Do not climb into Russian meat grinders. How to create new infantry quality in the Armed Forces
The fact that from time to time a couple of tanks and BBM leaves "carefully work" to the front edge - it does not change… Bloody carousel continues - infantry + mortars and art. This format is in the hand of our enemy, which significantly outweighs us in the human resource, to which it, in addition, is treated as a resource, not valuable citizens. Obviously, it is necessary, figuratively, to "stop" and think about what to do with it . . .
It is clear that "voluntarily" the enemy will not stop, before it should be forced. It is possible to do this only in one way - if it has multiple volume and the amount of losses in the same human resource that it is now betting. That is, the enemy has the speed of his "detachment" exceeds the rate of his recovery.
We cannot technologically do this yet (because we do not have the advantage in the whole spectrum of the means of lesions so significant that it leads to a real "devastation" in the ranks of the enemy, not quantitative, no quality). Moreover, our ammunition opportunities, let's just say, are also quite limited.
And General Zaluzhny, despite all that Hate, which he was staged by the short -lived "strategies", in his assessments and conclusions about the current development of the situation was not just right to 100%, but I would even say, for all 150%. Either technology or positional deadlock . . . However, the reality is that we can build our own technological "capabilities" on the battlefield, we can yet-neither resource nor financially or even organizational and administrative.
To count solely on the help of the Allies in this matter - well, this is, of course, perhaps, but this is a rather capricious business. Therefore, it remains to look for a way, figuratively speaking, "on the battlefield itself" . . . As for me, from the whole price of possible decisions and in view of the current format of organization and fighting, we have to give our own infantry "new quality".
That she certainly had an advantage in this format of the fighting of the enemy's infantry (until, unfortunately, we have to think about such a "costly" way). Or, very significantly and qualitatively work on the artillery component of our army. With the latter, there are some trabs. We are very dependent on this issue on our allies, which, for our part, do not have the bottomless stocks of art and ammunition for us . . .
So at this stage it is worth considering thoughtfully and seriously, first of all, the infantry, with constant and persistent attention to ours, it art.
Its "new quality" should consist of significant improvements to the 3rd main directions-training (I mean the whole complex, from moral and psychological preparation to tactical-special and fire), weapons+equipment (they must be in infantry in sufficient quantities not only to prevail in its "TTH" analogues of the enemy, and this should relate to the whole complex, from tactical drones, mortars, communications, large -caliber machine guns and grenade launchers, ending with "trunge Arms of Sagittarius), well, the command link of the tactical level .
. . From the commander of the department (assault group), to the commbrig and compole should be not only ready for the organization and management of infantry battle in a variety of conditions, but also be able to do it . . . that the enemy will strive to repeat the "fortress" of Bakhmut, Avdiivka, etc. …. in which our infantry will be at a high pace (even with a comparable, or even slightly smaller, the rate of infantry of the enemy itself).
It is in his hand, in the mobilization tension he will overcome us, because he has a much greater mobilization resource. The fact that as of now, the Kremlin regime due to the internal political features of the "fluid mobilization" has reduced the pace of mobilization, let them do not mislead you. As soon as he "discharges" (which is obviously, this or another), these rates will grow significantly.
Moreover, during this time the enemy has the opportunity to significantly improve and significantly increase the ability of his system of mobilization deployment of the army. To stop this, or better to change-dramatically change, is possible only when, figuratively speaking, the enemy will begin to realize the fact that in order to kill one Ukrainian infantryman on the front, he must spend his 15-20 "top" What situation and in all circumstances.
It is then that the meaning of mobilization races, which obviously chose the Kremlin one of the main elements of his strategy for war, will lose its meaning for him . . . And so far, in the current environment, it is quite profitable for him to arrange some another "meat grinder" once after Bakhmut and Avdiivka, tomorrow it can be Siversk, Coal or Kupyansk with Liman… At the same time, he is not so important the result as the process itself.
As for me, he should not (mean - the enemy) to help voluntarily in this case. To climb on your own initiative into these "meat grinders", for example, "repel right now and immediately Bakhmut" or act in this sense in some other way. I would still have made some changes in the structure and composition of our army, given the current development of the general (strategic) situation in the war. First of all, the functional. But, everything is the subject of another conversation . . .