Why does the France's army prefers quality over quantity?

But at the same time they lack depth and mass to perform large -scale operations for a long time before they just end opportunities. The study caused great resonance in France, where it was picked up by journalists and quoted by national meetings and higher French officers. The report expressed many ideas that the French military themselves tried to formulate, but at the same time, unfortunately, she gave arguments to the critics of the army.

Focus has translated the new text Michael Shurkin, dedicated to the French approach to military construction. The war in Ukraine has only exacerbated this problem. Convention fighting, even in the era of high -precision war and advanced information technologies, still require vast reserves of living power, equipment and ammunition.

Perhaps Ukraine and Russia do not spend their pace comparable to the First World War, but they doubted the idea that highly professional small armies can do without replacing quality by quantity - the idea that led to the reduction of fleet and military warehouses in pursuit Dividends from peace after the Cold War. The old dream that high -precision weapons will need fewer ammunition, nothing more than fantasy.

Given the current reserves, even a few tanks or howitzers are transferring serious problems for the French armed forces. For example, the transfer of Ukraine to Ukraine even 20 LECLERC tanks undermines the potential of the French army, because in France there are only about 200. France has already transferred a significant proportion of its valuable caesar howitzers, with only 70 units, and their replacement is now a serious problem.

In general, the French and European defense industry is generally difficult to even just replace old samples, not to mention the supply of large power structures - hence a long list of customers for the South Korean industry. According to the famous military analyst Michel Goya, the conclusion is obvious: France is unable to cope with even an almost equal opponent. France cannot simply give up expensive new technologies and return to the mass armies of the past.

French President Emmanuel Macron has put forward the idea of ​​a "military economy", but in France everyone agrees that this is not possible for financial and political reasons. In part, the problem is that, for example, the production of howitzers and various managed missile systems in France is extremely insufficient, the increase in production is not easy.

The CAESAR company now produces four units a month, and it is expected that by December production will reach six units a month, and by mid -2024 - eight. Of course, this is progress, but extremely slow. France is also not going to restore tanks. Yes, the new tank is in development-this joint Franco-German product is designed to replace Leclerc and Leopard 2-but its production is planned not earlier than 2035, and this process is almost impossible to accelerate.

You can also assume that the new tank will be much more expensive than Leclerc and Leopard 2. Finally, no one seriously discusses the return to the general military duty that made the mass armies of the last century. So what can France do to find the golden mean between mass and quality? The French government hopes to achieve savings through a special approach to investment in technology.

However, after all, current discussions in French political and military circles show that the country is still committed to the form of war, which has been cherished since 1940. The French approach to the War of High Intensity after the 1940 catastrophe was to prefer maneuver, speed and "boldness" due to masses and firing power.

It was a reaction to the doctrines of the First World War, which were often associated with General Philip Ponhen and contributed to the creation in 1940 of huge numbers and firing power, but cumbersome and inflexible forces, which attacked the rapid and much more maneuverable Wehrmacht.

A new maneuverability approach has found support in the colonial experience of the French army and its expeditionary doctrines, which also encouraged the courage and improvisation in the absence of numbers and resources. This colonial culture has a deep impact on the French army and to this day because of a number of institutional factors and the fact that, as is often repeated by one foreign legion officer, "the army is what it does.

" In recent decades, the French army has been busy with small conflicts in Africa most of the time. Of course, what makes sense in small is much less useful, say, in Donetsk. Historically, however, French military thinking about conflict with the Warsaw bloc reflects the same approach to war, supplemented with French military thinking about the strategic importance of nuclear weapons.

The heavy conscription parts of France, located in Germany, were intended for the protection of France on German land through aggressive blitz cliga maneuvers against much larger and more powerful but irreversible opponents. The French believed that they would never have enough fire power and mass to act differently. For example, the French tanks of the Cold War, including AMX-30, were less protected than the American tanks of the same era: their designers rely on speed and maneuverability.

However, it is very important, the French were expecting a short war. Either the war will be nuclear or it will end without reaching this threshold. Indeed, according to French strategic thinking of the time (see, for example, "Livre Blanc Sur La Défense" in 1972), the meaning of French regular forces in Europe was to be strong enough to harm the opponent, but not so strong to win it. If someone had the need to gather huge strength to defeat the French army, the French would be able to see it.

They could evaluate the intentions of the Warsaw Bloc and understand whether a serious danger to use nuclear weapons. From this it follows that the French planners of the Cold War did not consider it necessary to create large reserves of equipment and ammunition. Instead, France has invested considerable resources in the purchase of final insurance from the invasion - nuclear weapons, as well as the means of its delivery.

Since then, the structure of the French military-air and naval forces reflects this priority rather than the ability to defeat the Soviet military-air and naval forces. They are designed to deliver nuclear warheads and protection of delivery facilities. All other tasks are minor. As a result, there were submarines with nuclear ballistic missiles and first -class combat aircraft, for which nuclear tasks are first in the list of requirements. But all this is due to mass.

In addition to the fact that the money needed to maintain nuclear potential becomes inaccessible to other purposes, France reserves some of its aircraft and ships in case they are needed for nuclear missions that reduce their number for other purposes. The disappearance of huge armored divisions of the Warsaw Treaty and the emergence of high -precision weapons and network wars prompted France to reform their armed forces, making even more emphasis on "boldness" and maneuverability.

In the 1990s, France abolished military service, which, among other things, made all the armed forces "expedition". This meant that improvisation was widespread in the French military culture. The army also declined, which meant that it would have to do more using much less resources.

Finally, high technologies have pushed a number of theorists - primarily General Guy Yuben - to imagine highly decentralized and maneuverable small units that move in several directions and are supported by the logistics "exactly on the term" that doses the necessary stocks. The units receive exactly what they need, where and when they need it - and it is expected that they will need much less than before.

These ideas are now embedded in French mechanized parts, which are equipped with new machines connected to the networks intended for strikes for the right purposes at a precisely intended time. No more massive shelling. There are no more giant supply columns that allow mass fire, such as an endless flow of trucks on the road of life that provided French troops under Verden. The French parts will move quickly, and, according to Juben, "isotropno", that is, not by fixed axes.

In some ways, Juben was right, but like all others, he was overly optimistic about the vitality of this kind of struggle and economy that will give network and high -precision fighting. The war in Ukraine demonstrated that highly intensive conventional fighting was still causing great damage to soldiers and equipment. The armies, even with the most advanced technologies, still burn a huge number of shells, not to mention objects such as cannon barrels.

Indeed, the artillery, as the research emphasizes, remains the Queen of the Field of Battle, despite the Javelins and the high -mobile artillery missile systems. One reason is that in conventional military actions, artillery is often used to block or suppress movements. Not so much accuracy is important here, but a flurry of fire that causes the enemy to press into the ground. The war in Ukraine also questioned the idea of ​​maneuverability in the face of old and good massive fire.

The offensive maneuver is not impossible, but, according to Stephen Biddl, is much more complicated. Given its historical commitment to maneuver, France may be in a better position than Ukraine. But on the other hand, it may not be. No one argues that the French need more. The question is, as far as it is possible, and whether a relatively modest increase is possible due to a politically sound increase in the budget, to make sense.

Some people think about the creation of large but low -technological forces with adequate technologies that would be sufficiently accessible to provide greater mass. Goya, for example, wrote about the desirability of a selective approach to technology that should be invested. The idea is that in many cases it would be perfect to strive for "sufficiency", not of the highest quality to make a lot accessible. For example, it is not the best anti -tank missiles, but more cheap but adequate.

Another example, which is floating in the discussions on the modernization of the French armed forces, is a new NH90 helicopter, designed to replace an outdated Puma helicopter, developed in the 1960s. According to reports, the French army wanted to get something relatively simple and "reliable" for the role of a kind of flying pickup. Instead, they received a complex and complex machine with a high purchase price that is difficult and expensive to service.

The Tiger shock helicopter is also a wonderful but expensive and difficult to operate, which is confirmed by Germany, which hardly supports its tiger park in working order. Goya complains that after the Cold War, the French Armed Forces significantly reduced almost all major weapons systems.

The latest weapons of France, including frigates and howitzers, are wonderful - and, as it points out about RAFALE, their quality compensates for their quality to some extent reducing the number of systems they have replaced. (The French Air Force has about 100 Rafale and about 100 Miraage 2000. The Navy has 42 aircraft). However, again quoting Goyu, "Rafale can do many things and even a long distance, but they cannot be everywhere.

" Many officers would be glad to give up the newer arms armor (Véhicule Blindé de combat d'infanterie, Jaguar and Griffon), in favor of new versions of old, cheaper machines.

Old samples should be written off because they have worn and are more difficult to maintain them in working order, but should they be replaced with high -end and best high -tech devices that can provide the French industry? I spoke with Major General Charles Boduan, who recently resigned and who in 2018 killed technological programs of the French army. It can be considered a person from the team of the army of the future.

Boduen managed the development of several high -tech programs that are now in line, however, with high costs. His arguments are similar to Goya's arguments, although he more clearly rejects the idea of ​​creating low -technological forces and advocates for a combination of high and low technologies, which requires a rigid definition of priorities.

The path to progress, in his opinion, is to create good technologies and accept the idea of ​​having less efficient but "mass" equipment along with equipment that provides an advantage on the battlefield. It is necessary to invest in what is really needed. Caesar is a successful example of how France did. According to Bauduen, the French army invested in the gun itself and did not donate anything in terms of range, frequency and accuracy.

However, as a compensation, the French army decided to be pleased with the installation of a gun on a truck with an armored cabin, not on an armored and tracked platform, as a German PZH 2000. As a result, a gun was much cheaper less important.

Considering the war in Ukraine, Baudouin notes that the Russians preferred investing in certain technologies, especially in those related to counteracting access and denial in the area of ​​lesions, as well as in hypersonic missiles, completely neglecting outdated air, land and marine systems .

Although the choice of Russians can be questioned, it insists that the very idea of ​​selective investment can be a good choice for European forces trying to restore mass by investing in technology. It is about targeting certain key industries that promise to become a turning point.

Selective investment in certain technologies can bring some savings, but the fact remains: France and other European countries will have to spend much more money if they intend to restore something similar to the mass needed. This year, France has undertaken to spend much more money, but this is not enough to restore mass. At the end of January, Macron announced its government's intention to significantly increase France's defense budget.

In his speech, he stressed the need to increase the reserves of France and re -invest in auxiliary military forces - the so -called "tail", which was historically reduced to preserve as many "teeth" as possible. After Macron Goya's speech, he complained that even the restoration of the Armed Forces would absorb all new funds, leaving nothing for growth. The new military planning law, published in April this year, confirms his opinion.

Although it involves € 413 billion expenses over the next five years, the new law does not actually count on the growth of the Armed Forces, although it provides for a significant increase in drones and France's aircraft facilities, as well as an increase in intelligence costs, mine defense and cybernetics. France also seeks to increase its reserve forces. However, the number of brigades will remain the same, and the number of naval and military-air fleets of France will grow insignificantly.

On February 13, the Chief of Staff of the French Army, General Pierre Schill, introduced a group of journalists to his new vision of the further development of the French army. Interestingly, Schilles' answer to the dilemma "Quality Against Mass" is to preserve the current course, mostly due to investment in the ability of the army to do better what it has already been created for - in other words, work on improving its quality.

Schill clearly made it clear that the army would retain its current number, which is 77,000 servicemen suitable for deployment (out of a total number of approximately 120 thousand). He explained that just buy more tanks, howitzers, etc. , there is no point. His idea was to focus on stability and cohesion, allowing the army to cope better with highly intensity fighting at its current size, and ideally have larger reserves so that it could last longer.

It also meant giving up the expeditionary approach and some of its advantages. Шилль порівняв французьку армію з конструктором "Лего". Він зазначив, що армія нерідко на льоту збирає свої детальки у розгорнуті комплекси тих чи інших сил.

Перевагою такої армії була модульність за рахунок складання сил шляхом з'єднання шматочків і частин кількох підрозділів для забезпечення їх специфічними можливостями за необхідності.

Ці можливості, як правило, "дозувалися" в невеликих кількостях, що в більшості випадків сходило з рук через відносно низьку інтенсивність бойових дій, які вела Франція.

Так, наприклад, у 2013 році у складі французького угруповання в Малі було всього чотири CAESAR, оскільки вважалося, що більше не потрібно.

Крім того, оперативні групи розміром з батальйон, які французи розгорнули в Малі, складалися з частин, узятих із численних полків, що входили до складу кількох бригад.

Шилль вважав, що для перемоги у високоінтенсивній боротьбі з рівним за силою противником необхідно кілька речей. Так, підрозділам, які входили в розгорнуті батальйони, необхідна краща підготовка, щоб повною мірою використовувати свої численні можливості.

Це означало меншу кількість формувань, зібраних із безлічі цеглинок, і більшу кількість заздалегідь підготовлених сил із, по суті, органічними можливостями. Крім того, необхідні надійні елементи командування та управління для досягнення більшої узгодженості.

Французька армія, за його словами, матиме таку саму кількість полків і бригад, але вони будуть більш "повними".

Нарешті — і це найсуперечливіша ідея — армія повинна інвестувати набагато більше коштів у певні можливості, яких їй не вистачало або в які вона раніше не вкладалася.

До них належать засоби ППО (включно із захистом від безпілотників), кіберпростір і вогневі засоби великої дальності. З огляду на обмеження на чисельність сил, поява нових можливостей незмінно вимагає скорочення інших.

Тому бойові підрозділи можуть отримати менше бойових машин. Він навів конкретний приклад: деякі з нових бронемашин Serval і Griffon будуть переобладнані в платформи ППО.

Загальна кількість залишиться колишньою, але стане менше машин, призначених для використання за первісним призначенням.

Що стосується масовості, Шилль говорив про подвоєння розміру резервного компонента Франції та створення спеціальних резервних підрозділів — наразі більшість резервістів просто вливаються в наявні підрозділи.

Це був компроміс, який дасть французькій армії деяку масу, але й близько не наближає її до розмірів часів холодної війни і призову.

Деякі критики, такі як Гойя, припустили, що бачення Шилля, підкріплене Законом про військове планування, означало, що Франція у підсумку несерйозно поставилася до війни високої інтенсивності.

Філіп Шапло зауважив, що навіть за умови значного збільшення бюджету французькі збройні сили займаються лише відновленням, але в основі своїй залишаться такими ж, як були.

Справедливіше буде сказати, що Франція вважає справжні масові збройні сили недосяжними в політичному і фінансовому плані, і найкращий варіант — спробувати оптимізувати вже наявну армію, призначену для маневру, а не для грубої сили.

Чи буде це достатньо хорошим рішенням? Відповідь для французького керівництва полягає в тому, щоб повернутися до старого підходу: нібито ядерна зброя усуває необхідність у масовій армії, призначеній для протистояння противнику на кшталт Росії.

Дійсно, новий закон про військове планування підкреслює ключове місце ядерного стримування у французькому стратегічному мисленні.

Франція також припускає, що у своїй боротьбі вона буде не одна, тому Макрон наполягає на розширенні європейської оборони паралельно з серйозною інтеграцією в НАТО.

Є надія, що об'єднані європейські збройні сили зможуть забезпечити масовість, необхідну для ведення конвенційних бойових дій. Франція, схоже, не відступає від наміченого курсу.

Це означає, що у неї будуть висококласні збройні сили, які зможуть танцювати навколо російських військ і добряче їх пошматувати, але ненадовго.

Що станеться потім, найімовірніше, залежатиме від Сполучених Штатів та інших членів НАТО, а також від того, чи доведе ядерне стримування свою спроможність. Майкл Шуркін — старший науковий співробітник Атлантичної ради і директор глобальних програм у 14 North Strategies.