There is no strength on Kharkiv and Kiev: why in the summer there will be no offensive of the Russian Federation from the north

With this, the enemy (taking into account the setting of the same time - the beginning of the \ middle of summer) there are obvious and obvious difficulties . . . Moreover, the Russians will have to take into account in their own There are two more actions, if they want "Kyiv in 3 days" again: if you consider more or less real plans and scenarios of such actions of the enemy from the north, I would rather be a language not about Kiev but about Chernihiv.

Probably this plan It would look like… two groups (each-not less than one general military army \ the name, additionally strengthened by 1-2 by motor-rifle divisions \ MSD, or up to 3 separate motorized rifles \ tank brigades) + 2 tactical groups of airborne troops (VAT) According to the airborne division (landing assault), or in the "alternative version"-2 separate landing brigade (ODSBR).

The first is concentrated and unfolding southwest of Gomel (conditionally, the district - Rechitsa - Kholmech - Bragin - Khoynnyk), on the right bank of the Dnipro River. The second - the district - Novozibkov - Klimovo - Churovichi - Polynka, in the territory, actually the Russian Federation (Bryansk region), the first acts on the CEO of Lyubech - Chernihiv, part of the forces towards Slavutych, covering the main forces from the south.

The second - comes through Snovsk and Gorodnya, trying to cut the road of Chernihiv - Sosnitsa. The estimated number of both groups (minimum-80-90 thousand in \ sl, optimal-up to 110-120 thousand). Distribution of forces and means: the first group - 40%, the second - 60%. . . Once again, all this is exclusively specifically. At the moment, all this in reality does not exist-and very "debatically", which will appear at all . . .

It is obvious that the primary stage of such an offensive operation, the command of the enemy will be considered the promotion of their troops in the west and northwestern cities, namely to Kotelva - rolls. But for this, he will need to "take" 2 enough powerful defense nodes - Okhtyrka and Bogodukhov.

There are at least 2 moments that significantly complicate the enemy's achievement of these goals: operating in this direction, the main forces of the Warning, in the form of the 1st Tank Army (and) and the 6th All-Military Army (ID) continue " Brothers Sinkivka "and try to enter the rear and flank of several Ukrainian battalions, which defend themselves on the turn of Ivanivka - Kotlyarivka. And judging from the pace of this offensive, let's say, so, not very successful for the enemy.

Moreover, recent RDCs, LSR and Sibbat raids, although at first glance, they took place in "random" areas and directions in Belgorod and Kursk region. The Russian Federation, however, was far from random. If you put them on the imaginary map of the most likely areas of the prompt deployment of the enemy's offensive groups in hypothetical operations in Sumy or Kharkiv directions, then they will coincide in a "strange" way. For example, Grayvoronsky and Shebekinsky districts of Belgorod region.

are the most convenient in this regard. In other words, Russian volunteers from the Armed Forces "Obnude not from the Baldi" elected the areas and directions of their actions in the Russian territory . . . Thus, we summarize for the first (northern) group of operating areas, where there is, at least, the minimum probability of organizing and conducting the enemy of the operational offensive Operations: To make it clear how difficult it is for the enemy - I will give some figures.

Everything in the "Went", which tries to "actively act" immediately in two operating areas-in Kupyansk and Limansky, approximately 81-82 thousand in \ s \ (this is all together-with rear, headquarters and "wrath-flared brothels "I joke). However, it is without the so -called border cover. And although it is governed by the UV "West", but in particular, it is about 35-36 thousand "carcasses", deployed in 3 regions-Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod.

Moreover, this grouping is partially (ie in individual areas and tactical directions), to put it mildly, not very successful active (implied, offensive) fighting on a segment, about 145-150 km in the southeastern part of Kharkiv and northern part of Lugansk region Ukraine at once of 4 armies (1st, 6th, 20th and 25th), the enemy is forced to stop them from time to time through RDC, LSR and Sibbat in volume WTO \ dozens of fighters in the territory of Kursk and Belgorod region.

As you, dear readers, think how many and what "forces and means" the enemy in such conditions will need to "promptly deploy" in the relevant areas, so that, at least, try only "just hang on the flanks of" Kharkiv city (the second largest size in Ukraine ), where is the depth and scope of operations of tens of kilometers? This is, first.

And secondly-where and where to get them so much (including-their weapons, equipment and preparation, to mention MTZ-starting with the accumulation of appropriate stocks, starting with fuel and ammunition, ending with blood for transfusion in medical, food and form clothes)? And most importantly - how to make it all before the beginning of summer? The author expresses a personal opinion that may not coincide with the editorial position.