Logistics, "lanceotes", assault brigades: Hip Rustamzad will about the nuances of the Russian-Ukrainian war

Let's start with the basic: you are the Azerbaijani military, why do you interested in Ukraine, why are you on the side of Ukraine and cover this conflict? Ukraine is fighting for the entire post -Soviet space and at the same time wages the war for identification. Some people compare this conflict with the third world - yes, with some reservations, it can be safely counted in the world wars. Let's only imagine how the post -Soviet space will be reformatted by the consequences of this war.

I am on the side of Ukraine, at the same time trying to be a professional and carefully explore this war. As a military analyst, I got a very rare chance to be involved in war and analyze it. This is a huge experience. Although, of course, I would not like to have him. Recently, the Rusi Institute published a report stating, in particular, that when the Russians were standing near Kiev, the ratio of forces was 12 to 1.

How did it stand? Today, everyone is considering the battle near Kiev as something clear: the Russians are not able to fight, they have bad logistics, defeated and broken. But when we learn the details, it turns out that the situation was on the hair, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation could surround the capital of Ukraine and enter it. They failed. Is your opinion why the Russians were defeated in the north and rejected from Kiev? I consider it incorrect to compare the ratio.

I know dozens of people who went and took the machine. They are not marked anywhere, no formations are involved. Just people with combat experience found machines, found weapons and decided to withstand the invaders. Many of the DRGs, which fought on an initiative basis with the enemy - such folk resistance came out. Not only the army fought. I still believe that yes, the situation was critical, but the stability of the Ukrainian people was a key point.

That is, did the human factor play? The human factor, the consciousness of the Ukrainian people . . . We are all living witnesses - how people were organized in DRG, ordinary citizens, population. I think that there is a set of measures to consider here, because a purely military resource, most likely, Ukraine would not withstand in the Kiev operation.

If it were not for the Terroborons, if it were not for the population of Sumy, Chernihiv, who stood in defense, detained and shake the units of the invaders who broke through the north and east . . . The Kiev operation was a non -standard military operation. Here it is necessary to measure the ratio of forces. The majority of Kiev's population fought, the entire northeast of Ukraine was in war with Russian invaders.

Therefore, the main factor is the Ukrainian people and, by itself, the operational art and the idea of ​​the Kiev operation. The artillery has played very well in this operation. Let's move from spring 2022 to today.

What happens in the winter of 2023? In your opinion, what is the most dangerous now for the Armed Forces, what do you need to pay attention to and keep your hand on the pulse? The fact that this situation is on the front now is partly the consequences of the failure of the supply of ammunition and the weapons that happened after the release of Kherson. Ukraine really was with insufficient ammunition for artillery.

There are many reasons for this, which of them is true, or which are true, I think we will find out later. But for the most part, the exit of the Ukrainian army from Soledar was a tactical failure. At the same time, the promotion of these positions is extremely small. This is not even a tactical operation, I do not know, in the textbooks, where it is how to capture streets or villages, I did not meet this level of operations.

That is, in your opinion, you could not lose Soledar, was it possible to keep it? There is another reason. For some reason, they did not have time to saturate the troops with a sufficient amount of human resource, and probably there were mistakes of the operative-tactical level. Because to defend the city . . . We are both military people with you and understand that to defend the city is not a problem, even much less forces.

But here's what I see: the offensive just chokes from the information noise on the air. From considerations: whether tanks, or not give, from comparisons - Leopard, Abrams . . . But the conversation that the Ukrainian army was needed on the battlefield right now has disappeared. And this is felt-that in the Ukrainian army, few large-caliber machine guns, mortars in combat order of 60-mm, 80-mm and above.

This allows the Russian army to use the tactics of small assault groups and to push the necessary places in the small sections of the front. Purposefully pressing in one place or the other, they break the integrity of defense, and it becomes vulnerable to operations of both tactical and operative levels. I think the current situation is explained by the fact that the Russian Federation has decided to use the tactics of thousands of bites.

Further advancement creates the risk of Bakhmut's operational environment. And in the event of success, the Russian army will be able to reach the city of Siversk. However, there is one "but" - infozum. Many talk about the great Russian offensive, some scary things. It is not true. I believe that the Russian army lacks armored vehicles, lacking infantry. In Russia, "on the side", we can say, 15-20 thousand personnel.

There are no shock groups that would operate operational or strategic levels and in the long run. The Russian army has neither shock group nor specially selected artillery systems so that they can perform operations of operational or strategic level. And plus, there is little time in the Russian Armed Forces. Because 2-6 weeks, and we will get spring off-road. In such circumstances, it is not easy to step.

I think it is a war on exhaustion, and the Russian Federation does not make sense to raise the rate. The fact that the fighting is now, the Russian Federation is satisfied. They also do not want to overstretch their economic and military opportunities.

If you have already said about the lack of equipment on the front and weapons from Ukrainian fighters, then we remember the words of Zaluzhny in his interview The Economist, where he marked his vision, in particular about the quantity of equipment required for one operation. He said there literally: "I apologize to those who are at the front, but new equipment should come to the reserve parts and crews, not the front.

" How can this be interpreted? How to hear a fighter in the trenches under Bakhmut? Yes, the Commander -in -Chief Asks, but it does not make it easier when these live waves "Z". What we hear - 300 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles are all for the formation of mobilized, which were trained in NATO countries and studied according to their standards. They will be given NATO technique. These are 2-3 army buildings, such a steel fist that will break the enemy's defense.

But we also see that the artillery, shells and advanced troops that are on the defense line outside this configuration. They will also leave some of the weapons. What can you say about the threat of Russian drones-Kamikadze "Lancet" that hunt for Ukrainian weapons? Both sides, while in active defense, decided to bet on drones-Kamikadze. And now the Russian army is more successful. Their drones-Kamikadze "Lancet" literally staged hunting for artillery systems.

This is unacceptable that three American howitzers are destroyed in one day in one day. Ukraine collided with drone attacks about 5-6 months ago. And, as we know, anti-aircraft guns and machine guns proved to be very highly effective in the fight against Drone-Kamikadze. Why are the positions of artillery battery not covered by anti -aircraft machine guns? Lancet is not the best Dron Kamikadze. He dives at a small angle and at low speed. It is not so difficult to destroy this integer.

More advanced dives with large angles and at high speed. Here they are really difficult to knock them down. And what did the Russians do? They began to increase the number of drones-Kamikadze. They pulled out of their warehouses the old traces of MT-LB, put old ship's anti-aircraft machine guns and created air-friendly air defense. The Ukrainian army has no saturation with Kamikadze drones, and plus the dome of air defense of near action on its positions.

Unfortunately, over the last three months, the Russian command has demonstrated more flexible operational art than Ukrainian. How else can you fight "lancets" - except for those batteries that need to be covered with small -scale systems? The best remedy, until the laser systems have reached such power and the result that the anti -aircraft artillery gives, and the most economical and more efficient means of driving drones is, of course, anti -aircraft machine guns.

Radio-electronic fighting systems are effective against commercial low-level drones. Battle drones-Kamikadze have a control system that is susceptible to radio electronic struggle. Therefore, anti -aircraft artillery and guns are exactly the same. I would say that the most before the beginning of the spring-summer offensive operation, Ukraine needed Gepard, which very effectively pronounced themselves against the drones and against the winged missiles.

With some moment since the beginning of the war, I see a mismatch between the fact that the Ukrainian army is needed and the fact that the military-political leadership of Ukraine wants. Let's remember: the beginning of the Kiev operation, when the Ukrainian army demanded tanks and planes, and the Armed Forces ended with artillery shells and guns. At that time, they needed a lot of artillery, many guns.

Ukraine has a strategic defense operation - why tanks, why not aircraft, when you do not have an air advantage? I think that Ukraine needs to be more weighed, closer to coordinate and demand a specific solution to specific problems rather than exacerbate tanks or any other weapons. We know that there is no greatwaff. Concepts are fighting, fighting the complex use of troops, forces and means.

Without protection, these Leopard will be released - and in an hour of battle for half a hundred Leopard will no longer be burned. As the Ukrainian army with the help of Javelin burned the best Russian tanks. You mentioned that spring off-road is approaching, but at the same time officials in the West, in Ukraine, and all the observers say that the next two to three months will be decisive. Why? You know, I cut my ear in two words: "analogue" and "decisive".

Igal, who decided to release the Kherson region during this war? What changed in the fate of this war a very successful Kharkiv operation? It's a war for exhaustion. There will be downs and ascents. The strategic operation of the Ukrainian army may play a role, which, say, will release the whole south and Crimea. That's something that can change during the war. And two tired armies with a lack of military equipment and ammunition, what can they solve? Nothing. Therefore, the word "decisive" is cut.

At the same time, civilians who understand nothing in these cases are so often. That is, these are political statements that have nothing to do with reality? No, absolutely. In this war, something at a strategic level may become decisive, which will force the Russian army and the state to resort to the de -escalation of the war. To switch to a low intensity conflict, which was from 2014 to 2022 with different options. Or go to some intermediate negotiation process. There is no other.

Initially, one side has accumulated resources and conducted some operation, then the Ukrainian army awaits 6 months for resources to hold its dynamics. The current dynamics and approach of Western partners and the exhausted opportunities of the Russian army do not allow you to do something that will change the war dramatically. Can Crimea be a dramatic change? May be.

But how to perform this operation? In your opinion, what is minimal to Ukraine to begin the release of Crimea? What the authorities announced. These are not only tanks, but also Himars, artillery and small tactical operational missiles.

In order for the Ukrainian army to enter the Crimea, I think you need at least 5-10 million artillery shells, but where are they? Do you agree with me - is a strategic operation, cleanse the whole south and all Crimea? It's about at least 5 million artsnamers of all calibers where these ammunition? There is a great conventional war. The third generation war, when artillery systems and tank units are fighting, and neither party is able to reach the next level.

If NATO thinks that it is necessary to move to the fourth generation war, where they will fight high -precision systems, then yes, Okay. But where are these high -precision systems? Remember how many HIMARS were handed over to us. According to my data, no more than 40 pieces, and in recent months we simply see that Himars is used because of the disadvantages of ammunition.

That is, the desire, the ability of Western partners to set a goal - in the future six months, Ukraine should reach the borders of 1991. The event has no such purpose. Due to the scale of the war with hundreds of thousands of total losses in the Ukrainian army, younger officers who are on the battlefield can take out. How to resolve the issue of shortage with younger officers? This is a problem of all protracted wars.

It happens that only 20-30% of people who are beginning to fight are living until the end of the war of this type. The losses are enormous, the Russian Federation faced, they put literate soldiers and sergeants in leading positions. Ukraine has even better positions in this case, because there were many people at first in Ukraine who fought from 2014 to 2022.

I think that it is necessary to take competent sergeants or even ordinary fighters, but with higher education, systemic thinking, and in 2-3 months to give them a base: skills to control a platoon, control the mouth. Of course, it was necessary to think about this 5-6 months ago and to create a reserve of junior and middle officers. This is a problem solved, you just need to think and work on ahead.

If the General Staff thinks about where to take the commanders in the summer or in the fall, then now need to resolve the issue? Of course. The best professionals, sergeants, soldiers and junior commanders are organized, at least 3-4 months. During this time, you can teach a person. Ukraine has announced the creation of 8 assault Guards brigades under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, not the Ministry of Defense. They will be armed with artillery and heavy equipment.

What do you think is not under the wing of the Ministry of Defense? Why is it within the police structure and how effective it can be? It is necessary to separate military operations from special operations. Cities with the population are not whole for the army.

Here, let's say, the Crimean operation will begin: why should the Ukrainian army enter, for example, to Simferopol? The Ukrainian army should take control of the Crimean Air Force, destroy the connection with the mainland Russian Federation, and take control of the peninsula. But already force operations, special operations in cities, it is advisable to conduct structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Artillery, BMP and, say, tanks are needed just in case.

Suppose that in Donetsk it may be that some of the people who fought will dress in civilian clothes, decide to get up and go to guerrilla actions. This is what the assault brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are required. In the settlement, the army against the guerrillas is ineffective. It performs completely different tasks. I think that relevant units with such logistics hell as the Armed Forces are created in advance. Poland can help. Let's talk about logistics.

In many ways, Ukraine has managed to overcome the Russian Federation in logistics due to the large -scale volunteer movement. But it cannot last forever, the army must resolve these issues.

How do you see this situation and how to reformat or change the logistics of the Armed Forces in the long run? What to do with volunteers - integrate into the army in the form of a civilian corps or removed? I think that in a very short time you can mobilize people who participated in administrative and logistics companies and apply their skills.

This is a local movement that will provide the drones of some unit, but it is that new units need to be created to enhance the logistics capabilities of the army in the rear service and in the rear units. For the directions where the war goes, let's say, now hot in the eastern operating direction - two special -battalions. And they will need to focus on problem areas. You wrote about it, and we understand it all that the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces.

There was no such variety of systems and calibers in the world, no one fought so many different types of weapons. This gives rise to enormous difficulties for logistics, respectively, you need to create structures - semi -civil or semi -war. Let's say the battalion, and in its composition: a platoon engaged in artillery, a platoon responsible for repairing tanks. At the same time, the battalion reports to command, but has feedback with the troops.

Here is an example in Bakhmut, when, due to misunderstanding or something else, the units fell to 30%. In order to avoid a military bureaucracy, these units must have a direct connection and, of course, coordinate through higher organizations. In the case of a strict shortage of time, commanders can have time to process information. For example, gaps appear due to the loss of any control chains.

А ось така "цивільна" компанія з вертикальною та горизонтальною системами управління зможе забезпечувати підрозділи. Це працюватиме. Я думав про це. До речі, в ізраїльській армії штаби батальйону — це величезний монстр.

Ціла рота із 200 осіб, де є підрозділи, що займаються автомобілями, боєприпасами, ремонтом озброєнь. Ізраїль зараз дійшов уніфікації, але свого часу, у 50-60-ті роки, там теж був "зоопарк": і танки, і калібри, і озброєння, від Mauzer до танків Sherman, Centurion, AMX, трофейні Т-55. Т-72.

Тоді також був логістичний хаос. Сьогодні в Ізраїлі згадують про це з жахом. Я думаю, що тут треба буде попрацювати із Польщею. В Ізраїлі це було давно, окрім того, Ізраїль — невелика держава, проблеми відстані не існує. А ось польська модель якраз буде актуальною.

У них на озброєнні лише танків 5 або 6 типів. Як вони вирішують ці проблеми? Я гадаю, що польський досвід Україні більше підходить. У чому зараз головна проблема української армії? Я відчуваю, що Україна має проблеми з гнучкістю.

Проблеми з інтеграцією нового способу ведення бойових процесів. Ця війна поставила стільки завдань, скільки жодна армія у світі не вирішувала. Перевчуватися, і переозброюватися, коли перед тобою такий сильний противник… Ні, я дуже неохоче критикую українську армію.

З такими проблемами ніхто у світі не стикався. У другій частині інтерв'ю редактор військової рубрики Фокусу Ігаль Левін та азербайджанський військовий аналітик Агіль Рустамзаде обговорять новий повномасштабний наступ, потенційний розвал Росії, а також іранську загрозу.