The Armed Forces can go on a counter -offensive in 2025 - The Telegraph

Probably, the Ukrainian offensive is aimed at forcing Russia to transfer some of its troops from Donbass to counteract the threat to Kursk. About it writes the British edition of The Telegraph. However, yet Russia has not suffered for this provocation, journalists say. While Ukraine is moving in Kursk, Russia continues to press in the Donbass, where, despite the great losses, their troops do not stop.

"Ukrainian troops, incomplete and stretched, are able only to slow down, not stop, promotion of Russia. Such key settlements as New York, Toretsk, Yar and Pokrovsk, critical for the rest of Donetsk region, experienced intense battles and heavy artillery. The fire from the beginning of the Ukrainian offensive. In addition, in recent days the number of Russian aircraft in large cities of Donetsk region has also increased.

On August 9, Konstantinovka suffered a rocket strike when the enemy shells hit the supermarket and the post office. This is a continuation of the tragic trend of July 2024, which became the most fragile for civilians since October 2022, the authors of the material said. These bombardment may be part of the Russian Donbass. Ukrainian units are concerned that the transfer of forces to Kursk instead of Kharkiv and Donbass can jeopardize their current defense.

Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk are faced with a lack of personnel, which complicates defense operations and almost prevents counterattack, reporters write. The proximity of this settlement to the front line and its vulnerability to Russian artillery pose a significant threat. If Pokrovsk falls, it can lead to the surroundings of the Russians Konstantinovka, Kramatorsk and Slavic.

Ukraine hopes that in the end Russia will be forced to transfer more power from the occupied territories, which will weaken its position in other areas. American officials suggest that Russian troops have already been transferred from Crimea, Kherson and Zaporozhye, and can be redirected through occupied Donetsk and Lugansk to counteract the Ukrainian invasion of Kursk. Ukrainian sources also report that the Russian forces could be withdrawn from the Kharkiv Front.

However, it is important to note that there are no signs of Russian troops in the Donbass. If this is true, it testifies to Moscow's determination to focus on this offensive, even despite the success of Ukrainian forces in Kursk. Despite the great losses, Russia's constant success in the Donbass encourages it. However, several factors can undermine Moscow's determination.

First, if Ukraine continues success in Kursk, Russia may be forced to transfer more forces from the occupied territories, which will weaken its defensive positions. Secondly, the Ukrainian crews who are currently undergoing training can be deployed for strengthening either Kursk or Donetsk region, depending on where Russian troops show signs of weakness. This flexibility could allow Kiev to perform a counter -offensive in 2025, not just another offensive on the occupied Donbas.

Third, it is a continuing offensive on Crimea. The destruction of the Black Sea Fleet and the accelerated dismantling of the Russian air defense network in Crimea forced Russian troops on the peninsula to move to the defense. Ukrainian intelligence suggests that Crimea will be the next target, and the Kerch bridge, which is already a frequent target of Ukrainian sabotage, will probably be destroyed in the near future.

Although the usual offensive in order to return Crimea seems ambitious, the movement of Russian troops to strengthen the Donbass and Kursk can open the door to strengthen secret Ukrainian operations on the peninsula. The success of the Kursk operation may not depend on the withdrawal of Russian troops, but if it continues to put Moscow in an uncomfortable position and break the supply lines, Russian troops will have to answer that they will eventually undermine their operations in the Donbass.