"Hypocritical threatening event": Vladimir Putin's Baltic Strategy (Part 2)

In the period of formation in the 1960s and 1970s, he was strongly influenced by thinking characteristic of Marxist-Leninist political doctrine, which imagined world politics as a clash between socialism and capitalism, virtue and vices, the Soviet bloc and the West. As a result, Putin views the West as a decadent, hypocritical, and undermines Russia's social cohesion. In his outlook, chaos needs control, and pluralism must be in force.

Focus publishes the second part of the article "Deciphering Vladimir Putin Baltic Strategy", which scientists and safety professionals Holger Moller and Eric Shiraev have been published on the National Interest portal. The first part can be read at the link. The triumphalism of the West coincided with Russia's internal collapse in the 1990s.

The rapid transition of the Baltic States to liberal democracy and full integration into NATO and the EU were perceived by many Russians not simply as a political discrepancy, but as betrayal and humiliation. The commitment of Baltic societies to liberal democracy - open, pluralistic, effective - disgraces the Kremlin's ideology and violates its idea of order. This is not just a frustration, but marked the ideological doctrine that views liberalism as a threat to Russia's security.

The instincts of the Cold War - distrust, secrecy, ideological confrontation - as before, determine the Putin's perception of the world. Although many first considered Putin a pragmatic modernizer, his actions were caused rather than a strategic vision - this trend was manifested in his infamous speech in Munich in 2007. In an interview with 2025, Putin confessed that he wrote this speech on his own when he flew on the plane, succumbing to emotions.

At that time, many observers waved from his statements as a bravado, believing that he just wanted to seem tough. In a retrospective, this speech is perceived as a declaration of intentions than as a moment of rhetorical bravado. Considering Putin as a rational politician, we assume that he understands the huge cost of starting a military operation against the Baltic countries.

Hypothetically, if he considered such aggression, it would require considerable financial resources, major military mobilization and political risk of direct confrontation with NATO, which leads to the application of NATO 5 articles. In addition, the strategic location of the Baltic countries on the Gulf, directly opposite St. Petersburg, makes them risky goals with serious consequences, and Putin will have to think twice before resorting to hostilities.

From a rational point of view, a conventional attack on the Baltic country can cause a rapid and rigid reaction of NATO, which potentially threatens the safety and stability of Russia itself. Leaders are often expected to be unknown, which is considered to be their main virtue. However, rigidity can be a disadvantage. Putin's ideological rigidity is exacerbated by psychological features that have been rooted over time.

As an experienced scout, he learned to consider politics not as a dialogue, but as a battlefield. The deception, manipulation and disorganization for him were not auxiliary tools, but the essence of strategy. His managerial skills were harden at forty-year-old when he worked as a assistant mayor of St. Petersburg in the stormy 1990s-decades, marked by rampant in crime, corruption and murder. Then he assumed the role of the godfather, acting as a mediator in peace talks between the hostile clans.

His climbing to the peaks of power was impressively fast: until his appointment by the President he never held an elected position. For the next quarter of a century, Putin was isolated from critics and surrounded himself with loyal supporters. Insiders claim that it becomes more and more self -centered, focused on its historical role and disappointed daily responsibilities for government management.

It is important to note that Putin's ideological concept is not reduced to the return to Soviet communism, but rather a mixture of imperial nostalgia, social conservatism and national pride. The infamous tendencies, such as homophobia, woman -bearing, anti -Semitism and conspiracy theories, have become pronounced in the post -Soviet era. Instead of accepting Western values, Putin's regime renamed these trends to "traditional values" and used them both in domestic and foreign policy.

Although this is rarely emphasized in analytics, Putin's age is also an important factor in risk assessment. Autocratic autocrats often become tougher, less open to dissent, and are increasingly relying on old habits and ideological beliefs. In the case of a man formed by the dogmas of the Soviet era, this rigidity can increase compromise resistance and readiness for confrontation.

Such thinking is sometimes manifested in public statements concerning different apocalyptic scenarios, and in such statements as "we will immediately get into paradise, and they [the United States] will simply die because they will not even have time to repent" made in 2018 during an international meeting. Such thinking, if not controlled, crosses the traditional analysis of costs and benefits and leads to catastrophic decisions based on emotions, not on strategy.

The risk of miscalculation remains real, especially if the decision -making process drives paranoia or distorted sense of historical heritage. These conclusions shed light on Russia's strategic position on the Baltic countries, which it considers "a vulnerable part of the event", prone to manipulation through constant psychological operations - what we call "global information war", that is, purposeful use and management of information to ensure preference.

Transparent institutions of Estonia, effective e -government and NATO membership symbolize everything that Putin's Russia is not (and cannot be) under its reign. Destroying a successful example on his side, Putin seeks to strengthen the legitimacy of his authoritarian rule. Destabilization, not dominance, is the key word to understand Russia's anti -Western strategy.

Not having an attractive ideology capable of competing with Western liberal democracy, Moscow instead seeks to undermine the legitimacy and stability of its neighbors through psychological war, misinformation and provocations. Estonia, fully integrated into NATO and the EU since 2004, has been on the forefront of this campaign.

From cyber attacks to organized scandals, such as the 2007 riot around the monument to the "bronze soldier", Russia is constantly checking the social cohesion and political determination of Estonia. These efforts are not single incidents, but part of a broader revisionist strategy to preserve the Russian influence in the post -Soviet space.

Particularly painful is the unresolved question of the border agreement between Estonia and Russia - one of the first signals about Russia's intention to deepen the conflict with the West. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has encouraged territorial and ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet regions (frozen conflicts) - Nagorno -Karabas, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Transnistria, Crimea and Donbass - hindering peaceful settlement, stringing.

In general, this policy is reduced to maintain influence by destabilization. If Estonia showed a strategic imagination in 2005, it could predict Russia's true goals and not allow Moscow not to set up the Estonian public against the borders agreement. Holger Molder - Doctor of Science, Professor and Head of the Research Group on International Relations, Safety, Law and Technology at the Tallinn Technology University (Estonia). Earlier he worked at the Estonia Ministry.