Putin in the besieged fortress: what Russia has turned in 900 days of war
There was a second, perhaps, more good reason: a small victorious war had to return Russia's status of the "third pole of the world". This is the basic reason for this war. Without awareness of this, it will be difficult for us to make some predictions about the Kremlin's further actions. 2. Now, in fact, about the changes that took place in Putin's head. March Prigoine became a turning point for Putin. He understood one important thing: the elites are afraid of him so much that he can.
In the true sense of the word "all". Before that, he still beware of many things. I understand that many people will now start to say that he could do everything before, but that's not. In 2022 it came to the fact that Putin even turned into a "collective Putin" for some point and was forced to humiliate a system of collective responsibility for himself.
Actually, from that moment (after the march of Prigogine) it is possible to say metaphorically that a new Putin was born, who offered the Russians a new national idea. And this idea sounds like this: Putin wants to live as long as possible and die in the presidential chair. It's not about a history textbook or something. The main idea of the Russian state is Putin's long and cloudless life.
Do you ask, how about the "third pole of the world"? This idea remains, but now it is delayed indefinitely. More precisely, time is determined by Putin's life. He understands that technologically (in the sense of the latest technologies that determine the current era) he will not be able to make Russia a third pole.
And so all of his strategy on the external front is as follows: creation of problems for competitors (chaotization of processes), which should lead to the return of dialogue with Russia. Simply put, he will try to create problems anywhere in the world and, most importantly, within the competitors on the one hand, and on the other-will demand to sit with him at the negotiating table. And now the most unpleasant for us: Putin realizes that he can no longer leave Ukraine.
To start the dialogue, he will sell the event of the myth of impact on the axis of evil. His current game is the sale of air. More precisely, it wants to "guarantee" the measure of the safety of DPRK and Iran, clear rules of the game in the sugar, etc. , exchange for a constant dialogue, part of which will be the removal of sanctions. Once again, sanctions are only part of this dialogue in Putin's sense. 3. Now regarding internal affairs in the Russian Federation.
The main visible change is the "naked party", which became a Rubicon for the elite. The masses have not been understood to the end, but now new rules of the game have been created, the essence of which is reduced to the Kafkian formula: "You do not know what you will be punished, but you can be punished for everything. " The only possible behavior in this coordinate system is obedience and "be good to Abuzer. " It is a basic setting of power that was subdued by elites.
During the year, if nothing is especially changed, the masses will understand. They already experience a sharp deterioration of life (two -thirds of Russians do not have savings at all). But power moves to the fact that even more Russians will live on the verge of poverty. At the same time, the authorities do not build oprichnina as many people think.
The Kremlin builds such a structure of society in which there is a passive half that not only afraid of power and obeys it (in Russia, 400 years 99% of society are afraid of power).
This conditional half are apologists of the regime for which two mythological frameworks have been created: 1) they are against change, because the changes will mean that it will be worse (once one acquaintance was described by the situation since the 90s, when he was not paid a salary, but the chief was paid The workshop told them: "We do not need anyone for the passage"). Actually, the expansion of this base of people is one of the main tasks of the Kremlin.
2) the creation of a relatively large layer of minority that should be respected through their actions in the war. At the same time, the main myth of this war will not (only) in victories. And in money. This layer never before and never had and will have as much money as now. And the termination of payments tomorrow will change almost nothing in their attitude to Putin (unless external (other internal) propaganda machine). All this idyll has a large spoonful of tar for Putin.
Those who build this model (first of all Sergey Kirienko) think not only about Putin. They think of his death and the transit of power. 4. Until recently, no oligarch had influenced political processes in the Russian Federation. In the current coordinate system, the so -called "Kremlin Towers" have lost their primary essence.
Earlier, civilized and not very discussions took place between the towers, which resulted in Putin the sole right to arbitration, but the state received "economic" economic, rarely political and geopolitical decisions. Now the role of the Kremlin towers has declined to the role of oligarchy: that is, the staff that serves. And the main decisions begin to be closed within the relatively small circle of people responsible for Putin's safety.
In other words, Russia of today's model has largely moved to manual management on the most involved issues, and the circle of those involved in making decisions becomes narrower. Moreover, Putin begins to actively create discomfort systems for his environment. The beginning was launched at the moment when Patrushev was released, which was de facto "excellent" for security forces. Patrushev lost this role (and lost, because the splicing of his group and the group of "Gostech" of Chemezov began.
There was no real threat to Putin's authorities, but given the position that there is no smoke without fire, Putin lowered Patrushev. However, he did not strike on the chames, which oversees 80% of the Russian MIC (here the logic of Putin is simple - it is not necessary to break what works). So, breaking Tandem Patrushev -Chemezov, Putin did not stop. Here are just a few examples of the last month.
For example, Putin Dumin adviser has the right to control Charms (though the latter should also be controlled by the Defense Minister Belousov). It is worth paying attention to the landing of Senator Savelyev, who was a wallet of the same Dumin. A separate plot is the creation of the position of Deputy Head of Rosgvardia (there is no appointment), but the head of the Guard Zolotov is already in tension. And all this happens against the backdrop of Putin's dual power in the FSB.
It is now difficult to answer who is the main thing: Bortnikov or his first Zam Korolev, whose functionality includes, in particular, to report on the personal life of the elite. All this happens against the backdrop of two subjective points: because of aging, Putin makes a slower decision, and from the decision to create a position to filling in the vacancy can take months.
The second point is also associated with aging, but not only physical but also the aging of the system: Putin, in view of everything, is increasingly in paranoia. But, being a SC*kuna in kind, he builds a system of power in his head as a prototype of the whole state - he builds a system of a lounged fortress where he is a fortress. And he simultaneously plays both those who attack and for those who defend. 5. As for the common people, Putin never considered the people a subject.
The people are offered one option: a deterioration of life (where the compensator will be the myths mentioned above) and fear of strengthening the repressive apparatus. Putin sincerely believes that control over elites is the control of the people. Finally, it is worth asking yourself the question: "Is a Tabker possible"? The answer is simple: a Tabker is possible in two cases (such an exotic version as poisoning on the order The fright of one of Putin's sparkling.