4 ways to change the war: what is needed by Ukraine for a fracture on the front

For its part, Europe can support Ukraine at the level of defense, but to the level of counter -offensive and the release of the territories captured by Russia, its ability to MIC has not yet come.

In the context of these events and the formation of a further strategy of action, there are repeated questions as to what can radically affect the situation in the war zone (database) in Ukraine, so that Russian troops lose not only the possibility of initiative of offensive actions, but also in principle - keeping enthusiastic. territories? In total, there are at least four factors that can be radically affected, but mainly comprehensively, not separately.

Artillery continues to play an important role both in the offensive and in defense on both sides. And, unfortunately, the Russian artillery component, despite the shortage of ammunition (in February-March 2022, 70-80 thousand shots per day, in March-April 2024 there are 10 thousand shots per day), has an advantage of 10 by 1/2 Compared to Ukrainian fires.

Yes, the potential of Russia, even with the support of North Korea and Iran, fell almost 8 times in the third year, but the potential of Ukrainian troops decreased exactly by the same amount. Only the restoration of parity by the number of shots can change this situation in favor of Ukraine, and that is why. First, there are high hopes for the Czech initiative of 800,000 shells 155 mm and 122 mm calibers. What is 800 thousand shells? These are 5,000 shots for half a year.

But it should be understood that in addition to 155 mm and 122 mm, SOUs use 152 mm, 125 mm, 120 mm, 115 mm, 105 mm, etc. That is, we can talk about the prospect of approximate parity in the number of one to two or more. Second, quality. The quality, namely the accuracy and range of ammunition, 155-mm is much higher than the Soviet model of ammunition 152 mm. That is, where 10-15 shells of the caliber 152 mm are used to damage the object, 2-3 caliber 155 mm, and sometimes only one.

It is for this reason that Azerbaijan, sharpened on Soviet caliber artillery, goes to 155mm in cooperation with Turkish companies Repkon, MKE and Asfat. Therefore, bringing the proportion to the ratio of one to two and practically for the Russians will be a very sensitive factor for the Russians, which will significantly limit their offensive actions by the predominance of the human and mechanized components.

Tactical aviation of Russian troops today has total dominance in the airspace of Ukraine primarily through impunity use of correlated aviation bombs (CA). This means of the lesion became a rescue circle in the issues of breakthrough of the lines of defense of the Sou and the hacking of the fortifications. In general, the loss of Avdiivka in 2024 was the result of a shortage of BC for artillery and the lack of effective tools for counteracting.

The cabin is a corrected aviation bomb of free fall, which has received its properties by installing universal planning modules and flight correction (UMPC). These modules do not really particularly increase the accuracy of the task with correction, but they allow to plan for 50 and sometimes even 70 km. These modules are used on offab-250/500/1500 bombs, ODAB-500/1500, RBC-500/1500, etc.

Counteering these bombs is three components, namely, aircraft of a large radius (Patriot or SAMP/T), Western fighter sample (F-16) and OTRC, for example, in ATACMS missiles, for the task occupied territories (Crimea). Today, the prospects for obtaining these three ingredients are quite vague for Ukraine. But their simultaneous presence at some point will be able to dramatically change the situation in the airspace and significantly minimize the effect of the booth.

The Kerch Bridge is a major logistics artery that now supplies all the southern grouping of Russian troops in Ukraine. And what is the southern grouping of Russians in Ukraine? These are groups of troops: defense of Crimea - about 13. 5 thousand personnel and 200 units of equipment, including tanks, BBM, artillery systems, etc. ; Dnepr GV - about 130 thousand O/s, not less than 700 tanks, 1900 BBM, 1000 units. of artillery and about 250 units.

RSZV; Vostok GV - receives partial supply through the Kerch Bridge and has up to 52 thousand O/s, up to 400 tanks, about 900 BBM, 400 artisms and not less than 120 CSF. And all this mass must be provided daily with the appropriate MTZ so that it does not lose its combat capability. But in the case of loss of the Kerch Bridge, its functionality will lose the possibility of these troops not only to conduct offensive and assault actions, but also to defense.

Another logistics that could replace and compensate for the volumes supplied through the Kerch Bridge is simply absent in the temporarily occupied south of Ukraine, and therefore the loss of this logistics artery can cause the collapse of the entire system of providing a colossal group throughout the month.

The level of protection of the Kerch Bridge has increased significantly compared to 2022, and therefore the task of the SUU includes a blow to this illegal construction of such force that the consequences are not subject to restoration. Unfortunately, this is a difficult task that includes many variables, but its implementation will significantly affect the situation in the southern operating area in the shortest possible time.

Since December 2023, we could see with you regular spans and arrival of some air facilities in the areas of Russian refinery. Since the beginning of 2024, these blows became systemic, and on January 18, it became known about the effective arrival in the St. Petersburg oil terminal. Then it became apparent that the coverage of Ukrainian strikes in Russia could not only reach, but also exceed the radius of 1 thousand kilometers from the border.

In just two months, systemic strikes on Russian refineries have disrupted most of these enterprises and transit nodes in a thousand -gloter zone from the border with Ukraine, helped to reduce the exports of Russian petroleum products and the emergence of fuel deficiency in a number of regions of the Russian Federation. But the purpose of these blows is much larger.

The ultimate goal of strikes on refinery in Russia is to create a shortage of fuel and lubricants for the Russian troops in the database in Ukraine. In fact, there is nothing to fill tanks, BBM, motor transport, SAU and other military equipment. This is a very difficult goal, but not unrealistic.

In fact, as in 2022, Russian troops felt the first signs of ammunition deficiency for artillery, when the average daily nail lowered from 70-80 thousand to 50 thousand shots and continued to fall to the present 10,000, significantly reducing the offensive opportunities, as well as PMM The offensive actions of the Russians in Ukraine in the future. That is, strokes on the objects of the refinery of Russia are not so much terrifying or economic, but primarily strategic.

And the deficit, in addition, acute PMM deficiency in Russians can lead to a significant decrease in their offensive potential. The above factors in the complex, but not individual may be decisive in the breakdown of the current phase of war. But, as we can see, they all in some sense have some dependence. Some depend on the supply of a certain component (shells, air defense, aviation, OTRK, etc.

) on the international partners of Ukraine, others - on the degree of preparation and weakening of the opponent, the fourth - on the degree of accumulation of their own resource. In any case, Ukraine is now in a state where the advantage over the enemy and the creation of conditions for a fracture of the situation in a number of cases depends primarily on itself, without being an insoluble task. The author expresses a personal opinion that can coincide with the editorial position.