They began to beat more often: how the tactics of rocket strokes of the Russian Federation in the first half of June changed

In early June, the Russians began to make rocket strokes more often in Ukraine. Military observer Alexander Kovalenko analyzes the direction of these blows, rocket nomenclature and trends of Kremlin terror. In the first half of June 2024, Russian occupation troops had already conducted four missile attacks, which in its frequency is significantly different from the indicators of previous months.

Does this indicate that the commission of the roof for blows in Ukraine has chosen a new tactic, or can there be something else that can be the cause of such changes? Let's understand. But first it is worth mentioning what means and in what quantity, as well as how often Russia used in our country in these two weeks. The main blows were made on 1, 7, 12 and 14 June.

If during the previous months, the pause of a week or a half or two was maintained between the attacks, then in June the pause decreased to 2-5 days. According to the nomenclature used means: the largest in number used by the invaders of the means of defeat was a blow on June 1, when only the rocket was used 54, and the drones of Kamikadze Shahd-131/136-47.

For example, on June 7, the enemy launched only five missiles X-101/555/55, and on June 12, the missile component consisted of six means of defeat of different types and one-an unknown type that hit the administrative building and housing development in Kryvyi Rih, and and This has caused numerous victims among civilians. On the night of June 14, a total of 14 rocket means and 17 drones-Kamikadze were used. The main direction for the impact was the Khmelnytsky region - Starokostiantyniv.

Most often rocket terror was experienced by Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv regions, and then Kharkiv and Odesa. And this applies to both single beats and massive/with a limited ammunition. The latter had a strictly defined and unchanging purpose - the defeat of energy and airfields. It is in such blows that the ROVs continue to use the X-47M2 "dagger" missiles, as well as 9m723 ITSCander-M, and they can only be intercepted by anti-aircraft missile systems Patriot and SAMP/T.

That is, any important impact of the occupiers is obligatory strengthened by a rocket component, which in most areas of Ukraine can not be intercepted. And this is not something new in their tactics of striking, in the sense of the command of the moles, objects. The priority of their rocket terror has long been the objects of civil infrastructure, energy and airfields. There is nothing fundamentally new in the tactics of strokes with pauses in a few days.

In 2023 (from the end of April), Russian occupation troops implemented such tactics-having previously accumulated rockets, and then stretching for a few months regular strikes every 2-3 days, but mainly limited ammunition. It is possible that the enemy now sells similar tactics, but in conditions of more problematic accumulation of missiles and taking into account the devastation of warehouses with Soviet reserves.

In particular, the process of production of rockets in Russia has not demonstrated any phenomenal growth and remains at the level of last year's indicators: from all this list, special alertness is caused by CRMB "Caliber", which due to rare use in the moles have accumulated more than X-101/555/55, combined. There are also risks of recovering p-800 Onyx rockets.

But in both cases, these blows from the occupying troops will also not be widespread because of the limited possibilities of use of carriers (in the first case) and a limited number of launches (in the second). That is, if you want to increase the blows, the Russian command should take into account their own production capabilities - they do not have the opportunity to go beyond the limited BC.

Russian occupation troops did not dramatically change the tactics of the task of blows in the territory of Ukraine. In general, in the third year of the war they tested many options for increasing the efficiency of blows due to a breakthrough of air defense of the Air Force of the Armed Forces. They are also unchanged in the categories of objects that are blown, namely: energy infrastructure, aerodromes, civilians/infrastructure.

Even if you consider the option with the release of the occupation troops to the mode of beats with a frequency of 2-5 days, but smaller BC-we have already seen in the spring and summer of 2023, but on a much larger scale. Russia cannot fully catalyze terror against Ukraine because of the limited production and cumulative opportunities, which differ strikingly in 2024 from the period 2022-2023. The author expresses a personal opinion that may not coincide with the editorial position.