Terroboron against drones: How to use TRi at a new stage of war

In 2022 we started as follows: units of the Armed Forces, which were almost 100% of motivated civilian volunteers - soldiers, sergeants and junior officers (with the exception of the level of command of battalions and brigades, which were also formed from the mainly motivated personnel officers of the Armed Forces or power.

They were formed on a territorial basis, from the inhabitants of their communities, districts, and therefore were most closely united with the people and relied on supporting local volunteers and local self -government, and this support is still continued.

They acquired combat capacity, taught personnel and received the necessary combat equipment (thermal imagers, drones, HRB) and even weapons more often thanks to their initiative, volunteer assistance, rather than appropriate actions and providing higher command. And it has not changed much so far.

What happened next and what is now: a completely justified decision to participate in the fighting on the front line, because the main land units of the Armed Forces needed support in full -scale aggression. It is not easy to test with combat actions in the status of "supplied" units, subordinated to the Armed Forces Land Brigades.

It was inevitable, so the TRO command at the level of brigades mostly did not have the necessary forces, means and real combat experience to keep the defense strips on their own. And it was not easy, because the "dowry", as a rule, did not cherish and often cut difficult tasks, which led to significant losses.

The actual abrasion of most personnel of battalions TROs, as a result of more than 2-year failure to restore them for the restoration and lack of a system of qualitative replenishment of their personnel, in particular from among the inhabitants of their territories (in fact, the three units are always the last in the queue for replenishment).

Due to the lack of timely replenishment and restoration, there was a decrease in the unit of units developed for 2022-23, which provides the result on the battlefield and can transfer combat experience to the recruits. For the above reasons, as well as through the search for professional growth and greater monetary reward, in 2024-25, the outflow of promising personnel from the TRI units into more dynamic units of the Armed Forces, for example, forces of unmanned systems, increased.

What do we need? As of now, battalions and Troy battalions and brigades are capable of performing tasks in defense on the battlefield are little different from the departments of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces, with the exception of the presence of mechanized means that have not appeared in the TRO and the use of which is currently limited on the battlefield.

Therefore, the existence of the forces in the existing present format as separate from the land of the genus of troops, with a separate command, especially after the introduction of the corps system, no longer looks advisable and can give not only the pros, but also the disadvantages associated with duplication of management and providing on a residual principle.

Yet the TRO forces, which will perform certain tasks from defense at the territorial level, using the advantage of knowledge of their territory and communication with local communities, Ukraine needs. At present, priority is the air defense, the protection of our rear, the objects of critical infrastructure, from "Shahmed" and other drones of the enemy. This challenge is urgently relevant and obvious that the Armed Forces does not have enough strength and means to perform this work.