Technology

Drones-interceptors, Reb, SpaceX: How to cope with the Hundreds of "Shahmed"-interview with flash

So far, the most effective means of combating Shahaneda is the means of air defense and mobile fire groups. The system of "cover" helps, but a significant problem can be the establishment of Starlink Russians. Russia has increased the use of Shahaneda and other long -range drones against Ukraine, only in October, about 1600 units launched.

In an interview with focus, the Ukrainian specialist in military technology Sergey Beskrestnov (alias Flash ") shared his thoughts on how to deal with this threat and what new weapons can invent against it. Is the National Protection system intensified to fight the Shahaneda? We are talking about the category of EW, which works on satellite navigation signals, that is, figuratively speaking, replaces them or does not allow them to work.

These are the tools against Shahaneda effective if there are many such funds and they will be evenly distributed throughout the territory. Shahamed, which is protected by the navigation system, has lost their navigation. Yes, we continue to mount this system, of course, it is a big global expensive process. Unfortunately, our opponent also does not stand still, finding methods how to bypass it, how to act in certain situations.

For example, if Shahed earlier, getting into the zone of the ERB, could not find the target for the attack, now it has become smarter. Up to what leaves the main target and flies to another, reserve, which may potentially be protected by the means of EWS. It is very, very difficult to prove that Shahaned was planted precisely thanks to the means of HR. We do not know how the statistics are. We often see the data "location", we often ask me what it means, as a result.

It is difficult to say - whether it is the work of the EP, or just the coincidence, or whether it is "gerbera" just ended in the fuel and it fell. It is impossible to determine 100% that Shahaned was shot down by the means of the HR. How do you evaluate the prospects of drones-interceptors in the fight against Shahaneda? For example, the famous Wild Horne team has recently introduced their new reminiscents of the ball.

I am quite skeptical so far, because for the first time we saw this concept on Hakaton about Shahmed more than a year ago. The idea lies on the surface: to attack the "chema" faster drones, but we do not see that someone does so. This is a rather complicated process for a number of reasons. First, you need to have a high speed to catch up with Shahda (this issue has already been resolved). Secondly, you need to have a lot of time flight to catch up.

Plus, you need to have enough UAVs scattered in different areas that are in the next mode, always ready to fly away and intercept "Shahped". That is, a whole set of measures is required. This can be done, but it is necessary to accompany, fix, make, help to fly. We have learned to fight the anti-aircraft drones with the UAV-reconnaissance of the enemy, because they are slow, they fly very static, predictable. We are giving the FPV-therots, we go from above.

In the case of Shahaneda, especially those flying at night, it is often impossible to visual search for anti -aircraft drones, as is done in the afternoon. I do not exclude that we will come. Does SpaceX be involved in the Starlink blocking process used by Russia? The question is difficult. Of course, according to our official appeal, especially if we do it through our partners, SpaceX works out such requests and responds.

But it is in fact very difficult to determine and prove what "Starlins" are used, because we simply do not have such information. Yes, we can find Starlink, its data, information, determine where and by whom it was bought. But this is not the basis for locking the dealer or seller and all that he sold.

For example, Starlink, purchased by a volunteer in Poland and installed on Ukrainian UAV, as well as Starlink, purchased by a relative in Germany, transferred to the Russian, who also works in Ukraine - SpaceX cannot understand which of them we use and which enemies we use. There are no options here.

If you analyze the traffic from Starlink and on the basis of it to conclude who uses, it is not a solution-they raise VPN, make a closed tunnel through any European country, and it is not visible what information it goes. We understand that it is difficult against Starlink to act, but such work is done. It is a tracking of global dealers, which are supplied through the affiliated companies of equipment to the Russian Federation, not by units, but by hundreds.

For example, if Starlink is bought in Arab Emirates and suddenly found itself on the Eastern Front in Ukraine, then questions arise. It is clear that such a dealer can be tracked, blocked, and other sanctions so that he can not sell further to the Russians. But until we initiate, SpaceX will do nothing in this direction. Starlink also operate in the occupied territory, as SpaceX officially believes that it is the territory of Ukraine. It is both Crimea, Zaporizhzhya region, and southeast.

Where the fighting is ongoing, Starlink works, it does not matter if we have or have Russians. What are the promising directions of fighting Shahaneda? During the war, they have already come up with everything you can. There is nothing better to come up with, except to expect the appearance of FPV-pings that can catch up and attack "Shahda", to become our new weapons. Because we can increase the number of mobile fire groups, although they are enough in the country.

They are not always effective, because we see that "Shahda", sometimes, fly at a height of 3-4 kilometers over Ukraine and descend immediately before the attack. Here, mobile fire groups are not beneficial (except those that protect objects). We can ask our partners to give more aircraft to combat Shakhaned, but that means - to depend on someone again, an unstable option. Therefore, I am a fan of finding my own solutions. FPVrons can be their own solution.