate base accessible to the British, needed a significant reorganization of logistics.
The use of surface ships for rearrangement of equipment would not be difficult for the royal fleet, but steep slopes, soft sand and strong surf on the beaches required the use of helicopters from moving from the ship to shore. Even after unloading the equipment on the island of the Ascension, the necessary helicopters were required to transport deep into the island.
After the minimum redeployment and coordination of actions of the headquarters, the operational group went to a goal where the relentless climate and terrain would require even more aviation support. Air defense has been a vital factor throughout the Corporate operation. The decision to plant parts 3 of the commando brigade only after the aircraft carrier combat group has set an advantage in the air, eventually found it inappropriate. I had to go to the risk associated with Argentine Aviation.
Argentina had six times more aircraft than the British Operational Group, and the air defense systems, which are in service with the royal fleet, could not provide adequate protection for the troops after landing. The Rapier terrestrial air defense system was designed to reduce the risk of air attack in the absence of air advantage.
The terrain that is most suitable for this function by the Rapier system was not available for land vehicles, and the system itself was too crossed to carry the system manually. As a result, the Amphibian Combat Group commander, Michael Klepp, was forced to allocate limited funds to providing Rapiri with one SEA King helicopter to deliver stocks and gasoline for their generators. " The need for helicopters only increased when Britain has moved from amphibious to offensive operations on the shore.
The geography of the Falkland Islands limited the number of favorable places for planting. San Carlos Water was selected in the northwest of the eastern folklands. On May 21, the first units of the 3rd teams of the commandos were landed, but the extension of the bridgehead was delayed due to unresolved problems with logistical supply, as well as through measures to protect the forces related to the constant movement of surface ships to San Carlos Water and from it.
The only means of maintaining the tempo under these conditions was the constant use of helicopters. Since the initial planting and to the final surrender of Argentina, on June 14, "helicopters remained vital for logistics operations through the Cross -Established, Eastern Folkland Territory. " When the ExOCET rockets, released from the air, were sinking the SS Atlantic Conveyor ship, all the helicopters, except for one, were lost, which further complicated the limited mobility of land troops.
The absence of tolerant roads to overcome rocky swampy terrain led to the fact that scarce helicopters were occupied by the transportation of artillery and heavy equipment, while British Marines and soldiers were forced to march on the difficult locality. As a clear example, one is the fact that for the transportation of one battery of six 105 mm howitzers and the necessary ammunition required 82 SEA King departures.
Such a reduction in maneuverable means has undoubtedly led to a delay in the conflict, since most helicopters were allocated for transportation of equipment, not personnel. Relations between the command of the interagency units and the lack of helicopter provision for even one brigade have become a significant cause of friction as the operational group grows.
The royal infantry brigade numbered about 4,600 people, which, according to the Ministry of Defense, was not enough to confront 10,000 Argentines on folklands. With the deployment of the 5 infantry brigade, Major General Jeremy Mur began commanding a divisional headquarters as part of the operational group. Most of the battalions of this team consisted of soldiers who distributed time between the operational and ceremonial service guards without training from amphibious operations.
This additional brigade made it possible to increase the total number, but led to a confusing relationship in the command, which caused the greatest loss of British troops since World War II. When it was still thought that a political decision was possible, very little effort was made to determine the exact role of the 5 infantry brigade.
The answer to the question of what to do with these troops was received when the 3 brigade, the commandos carried out its first offensive actions after landing on San Carlos Water. The first success in the settlement of Gus Green prompted the 2nd Battalion of the Parachut Regiment to go too far forward from their own logistics, which made them vulnerable to the opponent's attack without the possibility of rapid reinforcement.
A poorly thoughtful support procedure and absence of helicopter specialists at the Amphibian Forces headquarters allowed an ambitious battalion to invite a helicopter support that was essential in other places. In response, part 5 of the infantry brigade was planted in the settlements of Bulf-Kuv and Fitzroy to facilitate the situation of isolated paratroopers.
Due to the wrong distribution of helicopters to transport these soldiers, despite the lack of amphibian experience, excess vessels were needed. The 56-kilometer transition to open landing ships took several hours, as the soldiers were exposed to the cool climate of the South Atlantic and the Argentine Air Attack. In the west on June 8, several surface ships were attacked, the LSL Sir Galahad ship sank, 51 soldiers and sailors were killed and 46 were injured.
In order to better understand the cause of such a tragedy, it is important to return to the past - in years that are directly heading for World War II. During this period, interagency competition was particularly struck by the royal fleet: in 1966, the aircraft carrier renewal program was abolished, and in 1979 the last catapult aircraft carrier - HMS Ark Royal - was decommissioned. These have had irreversible consequences for the fleet's amphibious capabilities in the coming years.
The only two aircraft carriers capable of performing operations with aircraft were HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, whose small decks flew "vertical take -off and landing" instead of helicopters instead of helicopters. Thatcher has enshrined the policy of budget restrictions that contributed to the more limited view of the purpose of the royal fleet. In the 1981 White Book of Defense, its government recommended that all amphibian courts are deposited by 1984.
The Britain's belief that the need for amphibian capabilities is unlikely and will only be used as part of a larger NATO surgery, has deteriorated the readiness of the royal fleet. Two aircraft carriers were prepared for sale to a foreign military, and the HMS Intrepid landing platform was already in the decommissioning process. Fortunately for the United Kingdom, Argentina decided not to wait for the full effect of the projected changes in British amphibian capabilities.
The sale of aircraft carriers was postponed, and the decommissioning of HMS Intrepid was canceled for the use of related landing ships and helicopters of medium load capacity. Since now, the gap between the British and Argentine potential seems inevitable.
However, no military professionalism would be able to overcome the distance of 12,800 km between the United Kingdom and the Falkland Islands without appropriate means not only to arrive at the theater of war, but also for the movement of troops, supplies and equipment on the non -remedial terrain of the islands. If the conflict began a few months later, the complete absence of amphibian vessels and related helicopters would make the return of Falkland Islands.
Much has been written about the successful choice of the invasion of the final transmission of English aircraft carriers. However, the carrier combat group was unable to fulfill its main task - to provide an advantage in the air. In the end, it is helicopter mobility that made it possible to return the Falkland Islands under the control of the UK. In the 2019 planning manual, the Marine Corps Commandant outlined an ambitious but necessary plan to reduce the threat of new equal opponents.
For each following year, its annual updates for the Force Design 2030 plan relied on this initial management, directing the service through the White House and the Ministry of Defense. Numerous conceptual documents were based on the leadership of the commandant. The concept of expedition operations on advanced bases is aimed at eliminating the potential advantages of the enemy "by improving our own ability to maneuver and use control over key maritime territories.
" Taking into account the lessons of the British experience of using helicopters on folklands is crucial that the Marine Corps does not repeat such errors in the process of maneuvering and maintaining its own distributed forces. It is very important that aviation with vertical takeoff is better integrated into marine mobility. The use of surface ships to plant personnel and equipment ashore is not guaranteed.
Artistic renders of conceptual light amphibian ships draw pictures of unloading equipment on clean beaches, but on the example of the Ascension Island is problematic. The Falkland War also showed that mobility requirements are not limited to the coastline. With the exception of four light tanks, all reserves, artillery and air defense systems were easy enough to quickly and efficiently carry them on helicopters.
The internal terrain or the absence of existing airfields is still one of the factors that have to be considered by marine infantry planners, especially in the islands in the Indo-Pacific region, where large airfields are often absent and road infrastructure is not developed. CH-53E/K helicopters provide a unique possibility of rapid transportation of radars, mobile air defense systems and ammunition systems for long-range high-precision artillery, critical for new military concepts.
The possibility of refueling in the air of these platforms allows to perform operations at distances that significantly exceed those that cover British helicopters. One hundred percent increase in the number of KC-130 transport squadron active component located in the Pacific Ocean will enhance the radius of CH-53E/K aircraft and MV-22 Osprey, which will allow the deployment from outside the first island chain on the distributed expeditionary bases within its limits .
There are already precedents when the aircraft of vertical zone overcome huge distances. For combat operations in Panama helicopters MH-53, twice in 1989 used refueling in the air, without planting almost 2 255 kilometers-an approximate distance between Guam and Taiwan.
Operation on such distances will certainly be an exception, but it gives the commanders of the Marines the ability to quickly use vertical aviation, when threats, terrain or alternative distribution of forces will become unbearable. Relations between the Marines Command can jeopardize the use of aircraft with a vertical take -off, repeating the history of conflicts that the British Operational Group faced in 1982.
The Marine Corps Library Regiment was created within the Force Design 2030 process, taking into account expeditionary operations on the advanced bases. The commander made it clear that this new unit is not the only one who can carry out such operations, but the base of the current and future litter regiments of the Marines in the Pacific guarantees that more operations will fall on their share within the new concept.
The previous doctrine only approximately determines the role of aviation in supporting the liter forces without indicating the source of these aircraft. The emphasis on the previous guidance and "concepts for reserve forces" on blows from the air, intelligence, observation and reconstruction, not the vertical take -off, threatens the repetition of history with inefficient use of helicopters in the United Kingdom in 1982.
Moreover, in the absence of aviation agents capable of carrying out a vertical lift, the dependence of the Little Regiment of the Marines on the consolidated squadron of the expeditionary units of the Marines to maintain their maneuver will be a source of instability. There will be not enough means to simultaneously support the operations of both units, since all their aviation is specifically designed to support the operations of the Marine Infantry Expeditionary Unit.
The tickets that distinguish squadrons on current deployment cycles will face difficulties in obtaining additional tasks, especially in conditions where CH-53 is reduced by 35%. This reduction is consciously planned so as to coincide with the simultaneous reduction of infantry battalions by 13%. However, in 1982, the success of the British Operations Group was threatened not just by the number of aircraft with a vertical rise, but a special relationship between command.
The lack of certain relationships between the Airborne Forces Commander and the Commander of the Litter Forces within current doctrines will complicate the unification of their units. It is necessary to clearly define the distribution of aviation support during expeditionary operations on advanced bases, including the use of helicopters.
Надмірний акцент на мобільності, що міститься в "Концепції резервних сил", ігнорує разючу невідповідність у швидкості, дальності та гнучкості авіації порівняно з перспективними надводними кораблями, які ВМС США не наважуються фінансувати.
Незважаючи на критичну роль, яку, як передбачається, відіграватиме мобільність на морській місцевості, авіація з вертикальним злетом жодного разу не згадується в цьому документі.
Будь-яка ставка на ненаявні безпілотники матеріально-технічного забезпечення без продовження інтеграції наявних наразі на озброєнні платформ великої дальності з вертикальним злетом і дозаправкою в повітрі ставить під загрозу життєздатність цих нових концепцій.
Ударні та розвідувальні безпілотники переконливо продемонстрували свою незамінність не лише під час оперативних випробувань, проведених Корпусом морської піхоти, а й у боях в Україні.
Здатність безпілотних платформ логістично підтримувати морську піхоту за умов, передбачених комендантом, більш сумнівна. Були запропоновані сучасніші безпілотні концепції, але однією з найпотужніших платформ із вертикальним злетом є вертоліт Kaman K-MAX.
Під час 33-місячного експерименту в Афганістані в 2011 році він довів свої можливості проти повстанців, але його швидкість 80 вузлів, дальність польоту в один кінець 267 морських миль та корисне навантаження 2 700 кг просто сміховинна порівняно з MV-22 та CH- 53E/K.
За вартості в кілька разів меншої, ніж у пілотованих суден із вертикальним злетом, безпілотні системи забезпечать лише частину матеріально-технічної підтримки.
Ці альтернативи для підтримки морської піхоти в Тихоокеанському регіоні варто продовжувати розробляти, але нині брак можливостей відводить їм допоміжну роль. "Технологічний прогрес різко змінює оборонне середовище.
Міць сучасної зброї, яка швидко росте, дозволяє точно знаходити цілі й уражати їх на великих відстанях, збільшуючи вразливість основних платформ, таких як літаки та надводні кораблі".
Можна вважати, що цей уривок описує сучасну глобальну обстановку, але ця цитата міністра оборони часів Тетчер показує, що багато міркувань, які визначають діяльність Корпусу морської піхоти, були актуальними й сорок років тому.
Корпусу морської піхоти США варто зробити конкретні кроки, щоб отримати уроки з досвіду Великої Британії під час операції Corporate.
Успішне додавання вертикально-підйомної авіації до концепції Корпусу морської піхоти, запропонованої командувачем, стане непростим завданням, але негативні наслідки застосування виключно альтернативних варіантів транспортування надто великі, щоб покладатися на них.
Нолан Вілен — пілот-інструктор CH-53E, наразі служить у першій ескадрильї морської авіації з озброєння та тактики. Нещодавно закінчив Школу експедиційних бойових дій.