No more Russian fist - as the Armed Forces managed to stop and scatter the offensive near Pokrovsk

Apparently, the command of the troops (UV) of the enemy "Center" is now concerned about two major problems. The first is how to quickly build up "muscle mass" in the advanced units of the 41st and 2nd general military armies (IDPs), which suffered, so, let's say, significant losses in previous battles? And the second is the further offensive, figuratively speaking, "in all directions immediately" it already begins to have a negative impact on the pace and efficiency of this offensive.

During the last three days in the UV Center Sector, the enemy has only advanced in the strip of the 41st General, on its extreme right flank (the area north of Vozdvizhenko's settlement), in the direction We managed to approach (600-800 meters away). There are units of two motorized rim regiments (SMEs) from "Territorial Troops" (1195 and 1438 SME), and as the main "shock power" put into battle in this direction for the obvious purpose to "break through to the road".

However, they crawl forward, but only at the cost of very significant efforts (a pace of 100-200 meters in 2-3 days). They still had the strength to capture the ram and approach the solution directly. However, numerous attempts to take Elizabeth to expand their tactical wedge to Malynivka both from the side of the Vozdvizhenka and across the Kazenny River from the Sviridonovka farm - have not yet been successful.

Moreover, apparently, in the farm, the farm on the farm of the Vodyane Second Armed Forces even counterattacked and pushed the enemy a little south, to the previously captured enemy Baranivka. As far as I understand, this tactical grouping of the enemy is now trying to expand its "breakthrough" towards the road Pokrovsk-Bakhmut on the flanks to ensure some stability of its wedge-to take Elizabeth and break into Tarasivka and a green field.

However, all this happens very slowly, very expensive the enemy, and so far the effectiveness of all this is very half of this. In the rest of the sectors, in the strips of the 2nd and 41th ID, where he continued intense attacking/assault actions during the last 3 days, he failed to achieve anything significant.

Moreover, according to some circulating information both we and the enemy, in the area of ​​the village of Dachensk (south of Pokrovsk), the advanced units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were able to contradaculate and repel the northeastern part Further, south and southwest.

Meanwhile, enemy forces and means operating in the "direction of the main blow" (NSU) in the Pokrovsk region, during the reporting period continued unsuccessful attempts to step on, in particular: within 3 days these attacks were not success He focused on the main forces of two general military armies.

And even more "strange" is the result that he was able to achieve in more than 2 months of stubborn offensive battles by these, clearly dominant Ukrainian, forces and means after his tactical breakthrough of our defense in the area of ​​Novotroitsky and Shevchenko (Verkhn. ). The depth of protection is from 7. 1 to 7. 5 km, width - 9. 5 - 9. 7 km. Yes, I'm not arguing.

The enemy managed to achieve certain results - he "cut" the road into a borderline and even broke through it, managed to tie the fighting for the beast (about 2 km from Pokrovsk), moved to the Assumption and luck. But it has been over a week as the enemy cannot "move" further. Neither the Assumption, nor the luck, nor the beastly enemy can take.

Thus, in the Uspenivka there are stubborn battles, the advanced units of the enemy are already within the settlement, as in the animal, but they are clearly towed. As a result of all of the above, at the moment, the enemy failed to solve his main task in the Pokrovsky direction - deeply bypass Pokrovsk from the west and cut the road to Pavlograd. As for me, this happened for a number of reasons, but one of them clearly served as a kind of chief trigger for this "semi -resort".

The fact is that the Russian command, deciding to introduce the main forces of the 41st General for NSU, in the lane of the 2nd General, seeking "quickly and effectively" to achieve "decisive advantage in power and means" on a rather narrow area or It has forgotten, or evaluated by minor fact that the advancing from the standing south of Pokrovsk in the northwestern direction by the Russian troops in one way or another will have to face a constantly emerging need to expand the offensive strip not only to the west and northwest of Pokrovsk, but also to the south.

Even southwest. That is, the environment and bypass Pokrovsk is directly related to the need to constantly "push" ahead of the 90th TD, which operates its main forces to the south, in the Novopavlovsky direction, in order to cover the left flank of its shock group. And the "deeper" of Russian troops climb northwest of Pokrovsk, the further and more intensively they need to "push" this division. I cannot say that the Russian command did not understand or did not take into account it.

At least two of his decisions indicate that it was still aware of the "left flank problem" of its shock group, which operates in the Pokrovsky direction.

For example, the transfer of the 90th Panzer Division to the 41st General, which implies a single command and, accordingly, improving the level of command efficiency and management of all troops involved in the implementation of this plan (plan), as well as the level of interaction between them, This is fully confirmed as well as the decision on the obvious two -legged construction of the shock group itself (in the second echelon were at least 2 brigade and 1 regiment), which also provides for the possibility of not only increasing efforts on NSU, but also, if necessary, tossing part of the forces in the same The strip of the 90th TD, that is, on the left flank of the shock group, just indicates that the command of the Russian UV "Center" quite adequately evaluated this problem and allowed this opportunity.

Another thing is that there were "unforeseen circumstances" that actually overwhelmed this understanding. From my point of view, the Russian command was too hurried with the Pokrovsky offensive, which seemed to be able to break into Pokrovsk "from the course" through the "collapse of Ukrainian troops".

The fact is that it would be more appropriate for the enemy to organize and draw an offensive in the Pokrovsky direction after the complete liquidation of the Kurakhivskyi bridgehead of the Armed Forces (including its "remnants") and significant promotion in the Novopavlovsky direction. And in this case, the offensive could be carried out not only "from the south and southwest", but also from the east and southeast.

Moreover, it was possible to attract an additional 2 brigade from the 51st OA (110th and 114th OMSBR), as well as a large part of the 8th name (at least one of its divisions-or 20- TU, or 150th MSD). But at the moment it is definitely impossible. Although the Armed Forces of Ukraine are slowly departing in the Novopavlovskaya direction, they conduct rigid harrows and hammer the above forces and means that the enemy could throw "Pokrovsk".

Moreover, due to the fact that the enemy cannot "quickly and deeply" move in the Novopavlovsky direction, he is forced to use a large part of the 90th TD in the Novopavlovsky direction for the purpose of "constantly pressing" from the north to Ukrainian troops, which They are defended in the "remnants of the Kurakhiv bridgehead", instead of fully concentrating them exclusively on the cover of the left flank of their shock grouping in the Pokrovsky direction.

Therefore, in fact, it is not surprising that the strip of the onset of the 90th Panzer Division is "so wide". As they say, the situation requires this. A fairly intriguing picture emerges. Instead of a focused blow to the southwest and west of Pokrovsk, the impact of the enemy (2nd and 41st hewed) is forced to do it, in fact, unbuttoned fingers (flanks that are constantly "expanding" should be covered and less than 90 forces should be covered -At tank division is clearly lacking).

In addition, the stubborn defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, albeit not quite successful, in the Novopavlovsky direction clearly directly affects the situation near Pokrovsk, where Russian troops, in fact, have to "spread" in the offensive lane, which is increasingly expanding (respectively, the tactical falls. and the operational density of the troops), without significantly changing its combat and numerical composition (BCS) in quantitative terms.

Honestly, I am not surprised at all that in the near future hostile command will take a significant regrouping of their forces and means, at least in the Sector of the Center (and most likely the "Yug"/8th OA). At the moment, the Center includes three all-military armies-the 2nd, 41st and 51st General.

The first two are almost completely involved in operations against the Pokrovsky district of defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and adjacent districts, and the 51st General-in Toretsky, Novopavlovsk and one brigade in the Pokrovsky directions. From a formal point of view of these forces and means, it is sufficient to organize and conduct the Pokrovskaya Storm.

Another question is how to do it (in the sense - where and with what forces), and most importantly - in what sequence? It turns out that both of these issues are important in the planning, organization and management of troops. The appropriate impression when it seems that you can "do everything and immediately", it is enough to stretch your hand to tear the fruit and in this connection, "wide opportunities" open, can play a very evil joke with you.