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Russia asks artillery shells and anti -tank missiles in Kima in exchange for the...

Kim Jong -in comes out of the shadow. How war in Ukraine and Syria helps the DPRK to survive and develop

Russia asks artillery shells and anti -tank missiles in Kima in exchange for the provision of advanced technologies for North Korea for satellites and atomic submarines. The agreement will continue Russia's ability to war in Ukraine, and can change the dynamics of nuclear restraint on the Korean Peninsula in favor of North Korea.

The full -scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine, the agility of Iran and Syria, as well as the potential invasion of the PRC in Taiwan enables Pyongyang to implement his destabilizing foreign policy and finding means of existence. What is bad for the whole world, is often good for North Korea - a country that develops in the shadow of the international system.

In the context of reducing global cooperation and strengthening competing blocks, the closest and medium -term perspective will give an unwavering regime to Kim Jong -in the necessary conditions for further survival. Subsequently, it can even lead to North Korea's exit with Zamublisia together with allies-revisionists, who are primarily united by the rejection of the order based on the rules that transformed these countries into rogue.

Focus translated Jonathan Corrado about why the DPRK will be able to survive and develop in the medium term. The destabilizing foreign policy practice of North Korea can be implemented due to the factors of the present time, as well as the near -term and medium -term future. All these factors can contribute to the growth and strengthening of the pool of countries subject to international sanctions and oppose liberal international order.

As you can see from the examples below, such countries are practically not faced with the negative consequences of participating in illegal operations with North Korea. Thus, global disintegration will provide favorable conditions for the smacious Pyongyang, which will receive unprecedented opportunities for the impunity of weapons, profit and aggression. Over the last century, the Korean Peninsula has been the object of indifferent (and sometimes hostile) rivalry of superpowers.

But from the very beginning, the ruling northern Korea dynasty - Kima - has learned to manipulate breaks and splitting, benefited from cracks in alliances between friends and enemies. Kim Il Saint enlisted the Soviet and Chinese support of its invasion south, despite the serious objections of Moscow and Beijing, and then received security paages from both countries during the Chinese-Soviet split.

Looking back, we can say that 2016 and 2017 became the highest point in international cooperation on imposing sanctions on dangerous aggression of North Korea. At that time, Russia and China supported the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions containing sectoral export prohibitions to slow down the inflow of cash used by Kim's regime to implement its weapons programs. However, in recent years, the implementation of these sanctions has declined sharply.

A number of meeting Kim Jong-in with the Secretary General of China Si Jinping (five meetings in 2018-2019) and Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2019 was aimed at strengthening partnerships and preparing for meetings with US President Donald Trump.

In the future, the new fragmented UN Security Council will not only weaken joint efforts to restrain the development of North Korea's arms, but can also encourage the growth and interpenetration of numerous networks of illegal distribution and purchase of weapons.

At the recent military parade, dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the end of the Korean War, Kim Jong-in sat aside from two honorary guests: the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Sergei Shoig and a member of the Politburo China Lee Hunchun. Such an atypical appearance on the annual parade of the country is deep.

The fact that Shoigu came to Pyongyan in the midst of the aggressive war of his country against Ukraine indicates that Moscow is counting on the constant military support of North Korea in the form of artillery and other weapons, which and in love with the financial assistance she needed. Kim is now a rare trip abroad, where he meets Putin to discuss further increase in assistance with weapons and military cooperation.

It is also rumored that after a long and heavy pandemic blockade, North Korea can soon open its borders again. When this happens, it will count on China in terms of increasing trade. Pyongyang clearly seeks to get out of isolation, strengthening partnerships that will allow him to escape. Russia's aggressive war against Ukraine has already opened new opportunities for North Korea to make a profit and bilateral spread of weapons.

Earlier, Russia retained at least the visibility of the UN sanctions, even if the facts were indicated by their violation. Now, hostile relations of Russia with the United States and Europe have nullified sanctions. Shoiga even praised North Korea's defensive development, despite economic sanctions and international isolation.

In addition to the reception of North Korean workers and the supply of Russian oil over the agreed marginal prices, which is contrary to sanctions, Russia and China have blocked the adoption of a new resolution of the Security Council aimed at imposing sanctions against North Korea for a record series of launching ballistic missiles.

In order to interfere with the work of the UN experts responsible for monitoring the compliance of sanctions on North Korea, Russia has again forced the resignation of the group coordinator from the United Kingdom in cooperation with China.

When, last year, South Korea announced that it would join a multilateral effort to impose sanctions against Russia, the Russian ambassador to South Korea Andrey Kulik warned that bilateral relations would "change the course" and threatened to withdraw Russian support in the field in the field of nuclear safety.

Now, when there is argument in Seoul that South Korea can be fatal assistance to Ukraine, the Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of Russia Dmitry Medvedev has threatened North Korea with a weapon if it happens. The leadership of North Korea began to call its relations with Russia "tactical and strategic cooperation".

On the occasion of Russia, Kim Jong -in, June 12, sent Putin a message to which he called for "closer strategic cooperation" and condemned the United States and the event for "hegemonist" policy. Russia's motivation in strengthening links with North Korea begins and ends with its own interests. Moscow receives numerous benefits from these closer relationships. According to NATO Secretary -General Jens Stoltenberg, North Korea supplies artillery shells and such rockets and shells.

The White House revealed information that Russia seeks more ammunition from North Korea, offering food and raw materials instead. The US Ministry of Finance has imposed sanctions against the Slovak weapon, which in the past has been a mediator between the governments of Moscow and Pyongyang and "is at the center of the" new intended agreement "Food in exchange for weapons".

Even worse, the US State Department fears that Kim's message from June 12 can provide additional supply to North Korean weapons to Russia to support its invasion. Indeed, according to US officials, Russia will ask for artillery shells and anti -tank missiles in exchange for the provision of advanced technologies for North Korea for satellites and atomic submarines.

Such an agreement will continue Russia's ability to war in Ukraine, and can change the dynamics of nuclear restraint on the Korean Peninsula in favor of North Korea. The development of North Korea missile technologies is aimed at evading and defeating the network about the US-Korean alliance. More quiet submarines can significantly strengthen North Korea's aspirations to create a nuclear triad.

Although both of these events are unlikely to happen quickly, they will be a serious threat to the Alliance's defense potential. Another benefit for Moscow is the fact that North Korea is one of the few countries that recognize Russia's illegal claim for sovereignty over separatist states in the Donbass in eastern Ukraine. Pyongyan even hinted that he could send his builders there.

As the placement of North Korean workers in its territory is a violation of the sanctions of the United Nations, more and more Russia's adoption can be interpreted as a corresponding political benefit for Pyongyang in exchange for its open support for the Kremlin's war. Relations between Russia and the international community are likely to continue to deteriorate, at least until any settlement in Ukraine is reached.

Putin even announced the withdrawal of his country from a new Treaty on Control of Nuclear Weapons from the US. It is a joyful news for North Korea, which can count on continuing and expanding opportunities to sell more weapons, export more workers and earn more profits to finance its illegal nuclear and missile programs while Russia is in strife with the international community.

If you turn to the Middle East, there are two countries that have participated in the past nuclear weapons in the past with North Korea and which are increasingly moving away from the international community: Iran and Syria. Joseph Baiden's administration has abandoned attempts to resuscitate the nuclear deal with Iran from which Trump's White House came out, and the US-Iranian relationship continues to deteriorate.

Today, given the dubious fate of a nuclear agreement known as a common comprehensive action plan, a continuing break in American-Iranian relations, as well as internal unrest caused by Makhi Amini's protests, the prospects for reducing tension look foggy. Unlawful trade in weapons with Iran began in the early 1980s. During the Iran-Iraq War, about 90% of the weapon exported by North Korea was intended for Iran. During the same period, collaboration in the field of rocket technology began.

According to the US intelligence community, "North Korea cooperation with Iranian ballistic missiles was constant and significant. " Experts suggest that the Iranian Shahab-3 missile can be created by the North Korean Nodong missile, and some elements of the Iranian launch vehicle have common features with the Hwasong-14 rocket. According to the testimony of US national intelligence director James Klepper, in 2016, this cooperation has slowed down.

However, in 2020, according to the report of the UN expert group, cooperation in the field of long -range missiles resumed. Less significant data allow you to uniquely link North Korea and Iran in the nuclear sphere, although officials have repeatedly expressed concerns about this opportunity, and unofficial sources hint at potential cooperation. According to Dr.

Bruce Beach, North Korea and Iran cooperated in the development of nuclear technologies provided by the Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Kadir Khan. In 2011, the Japanese newspaper claimed that 200 North Korean nuclear scientists worked at Uranus' enrichment enterprises in Nathas (Iran).

According to the Iranian defectors, Iranian officials were present at almost all North Korea nuclear trials, and North Korean expert delegations regularly come to Iran for consultations, as one of the Iranian opposition groups reported in 2015. Moscow apparently supports the strengthening of cooperation between Tehran and Pyongyang, when transit North Korean officials stop in Russia on the way to Iran.

North Korea also spread its impact on Syria: in the 1990s, it supplied Scud B and SCUD C missiles, and in the 2000s helped to build a plutonium reactor. The reactor installation, known as Al-Kibar, was located near the Euphrates River in the northeast of Syria. Apparently, it was built with the assistance of North Korea and created on a sample of a 25-megavatted heat reactor in Jonben. In 2018, Israel acknowledged al-Kibar in 2007.

Syria appealed these statements, but further investigation of the International Atomic Energy Agency found a significant number of chemically treated natural uranium particles at the site of the destroyed object. In 2012, Kim Jong -in publicly praised Syria Bashar al -Assad and wished him success in suppressing the uprising. Throughout the Civil War, North Korea supplied missiles and materials to create chemical weapons.

According to a group of UN experts, in 2020 there were 800 North Korean builders in Syria. The situation with Iran will continue to deteriorate if the efforts to replace the previous nuclear agreement fail and the US-Iranian tension will intensify. So far, according to the director of the Central Intelligence Directorate William Burns, "Iran's supreme leader has not yet decided to restore the weapon creation program.

" But this decision can be canceled at any moment, and Tehran can turn to Pyongyang for additional assistance in the form of technology and technical management. So far, Pyongyan will, at least, provide Tehran rocket care. Syria, which has suffered from a devastating earthquake and more than a ten -year civil war, will continue to contact North Korea with support on the world stage and supplies of weapons behind the scenes.

Equally disturbing is that in the future Syria "can promote North Korea's military cooperation with Iran and his allies. " In the near future, the spread of North Korean weapons to Iran and Syria will tick at least three points, which are priority for the KIM regime: providing profits, providing opportunities for opponents to the US and distracting the world public's attention from their nuclear activities by helping rebellious states.

The unification of these players as the only anti -American bloc is most clearly evidenced by "Friendship without the borders" of Russia and China and the constant approval of Moscow's aggressive war in Ukraine in Ukraine. After developing a plan of military cooperation for 2019, China and Russia conducted six joint patrols of the Air Force, in particular on June 6, without warning, the South Korea air defense recognition zone.

Russian officials have hinted that North Korea could join Tripartite Navy. China still did not want to go to this relationship, giving Russia weapons for war, although he opposed the US Hegemony and accused NATO of invasion. Beijing can still provide death, despite the associated costs. Meanwhile, China is already supporting the Russian invasion, providing dual-use goods, such as vehicles, drones and semiconductors, as well as increasing the purchase of Russian oil.

This support may be sufficient to enlist Russia's support if SI decides to achieve the unification with Taiwan by the power of weapons. It is difficult to imagine an event that would more nullify the achievement of globalization and split the international community than China's invasion of Taiwan. Regardless of the result, most Vargeims prophesy that human casualties will be terrible and economic consequences will be large -scale, which will lead to unprecedented split in the world system.

Given the obvious losses for all, it is difficult to find obvious winners in this situation, except, of course, North Korea. To understand why, you need to imagine reality after invasion. The exact results of the Chinese Taiwan invasion will depend on the nature of the Taiwan and the international community. But it is likely that the US and their allies will seek to assist Taiwan and impose on China.

The response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine can serve as a model for sanctions that can be applied against China. Of course, China is a much more important trading partner and locomotive of the world industry than Russia, so the creation of coalitions will be associated with some difficulties.

However, it can be assumed that a certain degree of ostracism will cause a blow in response from China, and those who doubt, all over the world will be increasingly pressure from Beijing and Washington to choose their side. Under a huge load, world financial, technological and trading systems will be increasingly split and diverge. That's where North Korea benefits.

First, the geopolitical instability caused by the invasion will allow Kim's regime to provoke and force the population of the peninsula to demonstrate their capabilities, change the status quo in its favor and kill a wedge between the US and South Korea.

Secondly, for political, economic and strategic reasons, North Korea will quickly stand on China, and most likely, China will cease to comply with almost all UN sectoral sanctions against North Korea, which will lead to a huge profit for the DPRK. The regime will be able to receive billions of dollars a year through the export of coal, fishery, textiles and foreign workers. It would also mean unlimited oil import from China (and Russia).

Cross-border Chinese-Korean business ties and purchasing networks will return to the level and then exceed it. Third, this team is likely to join North Korea partners with weapons (including Iran, Russia and Syria), which will provide even more opportunities to expand cooperation within this network of expanding sub-participants.

The emergence of parallel global economic and technological systems will give North Korea a safe harbor to attack a block that resists, with the help of financial, cybernetic and kinetic means, with the approval of their partners. The playing of the worst scenarios is a useful reminder that seemingly unrelated global events may have devastating consequences.

This emphasizes that the United States should actively cooperate with allies and partners to plan the worst options and be ready for effective response. It also serves as an argument against the idea that coalitions should be regional in nature and focused not only on solving this minute problems, such as, for example, combining efforts of partners with the European Union to combat the Russian invasion and separate work with Asian partners on North Korea and Taiwan.

This approach does not take into account the growing interregional integration of a set of problems. Global values ​​based on values ​​are better suited to solve the tasks and will be better tested. In addition, this imaginary experiment provides another convincing reason for active cooperation with competitors to prevent crises through trust measures, "red line calls" and institutionalized dialogues at the highest military and diplomatic level.

These steps can reduce the likelihood of dangerous actions that can provoke the worst version of this gloomy future, which few will suit anyone, except elites in Pyongyang, Beijing, Moscow, Tehran and Damascus. The US should always strive for de -escalation and create conditions that reduce tensions and promote rapprochement. For example, the freezing negotiation negotiations will significantly limit Pyongyang to the development of these programs, and therefore may cost a US programs.

At the same time, the national security apparatus should clearly imagine future tasks and provide scenarios in which US diplomats will not be able to reduce tensions. North Korea has friends for a common dislike. The United States has a deep and wide network of allies that share not only interests but also values. Therefore, the United States should adhere to a deep versatility -based approach, with the widest possible coalition to solve the two major tasks.

First, ensuring compliance with sanctions. The purpose of the sanctions is not to instantly change the behavior of the subsequent country, but to serve as one of the aspects of diplomacy to gradually change the factors and terms that influence the thinking of the enemy, deprivation of its means and materials necessary for the implementation of arms programs, and and Cost imposing as a warning for potential future rebellious states.

Sanctions are a global task that requires a lot of time and effort to work with regional firms, which are often not sufficiently informed of the UN Security Council resolutions containing prohibitions on certain interactions with North Korean structures.

In conditions where the sanctions are stacked and new resolutions of the UN Security Council are unlikely, ahead is a difficult task, first, to work with partners on identifying the distribution/procurement schemes that arise and, secondly, to intensify their implementation through proactive (proactive ( not punitive) interaction with regional diplomacy. Third parties in other countries are often key links that contribute to illegal deliveries.

That is why wide coalitions of vigilant and active partners are needed to ensure the compliance of the prohibitions and the end of lethal weapons between the two ways. Further, the United States should act in conjunction with their allies, especially with the Republic of Korea, and more and more often in tripartite format with Japan.

A recent highest level meeting in Camp dew between US President Joe Biden, South Korean President Yun Suk Jolell and Japan Prime Minister Fumio Kisida is a wonderful start. Among other points in the joint agenda, the Allies could expand the exchange of information, defense and missile defense training. The position of restraint of the Allies should develop according to the development of the threat.

More effective and effective may be the position of restraint by denial rather than restraining by punishment, which will be too expensive as the nuclear arsenal and delivery means in North Korea. Finally, in the long run, this means the emergence of new opportunities aimed at counteracting North Korea's ability for impunity.

This should include, in particular, the improvement of missile defense at the level of the theater of hostilities and at the national level, as well as the modernization of America's nuclear forces. Finally, the United States should expand their strategic thinking in reconnaissance reports and military planning. As Marcus Harlauskas from the Atlantic Council notes in his project, the likelihood of a two -frame conflict Nesuliv and deserves serious consideration and consideration.

Unfortunately, cognitive and organizational prejudices do not allow the United States to recognize these risks and take proper precautions. History shows that North Korea cannot be ignored. The more preparation measures will be taken today, the easier it will be to answer this call tomorrow. Jonathan Corrado is a director of the Non-profit organization The Korea Society located in New York.