Hard to silence: Why do Russians put Starlink on "Shahaned" and what to do with that the Armed Forces

The satellite communication will help the Russians to receive valuable information, including video, and traditional reb methods do not interfere with it, experts say. On the night of September 25, the defense forces were knocked down by the Russian shock drone Shahd-136, equipped with the SpaceX satellite communication terminal. The focus understood the advantages of such equipment to the Russians and what it can be overcome.

The Defense Express has released photos of a whipped Shahaneda, derived from its own sources, probably military. They can see a rectangular Starlink antenna and serial numbers on it. According to the Ukrainian military consultant Sergey Beskrestnov (Flash) in his Telegram-channel, the Russians are not experimenting for the first time with Shahaneda communications for the first time.

Previously, they already installed on these shock drones of LTE modems with Ukrainian SIM cards (mobile communications) and the Iridium (satellite) modem. "There are no reasons for excitement, but we have already taken the case in the work," the expert assured. In conversation with focus Igor Krynychko, the chairman of the Skyssist Supervisory Board, which produces Sirko drones, explained that satellite communication can be used to transmit any information.

It can be transmission of telemetry (measuring means of different indicators such as height), video and more. "What our fighters have found such a thing is not pleasing. It is difficult to suppress the Starlink satellite communication with the modern Reb. Certainly, these things complicate our military work," Igor Krynychko said. At the same time, Starlink on board "Shahaned" can help to knock down these drones.

The fact is that the satellite modules when transmitted data emit specific signals that can be seen and even suppressed. Because of this, the Ukrainian soldiers in 2022 shielded the Starlink antennas in various ways, so that the radiation was directed only upwards to the satellites. For example, put in the pits about a meter deep or enclosed with metal nets. "But radiation still is, and if such a device is flying, our radio intelligence should see it.

In fact, the question is more in the interception To calculate any radio point with the help of triangulation and to obtain the coordinates of the source of the signal. It is very difficult to prevent Starlink with the work of the EW, although it is possible to spin or replace the GPS signals required for its operation.

At the beginning of 2023, Sergei Beskrestnov conducted research in this direction and concluded that the classic methods of radio electronic struggle were not enough, but the terminals are vulnerable to the attacks from above, for this, the Russians may use Orlan drones with appropriate equipment on board.

In this case, not radio interruptions are dangerous, but "purpleding", that is, the replacement of GPS coordinates - in this case, the synchronization of the terminal with the satellite is violated. Igor Krynichko suggested that the suppression of the receiving antenna Starlink on Shahaneda could work, but it is necessary to attack from the air, and technically it is difficult, although it is quite possible.

Serhiy Gerasimyuk, founder of the enterprise "Antidron Ukraine", which produces the means of the ERB, has confirmed this opportunity. According to him, "Shahda" is found to be aircraft radar, and there are already appropriate components to suppress Starlink communication in the market. However, the capacity of such modules is only 5 watts at a price of about $ 3,000.

"This was already used by the enemy, in particular in the Kharkiv direction, when our troops on the line of collision disappeared the signal Starlink. But in this case, the use, roughly speaking, linear, parallel to the earth's surface. The question is whether it is possible to suppress the similar Starlink terminal when trying To create obstacles from the lower hemisphere without the ability to "illuminate" the most active phased antenna lattice (AFFA).

If practice shows that this method works, then it should be understood that point suppression is similar to the suppression of GNSS-signals of navigation makes no sense, because "Shahaned" in a minute will already come out of the obstacle area, since the remedies are static and the drone moves from quite a high speed. That is, this method requires a whole network of "gluthers" located on the UAV route. "Given the high price and low power is unrealistic budgets.

We have been creating a national cover system for a year, which is ten times cheaper relative to the area of ​​coating and cost. That is, theoretically possible, but is practically and financially profitable? I don't even think. I can even assume. that coating of a similar area even with kinetic means of lesions (air defense, mobile calculations with portable anti -aircraft agents such as Stinger, etc.

) can be cheaper, and therefore more efficient and more appropriate, " - says Sergey Gerasimyuk. It would seem that Ukraine has access to Starlink, so it should have long been to put these communication systems on their shock and intelligence drones. But it's not that simple. Modern antennas themselves weigh from 1 to 3 kg depending on the model, which already requires a large runway and the appropriate size.

It is not so scary for multi -digiters, there are cases where Ukrainians have been used on the forefront of large "bombers" from Starlink on board, but for aircraft it is a fairly great obstacle. SpaceX satellite communication does not help during operations in Russia, as simply does not work there. This problem is acutely felt in the Kursk region by Ukrainian military with which focus communicated.

Do not forget about the powerful remedies of the HRs that operate on the enemy's land, because of them it is impossible to use intelligence copters such as Mavic. Farless planes, such as "Sirko," become useful here. According to the head of the manufacturer Igor Krynichko, these small devices are adapted for work without satellite GPS navigation and in the conditions of powerful suppression of radio communication. Sulfur complexes have their own control station, which is up to 30 km.

The control is protected by the automatic system of pseudo -collapse of the operating frequency (PPRC), which itself "jumps" on free channels. Skyassist also has its own software, which gives additional controls under the action of enemy HPs. If the interference is so dense and powerful that they break through this protection, then the drone flies further on the autopilot, guided by the inertial navigation system.