Four recent waves of hidden mobilization and propaganda efforts undermine the set of "cannon meat" in the Russian Federation: ISW Estimates

Video of the day, without reducing its risks for Ukraine, in ISW ​​believes that the regime of Vladimir Putin is unlikely to overcome the fundamental structural problems of mobilization. "It is extremely unlikely that the forces formed as a result of such" partial mobilization "will significantly increase the pure combat power of the Russian army in 2022," - said ISW experts. They state that now the primary purpose of the Russian authorities is "delivery of bodies to the battlefield".

While mobilization has a significant effect in the long run, Russia would need to eliminate profound problems in the personnel training system and the army equipment. Here are just some of the problems that ISW analysts indicate: in addition, Putin has already spent at least four attempts in hidden mobilization in the last year - which probably depleted a pool of capable (and want to serve) reservists even before the onset of "partial mobilization", reminiscent of ISW analysts.

These are the waves: the current attempts of protests and resistance to forced mobilization in the Russian Federation also reflect the repetitive and unexpected failures of Putin in the preparation of their population for the Great War, states ISW. “Putin's information failures on this is especially important, since there are neither Ukrainian troops nor NATO troops in Russia, and there is no threat to any invasion of Russia. This is not 1812, 1914 or 1941.

The factors that led to people's mobilization in previous wars with Russia, in this aggressive war, simply absent, at least as Putin had lifted it to his people, ”the experts of the institute conclude. At the same time, they confirm that the forces of the Russian state machine will still be enough for mobilized to be at the front. “The process will be ugly, the quality of the reservists is low, and their motivation for battle is probably even worse.