Meaning of summer offensive: why Russia is torn to big cities and why can

Continuing the war, the Russian side stubbornly imitates diplomatic activity. Why is it Russia and what are her plans for the second half of the year? So, meetings on the restored Istanbul negotiating playground started - and this is a real daz. After all, in 2022 we already watched similar events in the same place. If someone does not see similarity, I will explain.

In 2022, when the full -scale invasion of the aggressor into Ukraine began, the Russian side realized very quickly that it was impossible to seize Kiev in 2-3 days, and incredible losses led to the stagnation of the first wave shock group. It was then that it began - we will call it so - the diplomatic operation "Imitation" to create a spare scenario withdrawal from the conflict. But at the same time, the Russian Federation did not stop active fighting. The same situation is similar.

The Russian army is exhausted as ever. It is mostly at the expense of the numerical advantage of personnel, but the classic set of units is no longer discussed. At the same time, Russia is preparing for a large offensive in the summer of 2025. Paradox? Not quite. Russian general plans for the summer offensive campaign are extremely ambitious.

They imply the following goals: first: secondly: thirdly: fourth: fifth: if you look at the common features of the offensive in all directions, it becomes obvious: they are all aimed at going to major cities and fighting for them by autumn and winter. And this is a rational explanation. Russian troops are extremely exhausted in terms of technical support: there are not enough tanks and armored vehicles. Instead of BBM, civilian cars, motorcycles, artillery and FPV are used.

Therefore, the main purpose of the offensive is to break through to the cities for the rainy season and cold, when motorcycles will no longer be used effectively. The task of the Russian Federation is to go to settlements where infantry battles will be held with the support of artillery and drones, which is more convenient in the fall-winter conditions. But there is a logical question: if such plans - why then diplomacy? The diplomatic track is stored in the event of an offensive.

If the task is not completed and the troops remain in the fields in the rain and frost, the aggressor mimics diplomatic activity to offer the "ceasefire" and "peace talks" again. This will allow in the fall-winter: in 2022, before the start of Istanbul talks, the Russian troops were as exhausted as it is now. They began to advance despite the negotiations. After escaping from Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy regions, Russia focused in the east and south.

The negotiations made ultimatic requirements for territories - identical to today's situation. In the summer of 2022, the army of the Russian Federation unsuccessfully came, after which their defense began to fall through a lack of resources. As a result, they were forced to flee from Kharkiv region and the Right Bank of Kherson region. And for stabilization - they declared "partial" mobilization.

The situation is similar again: the summer campaign of 2025 can exhaust resources so much that Russia will have to declare full mobilization. As for the front in the fall-winter, we will not be ordered, but the repetition of the events of the second half of 2022 in any of the directions is quite likely. That is why the events of 2025 are increasingly reminiscent of 2022 - both on the diplomatic and military front.